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Providing Pensions for U.K. Employees with Varied 
Working Lives 
Deborah R. Cooper* 
Abstract 
Several different working lives are investigated, including employees with 
breaks in employment, part-time employment, and temporary employment. 
The pensions that could be provided to the different employees by final salary, 
revalued career average, or money purchase pension schemes (plans) are calcu-
lated and compared. Some of the weaknesses in a final salary pension scheme 
(the treatment of deferred pensioners and cross subsidies between different 
groups of member) are considered. Possible alternative benefit structures are 
considered to address the problems. 
Key words and phrases: pension scheme, defined benefit, final salary, revalued 
career average, money purchase 
1 Introduction 
Most occupational pension schemes l in the U.K. are defined ben-
efit final salary schemes (GAD, 1991). Such schemes aim to provide 
a penSion at retirement based on years of service completed with the 
sponsoring employer and salary received in the years immediately pre-
ceding retirement. Occupational pension schemes were introduced to 
meet the different needs of employers and employees: employers want 
* Deborah Cooper, Ph.D., F.LA., is a lecturer in actuarial science at the City University, 
England. She joined the university after working for the Government Actuary's Depart-
ment and for W.M. Mercer. Dr. Cooper has a B.Sc. in mathematics from the University of 
London and a Ph.D. in mathematics (functional analysis) from the University of Wales. 
She is a Fellow of the Institute of Actuaries. 
Dr. Cooper's address is: Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics, City 
University, Northampton Square, London, ECIV OHB, ENGLAND. Internet address: 
D.R.Cooper@City.ac.uk 
1 Pension schemes are called pension plans in the U.S. 
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a tax-efficient and paternalistic means of controlling their workforce, 
and employees want a secure pension in retirement that bears some re-
lation to the income they had received while working (Hannah, 1986). In 
the past employees were expected to stay with one employer through-
out most of their working lifetime. Consequently, pension schemes 
were designed with retirement in mind, often giving no entitlement to 
benefit on early withdrawal. 
1.1 Early Withdrawal Benefits 
The benefits occupational pension schemes provide for early with-
drawals have improved considerably since pension schemes were intro-
duced. In the private sector the change has arisen largely as a result 
of legislation. In the U.K. early withdrawals (with more than two years' 
qualifying service2) now can expect a deferred pension increasing be-
tween the time of withdrawal and retirement at 5 percent per annum or 
the rate of increase in the retail prices index over this period, whichever 
is less. The value of the early withdrawal benefit, however, is still likely 
to be less than the reserve that would normally be held for an equivalent 
member remaining in the scheme. The difference between the value of 
the withdrawal and staying benefits can reduce job mobility. 
Because individuals who leave money purchase pension schemes 
receive the full value of the reserve held (ignoring any surrender penal-
ties), money purchase pension schemes are considered to be more port-
able. The withdrawal benefit now provided by final salary pension 
schemes is a substantial improvement over what was available 20 years 
ago;3 it is also better than what is available in many other countries 
with occupational pension schemes (FEE, 1995). Final salary pension 
schemes therefore have made a significant effort to rectify a major 
weakness in their retirement benefit provisions; at the same time they 
often have improved the level of other benefits that they offer. 
1.2 Final Salary Pension Schemes 
Many pension schemes are designed with the view of providing a 
target benefit which usually is expressed in terms of an indiVidual's 
annual salary immediately before retirement, i.e., final salary. Final 
salary pension schemes frequently are criticized for the benefits they 
2Qualifying service is service that contributes toward the pension that will be paid 
from the scheme, which may include deferred benefits. 
3Prior to 1978 members of occupational pension schemes had no statutory right to 
a withdrawal benefit. 
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provide to certain types of employees, in particular for the cross sub-
sidies that exist between various categories of members. (For example, 
see Disney, 1995.) Despite their apparent faults, however, they make an 
increasingly important contribution to the income of pensioners (John-
son and Stears, 1995). It is necessary to understand the Significance of 
the problems in their design and to discover whether it is possible to 
amend them. 
For those persons who do not have a substantial period of contin-
uous service with one employer up to retirement, final salary pension 
schemes may not provide the best option. For these persons money 
purchase provision may offer better value for money. Value for money, 
however, is a difficult concept to judge. For example, money purchase 
pension schemes may offer employees a better rate of investment re-
turn than a defined benefit pension scheme (Disney, 1995), but they 
also carry the possibility of a worse return. 
In a defined benefit pension scheme the investment risk largely is 
carried by the sponsoring employer. In a money purchase pension 
scheme, however, the plan participant takes the risk. This makes money 
purchase pension schemes more or less attractive according to the indi-
vidual concerned's attitude toward risk. Similarly, there may be greater 
flexibility within a money purchase pension scheme. For example, an 
individual member of a money purchase pension scheme normally will 
be able to choose which benefits the scheme should provide and to se-
lect a retirement age. Taking advantage of the fleXibility, however, is 
likely to make the pension scheme more expensive. 
1.3 Objectives 
Because of the changing nature of employment [with much new em-
ployment being of the temporary or part-time variety (CSO, 1996)], it is 
important to consider the impact of changing workplace dynamics on 
the accumulation of pension benefits. This paper examines the pension 
benefits provided by different types of U.K. pension schemes to persons 
with different working lives and compares them with the benefits pro-
vided by a final salary pension scheme. Several categories of working 
lifetimes are defined,4 and the retirement benefits accrued in the dif-
ferent pension schemes by each category are calculated and compared 
under various scenarios. Though the arguments put forward in this 
paper are based in the situation in the U.K., the problem of providing 
4 Appendix 1 defines terms which may not transcend international boundaries. 
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pensions for employees with different working histories is not unique 
to the U.K., and the paper's conclusions can be applied more generally. 
Final salary pension schemes are not risk free for all members. For 
early withdrawals there is the risk that they may be unable to achieve 
an adequate final salary pension because of the incomplete portability 
offered by final salary pension schemes compared to money purchase 
pension schemes. The paper attempts to quantify this risk. 
A profound concern in performing this type of comparison is that 
less than 50 percent of the workforce in the U.K. has occupational pen-
sion schemes available to them (GAD, 1991). The past 15 years in the 
U.K. (and in many other industrialized countries) have seen a shift in 
the nature of employment from permanent full-time jobs to part-time 
and temporary work (CSO, 1992; Polivka, 1996). In the European Union 
there are approximately 14 million part-time and 10 million temporary 
workers. Table 1 shows the position of the U.K. 
Those with part-time or temporary jobs are least likely to have access 
to occupational pension schemes, even when such pension schemes are 
provided by their employers (GAD, 1991; Hipple and Stewart, 1996). 
Even when they are available, final salary pension schemes are con-
sidered to provide poor value for money. Those companies that offer 
pension schemes to their full-time employees but exclude part-time or 
temporary employees frequently use this argument, together with con-
cerns about administrative costs, to justify exclusion. 
Table 1 
Temporary and Part-Time Workers. 
In Great Britain (Excluding Northern Ireland) 
As a Percentage of All Employees 
Temporary Work Part-Time Work 
Males 4.0% 
Females 7.8% 
Total 6.0% 
6.0% 
8.0% 
6.9% 
4.3% 
80.1% 
26.3% 
Source: Social Trends, Volrunes 17, 25, and 27. 
7.8% 
85.7% 
32.9% 
State pension schemes have been ignored throughout the paper for 
the sake of SimpliCity. 
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2 Varied Working Lives 
2.1 Definitions of Varied Working Lives 
Defined benefit pension schemes have developed assuming that the 
average employee will have a long period of full-time employment with 
one employer until retirement. This type of employee is becoming less 
common in today's workforce. Other patterns of employment are in-
creasingly likely to be the norm. 
We will consider examples of different working lifetimes and will 
look at the benefits possible under different pension arrangements. 
These examples will encompass persons employed part time; persons 
who are made redundant and who mayor may not return to work; per-
sons who take time from paid employment to look after children or 
other dependents; persons who change jobs frequently; and persons 
who change the hours they work. The six basic categories of working 
lifetimes have been taken from Davies and Ward's pamphlet for the 
Equal Opportunities Commission (Davies and Ward, 1992). They are: 
• No Breaks (that is, in paid full-time employment throughout the 
working life); 
• Break and Part-Time (that is, having time away from full-time paid 
employment and then returning to part-time employment); 
• Break and Full-Time (that is, having time away from full-time paid 
employment and then returning to full-time employment); 
• Break and Mixed (that is, having time away from full-time paid 
employment and, having returned to employment, experiencing a 
mixture of part-time and full-time employment) ; 
• Late Break (that is, taking a break from full-time employment rel-
atively late in life) ; 
• Late Start (that is, starting paid employment later than assumed 
for the other classes of employee) 
These categories were designed primarily to consider the working 
patterns of women who took time away from paid employment to care 
for children (for example, break and part-time) or elderly relatives (for 
example, late break). With little adaptation they can be used to consider 
the working lifetimes of employees (both male and female) who have 
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been made redundant and not been able to find replacement employ-
ment or who have only been able to find short-term or temporary em-
ployment. To make the calculations more comprehensive and to deal 
with these alternatives, some extra histories have been considered. The 
considerations result in a total of eleven categories. For example, vari-
ations of late break are conSidered, where the break is either short or 
long. Finally, a cyclical working pattern has been included to portray 
the experience of many semi-skilled and low-skilled workers whose op-
portunities for employment tend to vary according to the economic 
cycle. 
Additional calculations have been performed for employees who 
change jobs regularly throughout their working lifetimes, but are al-
ways assumed to be in employment. The labor markets in the U.K. and 
the U.S. appear to be characterized by high turnover at young ages and 
increasing tenure as employees age. Some figures are given in Tables 
2 and 3. In the U.K. the average tenure has not changed significantly 
over the past ten years (CSO, 1997); in the U.S. there is some debate 
about whether average job tenures are falling (Farber, 1995; Swinner-
ton and Wial, 1995). It is estimated that the probability of an employee 
in the U.S. remaining in paid employment for longer that four years is 
approximately 50 percent (Swinnerton and Wial, 1995). 
Table 2 
Average Job Tenure in the U.K. 
1986 1996 
Males 9.4 years 
Females 6.5 years 
Table 3 
8.9 years 
7.1 years 
Median Job Tenure in U.S. 
Age 1993 
25-34 3.2 years 
35-44 5.8 years 
45-54 9.5 years 
55-64 12.4 years 
Periods of job security increase with age, which is to the relative 
advantage of a final salary scheme because the value of these schemes 
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is weighted toward employment close to retirement age. In contrast, the 
value of money purchase schemes is weighted toward employment at 
younger ages. Full details of the assumptions made about the different 
categories of employment are given in Appendix 2. 
2.2 Measuring Benefits for Different Categories of Employ-
ment 
A difficulty in dealing with diverse groups of persons is finding a 
standard of comparison for the benefits provided by the different pen-
sion schemes that is appropriate for all concerned. There are several 
possible choices of benchmark, each one with certain advantages and 
disadvantages. Two used in this paper are described below. 
2.2.1 Total Service Pension 
One measure to use as a benchmark is the pension that could be 
provided from a final salary pension scheme, had all of the employee's 
service been completed in consecutive years, in a pension scheme that 
does not distinguish part-time and full-time service. This is called the 
total service penSion. 
The total service pension is, arguably, the best pension a final salary 
pension scheme can be expected to provide: it ignores breaks in service 
as well as changes in type of employment. It does not compensate part-
time employees and those taking breaks from employment for the lower 
rates of salary growth assumed (see Section 4.3.3) and the shorter time 
spent in paid employment; as expected, these employees do not have a 
direct opportunity to recoup the earnings they have lost. 
2.2.2 Final Salary 
For final salary pension schemes, there is a choice of which final 
salary to use.s If we choose the final basic salary of the individual 
concerned, it becomes difficult to make comparisons across the board. 
There is also an additional problem: for some groups final salary may 
have been earned several years prior to retirement, while for others it 
may not be an annual rate. On the other hand, if a comparison is made 
sCommon definitions of final salary in the U.K. include basic salary earned in the 12 
months preceding retirement; the average annual rate of basic salary earned in the 36 
months preceding retirement; and the annual rate of salary at retirement, including the 
average of 'fluctuating emoluments' over the preceding 36 months (GAD, 1991) 
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with the employee's last earnings before retirement, we can get some 
idea how well different pension schemes provide replacement income 
for its members. 
The results under final salary are influenced heavily by the total 
amount of service; that is, the longer the employee has worked, the 
better the pension scheme appears. With few exceptions the "full-time 
and bonus" category of employee appears to do best using final salary 
as a measure of performance, and the "break and mixed" category em-
ployees appear to do worst. 
Other measures that do not depend on a particular working his-
tory demonstrate the force of two commonplace observations: first, the 
longer the period over which the employee contributes to a money pur-
chase pension scheme, the larger the expected benefit; second, making 
provision in money purchase pension schemes early in the employee's 
working lifetime is important. These observations both provide argu-
ments in favor of a state pension, such as the basic state penSion in the 
U.K., which underpinS other layers of benefit.6 
3 The Different Pension Schemes 
The different pension schemes considered are deliberately simple. 
For occupational pension schemes to succeed they must be attractive 
to both employers and employees. A penSion scheme with a relatively 
simple benefit design will be straightforward to manage and easy to 
understand and so will be desired by both groups. 
3.1 Final Salary Pension Scheme 
The final salary penSion scheme used provides a pension of 1/60th 
of final salary for each year of service completed. This is the most com-
mon accrual rate among contracted oue pension schemes in the U.K. 
private sector (GAD, 1991); public sector schemes, which provide an ac-
crual rate of 1/80th, provide a lump sum in addition to the pension. For 
those employees working part time, the pension scheme provides a pen-
sion based on the annual rate of salary, with total service aggregated. 
Someone retiring with a total of n years of service, with an average of 
hi (hi:::; 40) hours per week during year i (i = 1,2, ... , n), where 40 
6 A comparison with the basic state pension is given in Appendix 3. 
7That is, contracted out of the state earnings related pension scheme (Appendix 1). 
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hours is considered full time, would receive an annual pension of: 
S n h· 
Annual Pension = 60 I _t 
i=140 
13 
where S is the annualized rate of salary received in the 12 months pre-
ceding retirement. Thus, someone retiring with a total of 30 years at 
20 hours per week part time would receive an annual pension of: 
. S 20 S Annual PenSIOn = - x 30 x - = -60 40 4· 
Those pension scheme members who work different part-time hours at 
different points in their career will have the appropriate proportion of 
each year of service used in the calculation. 
A further consideration is how members of pension schemes are 
treated when they move from one category of employment to another. 
For example, if an employee moves from full-time to part-time status, 
some penSion schemes make the full-time entitlement paid-up8 and 
start accrual in the pension scheme afresh as a part-time employee. 
This may be the case if a separate pension scheme is operated for part-
time employees. Other pension schemes may consider the two peri-
ods continuous service. Where relevant, results are presented on both 
bases. 
Finally, we consider the position of pension schemes that allow em-
ployees to take extended breaks and return to service, counting the 
periods of employment at either side of the break as one consecutive 
period for accrual purposes. Several pension schemes, particularly in 
the public sector, allow past members who rejoin the pension scheme 
after a break from employment to have service counted as continuous 
on payment of a small contribution, usually related to pay at previous 
withdrawal. In effect, this is the total service penSion. 
3.2 Revalued Career Average Pension Scheme 
The revalued career average pension scheme provides a pension of 
1/60th of the revalued career average salary for each year of service. 
Calculations have been made assuming a rate of revaluation in line with 
price inflation as well as one in line with growth in earnings. The former 
rate of revaluation will make the pension scheme perform less well 
8That is, the accrued pension is frozen, receiving only statutory revaluation rather 
than increasing in line with salaries. 
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than a final salary pension scheme for a full-time employee. Also, if 
revaluation is in line with increases in salaries, then, the final salary 
pension scheme and the revalued career average pension schemes are 
identical for full-time employees. 
In this revalued career average pension scheme there is no difficulty 
with the treatment of early withdrawals, because the same rate of reval-
uation is applied to deferred benefits. The different categories of mem-
bers do not have to be considered separately. The state earnings-related 
pension scheme operates in this way. 
The pension for part-time employees is calculated Similarly to the 
final salary pension scheme. 
3.3 Money Purchase Pension Scheme 
Two money purchase pension schemes are included in the analysis: 
• Employees contribute 5 percent of their salaries throughout their 
working lifetimes . 
• When employees are in full-time paid employment they contribute 
the maximum amount to the pension scheme, which, for simplic-
ity, is assumed to be 17.5 percent of salary at all ages. For part-
time employees, however, they contribute only 5 percent of salary 
at all ages. 
The first arrangement was selected because, on average, the contribu-
tion to occupational pension schemes made by members is about 5 
percent of their salaries (GAD, 1991). Few employers have chosen to 
make contributions to the private money purchase pension schemes 
(or personal pension plans) of their employees. Consequently, it seems 
reasonable to calculate the amount of pension that could be provided 
with the contributions saved by opting out of an occupational pension 
scheme. For simplicity the calculations do not allow explicitly for ex-
penses. Implicit allowances are made instead. 
There are several reasons for the two tiers of contribution in the 
second plan. First, those with low pay have less opportunity to save, so 
it seems unreasonable to suppose those employees would continue to 
invest the same proportion of their salaries in a penSion scheme if they 
moved from full-time to part-time employment (Table 4). Second, if an 
employer were to contribute to a money purchase pension scheme, it 
seems most likely that they would do so only for full-time employees.9 
9That a low level of contribution will lead to a low level of benefit is not a failure of 
money purchase schemes. The problems of money purchase schemes that this paper 
considers are those of volatility and high cost. 
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Finally, most individual money purchase pension schemes have a fixed 
charge deducted from each contribution, so the value to the plan par-
ticipant of the contribution made reduces with the amount. Thus, the 
lower tier acts partly as an implicit allowance for per policy fees. 
Table 4 
Distribution of U.K. Annual Household Expenditure 
On Personal Pensions by Gross Income 
Quintiles 
5th 4th 3rd 2nd 
Lowest Bound £117 £223 £367 
Avg Wkly Exp £0.25 £0.84 £2.68 £4.54 
1st (Top) 
£556 
£14.92 
Source: Family Spending, (50,1995; Avg Wkly Exp = Average Weekly Expenditure. 
In addition we consider what level of contribution would be required 
by a money purchase scheme (given the assumptions made) in order to 
reproduce the retirement benefit provided by the final salary scheme. 
4 Assumptions 
The calculations have been performed for an employee starting em-
ployment on £16,000. This is close to the average wage for male em-
ployees in 1995. In most cases the absolute figure does not matter, as 
the comparison is done using proportions and percentages. In addi-
tion, it is assumed that the basic state pension will continue to increase 
in line with the Retail Prices Index, as it has since 1979. Other assump-
tions are specified below. 
4.1 Service 
The calculations assume a full working lifetime consists of 40 hours 
paid employment per week from age 20 to 60; the maximum pension in 
the final salary pension scheme is 2/3rds of salary. Pension payments 
to retirees start at the normal pensionable age, which is age 60. It could 
be argued that 65 is a more realistic retirement age because most pen-
sion schemes have a normal pension age of 65 for men, and the trend 
seems to be to equalize pension ages for men and women at age 65 
(GAD, 1991). The average age at which pension payments commence, 
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as reported in the Government Actuary's Survey, is about age 61, how-
ever. Employees often take early retirement, whether voluntarily or not. 
An older normal retirement age would enhance the apparent per-
formance of money purchase pension schemes because of the effect of 
compound interest and mortality. The calculations assume that em-
ployees start contributing to money purchase pension schemes at age 
20, however, and the early commencement age partially offsets the ef-
fect of the early retirement age, so this apparent unfairness has largely 
been ignored. 
Part-time employees have been included at two levels of service. 
Over 5 million persons work part time in the U.K., of whom about 80 
percent are women. Significant proportions of male part-time employ-
ees are those already in retirement from their main occupation (GAD, 
1991), and it is difficult to make allowance for this group. Until women 
have children, those in employment are largely in full-time work (Mar-
tin and Roberts, 1984). Of these, 50 percent return to work within 
nine months of having a baby; about 30 percent return to full-time em-
ployment (McRae and Daniel, 1991). Many of the remainder return to 
part-time work once their children are in school. We can assume that, 
to some extent, women choose to work part-time because of child care 
responsibilities. 
Part-time employees are assumed to work for either 40 percent (that 
is, 16 hours) or 75 percent (that is, 30 hours) of a full working week. In 
addition, the service histories of some part-time employees used in the 
analysis assume that women are able to choose to work longer hours 
as their children grow older. There is some evidence to support this 
pattern (EOCNI, 1993). For example, the "break-and-mixed" category 
assumes the employee starts by working full-time; stops paid employ-
ment to care for young children; returns to paid part-time employment 
of 16 hours per week; has a further break; and then works until retire-
ment at 30 hours per week. 
4.2 Mortality 
Except in the calculation of the annuity used for converting the 
money purchase fund into a penSion, mortality is ignored throughout 
the analysis. This has different implications for the defined benefit pen-
sion schemes and for the money purchase pension scheme, although 
the effect on death benefits is the same. By ignoring mortality the anal-
ysis assumes that the death benefits provided are equal in value to the 
reserve or actuarial liability. 
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4.2.1 Money Purchase Pension Scheme 
By ignoring mortality when accumulating the contributions paid to 
the money purchase pension scheme the analysis assumes that, on 
death before retirement, the value of the fund is applied to purchase 
benefits for any dependent survivor or is paid to the estate of the plan 
participant. 
We assume that the full accumulated fund is used to purchase re-
tirement pension. Death benefits in addition to those provided by the 
accumulated fund must be purchased with additional contributions. In 
general this means that unless an additional contribution is paid, the 
provision for dependents on early death will be inadequate. 
4.2.2 Defined Benefit Pension Schemes 
The average defined benefit pension scheme provides a lump sum 
death benefit of nearly three times pensionable salary together with a 
spouse's pension calculated allowing for some enhancement of service 
(GAD, 1991). In the private sector this is usually up to full potential 
service. Except for older employees, the value of these benefits is likely 
to be greater than the reserve required to fund the retirement benefit. 
Ignoring mortality can result in an underestimate of the cost of a 
money purchase pension scheme and of the value of the benefits from 
a defined benefit pension scheme. Rather than adjust the calculations 
to allow for this difference between the two types of pension scheme, 
we will discuss it in the results section. 
The other decrements affecting pension schemes are withdrawal and 
ill health retirement. These are considered in later sections of this pa-
per. 
4.3 Economic Assumptions 
Interest rate assumptions are needed to project the accumulated 
value of the money purchase fund; as a yardstick to measure salary 
growth and inflation; and to cost the annuity at retirement. These rates 
are difficult to predict, and the results are sensitive to the assumptions 
chosen. For this reason, a sensitivity analysis is included as part of 
the results. The interest rates are assumed to be constant over time 
as the comparison of results is made only at the end of one period of 
time. The rates reflect an average of the experience over the period of a 
person's working lifetime. Each assumption is briefly discussed below. 
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4.3.1 Inflation 
The inflation assumption is used to increase benefits while in defer-
ment and as a basis from which to estimate real rates of salary growth 
and real interest rates. 
It is assumed that the Retail Prices Index will increase 4 percent per 
annum. This is slightly higher than the current U.K. government's self-
imposed maximum inflation target, but lower than the average over the 
past 20 years. 
If inflation is higher than that assumed in the projection, then nom-
inal investment return will improve if the real rate of investment re-
turn remains the same. Similarly, if real rates of salary growth remain 
the same, salaries paid will be higher. Thus, money purchase pension 
schemes will perform relatively better than otherwise, having higher 
income from investments and contributions; defined benefit pension 
schemes will award pensions based on a higher salary figure. The ben-
efit design of the pension schemes will determine which arrangement 
gives the better value for money. 
4.3.2 Real Interest Rates 
The assumption for real interest rates is combined with the infla-
tion assumption to accumulate the contributions made to the money 
purchase fund. A real rate of return of 4 percent per annum has been 
assumed. This rate reflects what is currently available on longer term 
index-linked gilts lO (roughly 3.5 percent on gilts maturing in 2030, as 
of March 1996) which gives a conservative estimate of the likely invest-
ment performance of a fund (Thornton and Wilson, 1992). This ap-
proach can be justified for two reasons: first, the rate used is assumed 
to be net of expenses (to allow implicitly for expenses), and second, 
most persons included in the categories of employees in this survey 
will be on fairly low and insecure incomes and probably would want a 
personal pension plan giving a reasonably secure investment return. 
In the U.K. it seems that a small majority of investors in personal 
pension plans prefer more cautious, with profit, poliCies to unit-linked 
policies (ABI, 1996). Some figures are given in Table 5. Some of the 
linked poliCies are linked to with-profit or fixed interest unitized funds. 
Low interest rates penalize the money purchase pension scheme 
both by depressing the assumed performance of the pension scheme 
and by making the annuity more expensive. In order to explore a plau-
10 Gilts is the name given to securities issued by the United Kingdom government. 
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Table 5 
Personal Pensions: New Business 
(In £1,OOO,OOOs) 
1991 1993 1995 
Number of New Policies 2595 2030 1199 
Net Premium Income: 
Single Premium-Linked 1719 2393 1675 
Single Premium-Non-Linked 2254 2626 1628 
Yearly Premium-Linked 600 580 536 
Yearly Premium-Non-Linked 519 517 411 
DSS* Rebate-Linked 369 207 92 
DSS* Rebate-Non-Linked 226 139 53 
Total 5688 6462 4395 
* The DSS rebate is the contribution paid by the Department of Social 
Security to appropriate personal pension schemes (Appendix 1). 
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sible range of results, calculations also have been performed assuming 
real interest rates of 5 percent. 
4.3.3 Real Salary Growth 
The assumption for real salary growth also can be considered to be 
low: a real rate of salary growth of 1 percent per annum has been as-
sumed. While average salaries increased faster than this over the 1980s, 
there is no certainty that they will continue to do so. At present, only 
senior executive salaries are increasing faster than the rate of inflation, 
and these employees are unlikely to have part-time contracts. Calcula-
tions also are performed assuming 2 percent real growth. This is to be 
consistent with the 5 percent real growth tested above, as a 4 percent 
gap between real interest rates and real salary growth may be too large. 
The analysis assumes that salaries only increase faster than inflation 
when an employee is in full-time work. At ages when a working pro-
file imposes part-time work, salaries are increased in line with inflation 
only. Similarly, after a period of unemployment, the salary at which the 
employee is assumed to reenter employment will be the salary at the 
previous date of exit increased in line with inflation only. There is evi-
dence to support these assumptions, as well as the belief that part-time 
employees are usually paid less than the equivalent full-time employ-
ees. This can be shown by comparing hourly rates and by considering 
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measures of productivity (Kremer and Montgomery, 1993). No attempt 
has been made to allow for different relative levels of pay in the analy-
sis. 
A consequence of the assumption that real salary growth only occurs 
during periods of full-time employment is that those taking breaks from 
employment will return to work at a relatively lower level of pay than 
their contemporaries who remained in full-time work. 
lust as assuming large real investment returns will result in a better 
performance for money purchase pension schemes, larger real salary 
growth will mean defined benefit pension schemes pay a larger pen-
sion. In the case of high real investment returns, however, the appar-
ent advantage accrues only to the money purchase pension scheme. In 
the case of high salary growth, there is an advantage to both types 
of pension schemes: the money purchase pension scheme benefits 
from larger contributions. In practice, if investment returns are better 
than expected over the long term, members of defined benefit pension 
schemes can expect to receive some advantage. In the past, surplus in 
occupational pension schemes has been used to make (discretionary) 
increases to pensions in payment and, less frequently, other benefit 
improvements. 
4.3.4 The Annuity 
An interest rate consistent with the inflation and real interest rate 
assumptions above has been used to calculate the annuity. 
The comparison between the money purchase and defined benefit 
pension schemes has been made assuming that a pension increasing 
at 4 percent per annum is purchased (that is, in line with limited price 
increases, given the inflation assumption). According to the Govern-
ment Actuary's survey (GAD, 1991), occupational pension schemes in 
the private sector guarantee, on average, increases of about 2 percent 
per annum. In 1986 they granted increases of 3.5 percent per annum, 
on average. Public sector penSion schemes guarantee increases in line 
with inflation. Although limited price increases are only a statutory re-
quirement on pensions accrued after April 1997, it seems reasonable 
to include the cost of increases to make the comparisons consistent. 
Allowing for increases to pensions in payment will make money pur-
chase pension schemes appear to perform less well than defined pen-
sion schemes. 
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5 The Results 
We begin by considering how well final salary pension schemes per-
form compared to the total service pension, and by presenting the es-
timated additional cost required to fund the difference between the 
final salary pension and the total service pension for each category of 
member. The benefits provided by a revalued career average pension 
scheme also are considered. The pensions provided by money purchase 
pension schemes are compared with the total service pension, and the 
vulnerability of the plan participant to worse than expected investment 
and salary experience is investigated. 
A comparison of benefits with the basic state pension and with av-
erage earnings is presented in Appendix 3 to reinforce some of the 
results. 
5.1 Final Salary Defined Benefit Pension Scheme 
Final salary pension schemes are considered to fall short of mem-
bers' expectations on two counts: (i) because of their treatment of early 
withdrawals, and (ii) because of cross subsidies between members. We 
shall first consider early withdrawals. 
5.1.1 Deferred Pensioner 
The benefit paid to early withdrawals usually has a smaller value 
than the reserve required for employees who remain with an employer. 
Deferred benefits normally are increased at rates less than the rate of 
increase in earnings. The results presented in Table 6 show, however, 
that (given the set of assumptions used for the calculations) the differ-
ences are not exceptional. The calculation of the total service pension 
effectively assumes that all service is completed contiguously and in 
the years immediately preceding retirement. This is used as a proxy 
for a final salary pension scheme that increases deferred pensions in 
line with earnings. Table A4 in Appendix 2 gives the amount of the 
total service pension accrued by each category of employee relative to 
the full-time pension. 
We can assess how poorly deferred employees do under the present 
arrangements by comparing the total service pension with the pension 
calculated assuming movements between part-time and full-time ser-
vice do not interrupt pension accrual (called "part/full time continu-
ous"). The difference in the two pensions arises because of the differ-
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ence between inflation and salary growth. We have calculations assum-
ing a 1 percent and 2 percent real salary growth. 
Table 6 
Pension Allowing for Periods of Deferment 
As a Percentage of Total Service Pension 
Real Salary Growth 
1% Growth 2% Growth 
Full-Time 100.0% 100.0% 
Break and Mixed 97.3% 94.7% 
Late Break 92.5% 86.0% 
Break and Part-Time 99.6% 99.2% 
Early Break and Full-Time 96.3% 93.5% 
Late Break and Full-Time 94.0% 89.1% 
Short Break and Full-Time 93.7% 88.8% 
Long Break and Full-Time 94.4% 89.7% 
Late Start 94.0% 89.1% 
Full-Time & Bonus 100.0% 100.0% 
Cyclical 93.0% 86.7% 
As expected, deferred pensioners do less well when the annual real 
salary growth rate is large. In addition, they would do less well under 
current legislation if inflation were high over the deferred period, as 
the statutory increase in deferment is capped at 5 percent per annum. 
Categories (other than the "full-time" and "full-time & bonus" cate-
gories) that appear to do relatively well under the present arrangements 
are those with the smallest proportion of full-time employment. Their 
earnings do not attract real salary increases; therefore, the difference 
between deferred benefits and ongoing benefits does not significantly 
reduce their expectations. 
Table 7 gives the additional contributions (paid over a working life-
time) required as a percentage of annual salary to make up the shortfall 
in pension identified in Table 6. 
We also can consider the position of employees who are in full-time 
paid employment throughout their career, but who change jobs fre-
quently. Some employees choose to change jobs frequently, but em-
ployees increasingly are being offered temporary contracts-these em-
ployees have no choice about their job mobility. Between 1994 and 
1995 the number of employees with temporary contracts increased 10 
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Table 7 
Additional Contribution Required 
To Fund the Total Service Pension 
*4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Full-Time 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Break and Mixed 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 
Late Break 0.6% 0.4% 1.2% 0.9% 
Break and Part-Time 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
Early Break and Full-Time 0.4% 0.3% 0.8% 0.6% 
Late Break and Full-Time 0.6% 0.4% 1.2% 0.9% 
Short Break and Full-Time 0.6% 0.4% 1.3% 1.0% 
Long Break and Full-Time 0.5% 0.4% 1.0% 0.8% 
Late Start 0.6% 0.5% 1.3% 1.0% 
Full-Time & Bonus 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Cyclical 0.5% 0.4% 1.1% 0.8% 
*4/1, for example, refers to 4 percent real investment growth and 
1 percent real salary growth. 
percent to 1.5 million. The majority of persons in these jobs would have 
chosen permanent employment had it been available (CSO, 1996). With 
each withdrawal, the contribution to pension made by a period of ser-
vice is effectively downgraded in a typical final salary pension scheme. 
The results for employees who change jobs frequently are presented 
in Table 8, and the extra contribution required to meet the shortfall is 
shown in Table 9. 
Table 8 
Pension Allowing for Periods of Deferment 
As a Percentage of Total Service Pension 
Withdraw Every Five Years 
Withdraw Every Ten Years 
Withdraw After Five Years Only 
Real Salary Growth 
1% Growth 
84.6% 
86.7% 
96.3% 
2% Growth 
72.5% 
76.1% 
93.8% 
Tables 8 and 9 show that those employees who change paid employ-
ment frequently are disadvantaged in a final salary pension scheme if 
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Table 9 
Additional Contribution Required 
To Fund the Total Service Pension 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Withdraw Every Five Years 
Withdraw Every Ten Years 
Withdraw After Five Years Only 
1.5% 1.1% 
1.3% 0.9% 
0.3% 0.3% 
3.2% 
2.8% 
0.7% 
2.4% 
2.1% 
0.6% 
deferred pensions are increased in line with inflation only. The impact 
of real salary increases has a more significant effect than the frequency 
of job change, however, as shown in Table 10. 
In certain circumstances, it is possible to redress the balance be-
tween early withdrawals and those who remain with an employer. For 
an employer, the motivation to do so could depend on the reason for 
leaving employment. Employees leave their jobs for several reasons, 
e.g.: 
• They choose to go to another employer; 
• They are made redundant or their contract ends; 
• They need time away from employment, for example, for child 
care and would like longer than their statutory allowance. 
Those employers who give employees the right to an extended break 
without jeopardizing their future employment may have addressed the 
grounds for complaint of one of the above groups. For example, the em-
ployee will be able to count the two periods of service as though they 
were continuous for the calculation of benefit and frequently will be 
allowed, for a nominal contribution, to have the break included as part 
of their pensionable service. Employees seem to support this arrange-
ment, even when they are unlikely to profit directly from it (Gough, 
1997). 
Similarly, those employees who are made redundant are already en-
titled to lump sum payments, as established in employment law. Part of 
the redundancy payment could be directed toward a pension scheme. 
In addition, if it can be agreed that at least part of the employer's con-
tribution to an occupational pension scheme is in respect of deferred 
pay, the redundancy payment could be increased to allow for this, and 
that part of the lump sum could be compulsorily invested in a pension 
arrangement. 
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Table 10 
Portion of Total Service Pensions Earned By 
An Employee Who Regularly Changes Employment 
Real Salary Length of Consecutive Employments (in Years) 
Growth 1 2 5 10 20 
1% 
2% 
82.9% 83.0% 84.6% 86.7% 
69.8% 70.4% 72.5% 76.1% 
91.0% 
83.6% 
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The level of replacement income provided by the different pension 
schemes for some categories of employee is shown in Table 11. The re-
sults suggest that if an employee in a final salary pension scheme must 
take a break from paid employment, it should be taken early rather than 
late. The deferred pension will then be in respect of a shorter period 
of service. This differs from the position of an employee in a money 
purchase pension scheme, where it is better to take a late break. With 
the assumption of 1 percent real salary growth, the employee taking 
an early break loses about 2 percent of the value of the total service 
pension, and the employee taking a late break loses 3 percent. If there 
is 2 percent real salary growth, the loss is in the order of 3 percent and 
6 percent, respectively. The length of the break in employment also 
affects the level of replacement income available from a final salary 
pension scheme, although not substantially. The total service pension 
is the same percentage of final salary, regardless of the assumption for 
salary growth. 
Table 11 
Pensions as a Percentage of Final Salary 
With Deferred Pension 
Total Service 1% Real 2% Real 
Pensions Salary Growth Salary Growth 
Early Break 50.0% 48.2% 46.7% 
Late Break 50.0% 47.0% 44.5% 
Short Break 58.3% 54.7% 51.8% 
Long Break 41.7% 39.4% 37.4% 
Now we turn to the other cross subsidies. Cross subsidies exist 
in any insurance arrangement, such as a defined benefit retirement 
pension scheme. An obvious subsidy is from those who die just be-
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fore reaching retirement to those who survive well beyond pension age. 
Other subsidies include: 
• From employees with no dependents to those with dependents; 
• From those who do not have much salary growth, particularly to-
ward the end of their career, to those whose salary grows faster 
than the average, particularly close to retirement (Wilkie, 1985). 
The former problem is discussed in Section 6. The latter issue can 
be considered by looking at the results for the "full-time-and-bonus" 
employee. 
This paper does not attempt to address the issue of cross subsidies. 
We just consider the extent of their presence in the different schemes 
under consideration. 
5.1.2 Salary Growth 
If we consider "full-time-and-bonus" employees, we can investigate 
the different benefits available to employees whose salary falls when 
approaching retirement. It is assumed that this category of employee 
receives a 20 percent bonus on salary up to age 45 due, for example, 
to overtime payments. Thereafter, the bonus stops and the employee 
receives basic salary only. Consequently, the employee's pension will 
be calculated using the same final salary as other full-time employees, 
including those who have no history of overtime. The calculation of 
the final salary pension ignores the bonus earned when the employee 
was younger. Because of this problem with the formula, many final 
salary pension schemes ignore so-called fluctuating emoluments (com-
pensation) in the calculation of pensionable salaryll (GAD, 1991). The 
employee is able to make other pension provisions, such as additional 
voluntary contributions. If defined benefit pensions are intended to 
maintain the level of income just before retirement, this arrangement 
seems reasonable. A sizable proportion of pension schemes include 
all pay in the calculation of pensionable salary, however, so it is worth 
considering the alternatives. The results for the "full-time-and-bonus" 
category are given in Table 12. 
The relative values of the benefits depend heavily on the rate of 
revaluation assumed to be applied in the revalued career average pen-
sion scheme. Even though the employee was assumed to earn 120 per-
cent of the basic salary for 25 years, revaluation in line with inflation is 
llThe salary included in the calculation of pension. 
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Table 12 
Revalued Career Average Pension Received by Full-Time 
And Bonus Employees as a Proportion of Final Salary 
Revalued in Line With: 
1% Real Salary Growth 
2% Real Salary Growth 
Inflation 
61.8% 
51.4% 
Note: Total Service Pension is 66.7% of final salary. 
Salaries 
75.0% 
75.0% 
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unable to match the benefit from the final salary pension scheme. The 
position is improved, however, when the pension scheme revalues pen-
sionable salaries in line with salary growth. The employee effectively 
earns 12.5 percent more pay over a working lifetime than an employee 
who receives no bonus, and this is reflected in the pension. 
Thus, employees with fluctuating emoluments that decrease in size 
toward retirement may receive a higher pension from a revalued career 
average pension scheme. It follows that a final salary pension scheme 
that includes such employees, and incorporates their total pay in the 
definition of pensionable salary, will incorporate some cross subsidy 
from these employees to those without fluctuating emoluments. Using 
similar arguments, it also follows that there is a cross subsidy from 
those with lower salary growth than the average to those with higher 
salary growth. 
We shall now consider the revalued career average pensions of the 
other categories of employee. 
5.2 Revalued Career Average Pension Schemes 
The employees who do relatively well in a revalued career average 
pension scheme, even when the revaluation is only in line with price 
inflation, are those who work part time. Because it is assumed that the 
salaries of part-time employees do not increase any faster than price 
inflation, this should not be surprising. Even so, the pension scheme is 
unable to provide a pension as large as the final salary pension scheme. 
If the rate of revaluation is increased to be in line with salary growth, the 
position alters. All categories of employee do at least as well (full-time) 
or better (all other categories) in the revalued career average pension 
scheme as they would do in a final salary pension scheme. These results 
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are shown in Table 13, assuming 1 percent real salary growth, and they 
should be compared with those in Table 6. 
The revalued career average pension, with revaluation in line with 
earnings, restores the link to actual years worked that is partly lost in 
the final salary scheme for those employees with breaks in their working 
history. As a result, we see that a revalued career average pension 
scheme can be used to remove the cross subsidy between stayers and 
withdrawals, as well as between low and high earners. The pension 
design depends not only on service, but also on how significant a year 
of service is in terms of income to the employee. 
Table 13 
Revalued Career Average Pension 
As Percentage of Total Service Pension 
Revalued in Line With: 
Inflation Salaries 
Full-Time 82.9% 100.0% 
Break and Mixed 94.1% 118.2% 
Late Break 89.0% 111.6% 
Break and Part-Time 97.9% 119.9% 
Early Break and Full-Time 86.9% 101.7% 
Late Break and Full-Time 86.9% 103.5% 
Short Break and Full-Time 84.9% 101.5% 
Long Break and Full-Time 89.0% 106.4% 
Late Start 86.9% 101.7% 
Full-Time & Bonus 92.5% 112.5% 
Cyclical 91.3% 113.4% 
There are difficulties in adopting a sensible and fair level of revalua-
tion. The data in Table 12 show the relative penalties to one category of 
employee where revaluation is in line with inflation and salaries grow 
faster than inflation. In addition, if a pension is viewed as deferred 
compensation, then its value should reflect real levels of salaries when 
it vests, otherwise part of the salary in each year of work prior to retire-
ment has been devalued. Because a single, average rate of revaluation 
must be applied to all members in a pension scheme, those employees 
whose salaries increase faster than the average may feel that they are 
subsidizing those with flatter salary progression. If the annual rate of 
revaluation is appropriate for the industry in which the company oper-
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ates or even linked to actual rates of salary growth within the company, 
the effect of the revaluation will be to maintain the real value of a year 
of work. The extent of the cross subsidy will be reduced significantly. 
5.3 Money Purchase Pension Schemes 
The calculations show that, if the pension purchased under a money 
purchase scheme is compared with the total service penSion, those 
employees who have breaks in their employment appear to do better 
than the standard "full-time" employee from money purchase pension 
schemes (Table 14). For example, assuming a contribution of 5 per-
cent salary to a money purchase pension scheme and 5 percent real 
investment growth and 2 percent real salary growth, the "break-and-
part-time" employee receives 89.4 percent of the total service pension, 
whereas the "full-time" employee receives a pension of only 56.3 per-
cent. The employees' career profiles assume they all begin their paid 
employment with a period of full-time service, and the effect of these 
early contributions is most significant: "break-and-part-time" employ-
ees do best because the largest proportion of their contribution is made 
in the early years. 
When replacement income is conSidered, the position is reversed; 
full-time employees appear to do better. This apparent contradiction 
arises because the total service pension is based on the proportion of 
time worked, whereas the comparison for replacement income is based 
on final annualized salary. That is, it will be relatively larger than the 
total service pension for those whose paid employment included part-
time work. 
The contributions required throughout a working lifetime, as a con-
stant proportion of salary, to reproduce the total service pension in 
retirement (given the assumptions of the paper) are presented in Table 
14. The pension being funded by each category of employee is the same 
amount in the columns 4/1 and 5/1 and a higher amount in columns 4/2 
and 5/2. The different assumptions for real salary growth do not have 
a significant effect on the contribution required from those employees 
with part-time service, as they only experience real salary growth for 
a small proportion of their careers. There is a notable difference for 
those employees working full time. 
We can use Table 14 to form an idea of how vulnerable money pur-
chase pension schemes are to changes in experience. For example, if a 
full-time employee chose to contribute 8.9 percent of salary to a pen-
sion scheme (assuming 5 percent real interest and 2 percent real salary 
growth) and the experience of the pension scheme turned out to aver-
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Table 14 
Contributions to a Money Purchase Pension Scheme 
Required to Fund a Total Service Pension 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Full-Time 9.4% 7.0% 11.7% 8.9% 
Break and Mixed 7.0% 5.1% 7.6% 5.5% 
Late Break 7.6% 5.5% 8.7% 6.4% 
Break and Part-Time 7.4% 5.4% 7.6% 5.6% 
Early Break and Full-Time 10.0% 7.6% 11.8% 9.1% 
Late Break and Full-Time 9.2% 6.9% 11.0% 8.3% 
Short Break and Full-Time 7.4% 7.1% 11.5% 8.7% 
Long Break and Full-Time 8.7% 6.4% 10.1% 7.5% 
Late Start 10.1% 7.8% 12.0% 9.3% 
Full-Time & Bonus 8.2% 6.1% 10.3% 7.7% 
Cyclical 7.6% 5.6% 8.5% 6.2% 
age 4 percent real interest and 1 percent real salary growth, the retire-
ment pension provided by the pension scheme would be 5.5 percent 
less than expected. The "break-and-part-time" employee contributing 
5.6 percent would be 24.3 percent lower. These calculations are sum-
marized in Table 15. 
The data in Table 15 give an indication of the downside risk of using 
money purchase arrangement to provide for retirement income. In the 
U.K. for money purchase pension schemes operated by an employer, 
there is an obligation for an actuary to recommend a level of contribu-
tion for a given target benefit. For individual money purchase pension 
schemes (personal pension plans) a salesperson normally would pro-
vide estimates of the projected level of benefit, given certain levels of 
contribution. The bases that can be used for the projection are pre-
scribed. Currently the mid-range basis would permit 9 percent interest 
and 3 percent inflation, which is not too dissimilar from the 5/2 as-
sumption (it is more optimistic). 
If the money purchase pension scheme earns interest at 8 percent 
per annum rather than 9 percent, then its value, accumulated to retire-
ment, will be less than estimated at the start. Similarly, if the employee 
experiences real salary growth of 1 percent per annum rather than 2 
percent, then the fund will receive less income from contributions and 
will be smaller than originally estimated. Thus, the penSion it provides 
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will be smaller. In addition, if interest rates at retirement are lower than 
anticipated, the cost of the retirement annuity will be more expensive, 
reducing the pension even further. In a money purchase scheme all 
these risks are borne by the individual plan participant. 
Table 15 
Effect of Wrong Contribution Level 
Full-Time 
Break and Mixed 
Late Break 
Break and Part-Time 
Early Break and Full-Time 
Late Break and Full-Time 
Short Break and Full-Time 
Long Break and Full-Time 
Late Start 
Full-Time & Bonus 
Cyclical 
Percentage of 
Total Service Pension * 
94.5% 
77.5% 
84.0% 
75.8% 
91.5% 
89.7% 
92.5% 
86.1% 
92.1% 
94.6% 
82.0% 
* Assumes that the contribution required to fund the total service pension, given 
5 percent real interest and 2 percent real salary growth is paid and that actual 
experience is 4 percent real interest and 1 percent real salary growth. 
Those persons we are assuming are least able to accept the uncer-
tainty of a money purchase pension scheme (for example, those with 
some part-time employment) are the most vulnerable. 
From Table 14 it should be apparent that if employees contribute 
the maximum 17.5 percent of salary assumed under the money pur-
chase and variable arrangement, in all cases the pension provided will 
exceed the total service pension. The comparison for employees with 
full-time paid employment only is straightforward. Those employees 
with periods of part-time employment contribute at different rates de-
pending on their status, making the comparison more difficult. Be-
cause the two categories concerned both begin paid work in full-time 
employment, the importance of their early contributions together with 
their depressed final salary (due to inflation only increases) makes the 
money purchase pension scheme perform slightly better than the con-
tributions paid would suggest. 
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5.4 Case Study 
We have seen that the employees who appear to do least well in 
a final salary pension scheme are those who change jobs frequently. 
The employee who changes jobs regularly, but is always in full-time 
employment, and the cyclical category of employee both receive pen-
sions of less than 85 percent of their respective total service pensions 
from the final salary scheme. Consequently, we consider the pension 
entitlements of these employees in more detail. 
Assume an employee wishes to receive a pension equal to the total 
service pension. This is equivalent to the revalued career average pen-
sion the employee would receive, if revaluation were in line with salary 
growth. Because the revalued career average pension scheme meets the 
aim, we only need consider money purchase and final salary pension 
schemes. 
There are various possibilities for the employee. For example, the 
employee could: 
• Join an occupational pension scheme and pay additional voluntary 
contributions; 
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the equiv-
alent of the members' contribution to the pension scheme; 
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the contri-
bution believed necessary to fund 100 percent of the total service 
pension; or 
• Start a money purchase personal pension plan and pay the equiv-
alent of the members' contribution to the pension scheme, with 
the employer contributing the remainder. 
Table 16 shows the contributions required by these employees to 
fund a total service pension. If the employee joins a final salary pen-
sion scheme, then additional voluntary contributions are necessary to 
increase the scheme's pension to the total service pension. These are 
given in the first row of figures for each category. Otherwise the em-
ployee must join a money purchase pension scheme and fund the total 
service pension himself or herself, perhaps in conjunction with an em-
ployer. The contribution required for this is given in the second row of 
figures. 
We should consider the employee's financial position while in em-
ployment, depending on the decision made. Assume members con-
tribute 5 percent of their pay to the occupational pension scheme. Then 
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Table 16 
Contribution to Money Purchase Pension Scheme 
Or Additional Contributions Required for Equivalent Pension 
Change Jobs 4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Every 5 Years 
Final Salary Scheme 1.5% 1.1% 3.2% 2.4% 
Money Purchase Scheme 9.4% 7.0% 11.7% 8.9% 
Cyclical 
Final Salary Scheme 0.5% 0.4% 1.1% 0.8% 
Money Purchase Scheme 7.6% 5.6% 8.5% 6.2% 
Source: Tables 9 and 14. 
the employee's gross pay will be reduced the amounts shown in Table 
17. Categories 1), 2), 3) and 4) in the Table refer to the four options 
discussed above, respectively. 
Table 17 
Contribution Required From Employee 
Under Each Arrangement 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
5 years 1) 6.5% 6.1% 8.2% 7.4% 
2) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
3) 9.4% 7.0% 11.7% 8.9% 
4) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
Cyclical 1) 5.5% 5.4% 6.1% 5.8% 
2) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
3) 7.6% 5.6% 8.5% 6.2% 
4) 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 
The financial position of the employee in retirement will be the same, 
except for the second option where the employee will fare less well. 
For example, if the money purchase fund experienced 5 percent real 
growth and the employees receive 1 percent real salary growth, the 
fund of the employee moving jobs every five years would be able to 
purchase a pension of 71.4 percent of the total service pension; the 
cyclical employee's fund would be 89.3 percent of that necessary for 
the total service pension. 
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We need only consider the first, third, and fourth options. The third 
option is the most expensive. The best alternative financially seems to 
be the fourth option, where the employer contributes to the employee's 
personal pension plan, because (assuming the assumptions are borne 
out by experience) the employee receives the target pension and pays 
the least contribution. The fourth option ignores the cost of other ben-
efits provided by a defined benefit pension scheme (for example, the 
cost of life insurance and the ill health pension). If these costs are in-
cluded, the choice between the first and fourth options becomes more 
difficult. In particular, as the benefit in the first option is provided 
by a final salary pension scheme, the risk of the pension being lower 
than expected because of poor investment performance is limited. With 
the fourth option the risk of underperformance rests solely on the em-
ployee. 
A revalued career average pension scheme would meet the target 
benefit of both these categories of employee, provided revaluation was 
in line with salary growth. If such a scheme is not available, then the 
best chOice for both categories appears to be between: 
• Joining a money purchase pension scheme where a reasonable 
level of contributions are made by the employer and hoping that 
the benefit of good investment performance will compensate for 
the additional expenditure on insured benefits that might be nec-
essary; and 
• joining a defined benefit pension scheme final salary with the 
certainty of a pension (and other benefits) which can be supple-
mented by additional contributions to compensate for revaluation 
of deferred benefits at less than the rate of growth of salaries. 
Few employers contribute to individual money purchase pension 
schemes, and when employers have introduced occupational money 
purchase schemes they have tended to pay lower contributions than 
they would pay to a final salary pension scheme (NAPF, 1996). In prac-
tice, those employees with access to an occupational scheme are likely 
to be in the second position; those without access to an occupational 
scheme will have to choose the third option above, assuming they can 
afford it. Again, the evidence shows that persons choosing to start in-
dividual money purchase pension schemes frequently pay a minimum 
level of contribution and that there is a large proportion of the working 
population with no pension provision other than that provided by the 
state. 
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6 Death in Service and Other Issues 
6.1 Death in Service and Other Insurance Benefits 
The results of Section 5 have ignored the provision for death and 
other benefits provided by defined benefit pension schemes. This seems 
a reasonable approach because, for some categories of employee, a 
death benefit may not be important and may represent further cross 
subsidy (from single members to those with dependents). Security for 
dependents is important for a large percentage of the population, how-
ever, and should not be ignored. 
The average death in service benefit provided by a defined benefit 
pension scheme is a lump sum of approximately three times the an-
nual salary at the time of death, together with a spouse's pension of 25 
percent pensionable salary. This is unlikely to require a contribution 
to a money purchase scheme much in excess of 1 percent of salary.12 
The cost of the ill health (disability) pension is harder to estimate, but 
could be as much as 4 percent of salary.13 These benefits could cost 
more than the difference between the costs of the money purchase and 
final salary pension schemes identified above. An obvious problem is 
that those employees for whom such insurance is relatively expensive 
are more likely to choose to join an occupational pension scheme, as-
suming one is available. This could increase the overall cost of defined 
benefit pension schemes. 
The cost of both these forms of insurance will increase with the 
age at which contributions begin and also may increase throughout 
the policy term. Money purchase pension schemes are likely to be rel-
atively more attractive to younger employees, even ignoring the cost 
of insurance, and this could be a problem for defined benefit pension 
schemes. Employees could choose to opt out of occupational pension 
schemes while young, expecting to be able to join their employers pen-
sion scheme when older. In the long run this could prove to be a poor 
strategy because it will increase the average age of the membership of 
occupational pension schemes, thereby increasing their average cost. 
Because the provision of occupational pension schemes is voluntary, 
employers may choose to close the pension schemes as the cost in-
creases, leaving no pension scheme for aging employees to join. If 
employers were able to make membership of pension schemes com-
12This figure was calculated assuming a term assurance for the lump sum necessary 
to fund the benefit, allowing for the accumulated value of the money purchase fund. 
13This amount was reached after some telephone inquiries to insurance companies. 
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pulsory, as was possible in the past, this problem at least could be 
avoided.14 
6.2 Administration 
Most employers effectively meet the cost of administering occupa-
tional defined benefit pension schemes. Sometimes they only do so 
implicitly, as they usually meet the balance of the cost of the pension 
scheme. In any case, it is important that administration costs are kept 
to a minimum. 
One problem is in data storage-in final salary pension schemes this 
is frequently used as a reason for excluding part-time and temporary 
employees because it can be difficult to record the number of hours 
worked each week. Data handling software packages are making such 
advances that this should become less of a problem. The only infor-
mation that needs to be stored for a revalued career average pension 
scheme, regardless of category of employee, is the total revalued salary 
to date. This can be uprated annually, for example when tax statements 
are produced. Consequently, any additional data handling can be kept 
to a minimum for all employees. 
In individual money purchase schemes the plan participant will have 
to meet the expenses of the provider. In an occupational money pur-
chase scheme it is usual for the employer to meet the expenses. Because 
of economies of scale, the expense margins are usually lower for group 
schemes. 
7 Summary and Conclusion 
While the assumptions and methodology underlying the calculations 
can be criticized for their simplicity, they still serve to demonstrate 
some useful results. 
For many working histories, a defined benefit occupational pension 
scheme can offer good value for money. Revalued career average pen-
sion schemes, where revaluation is in line with earnings, meet many of 
the criticisms of final salary pension schemes. 
14Legislation was introduced in the U.K. prohibiting companies from making mem-
bership of an occupational pension scheme a condition of employment because of their 
perceived problems with portability. If the portability problems were addressed, there 
should be less objection to compulsory membership. 
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Final salary pension schemes compare poorly with money purchase 
pension schemes in some circumstances. Their two main weaknesses 
are: 
• When salaries grow significantly faster than inflation and deferred 
benefits are increased in line with inflation only; 
• When interest rates are significantly higher than the rate of salary 
growth and than assumed in the funding basis and the extra re-
turns are not passed to the members of a defined benefit pension 
scheme. 
The former condition primarily affects employees who change jobs. In 
some cases employees change employment because they perceive an 
advantage to a new job. The employer, who meets the balance of cost in 
most defined benefit pension schemes, may have trained the employee 
and perceive a significant finanCial disadvantage to the move. Most 
employers feel justified in providing a deferred benefit that gives less 
weight to the years worked with the employer than a retirement benefit 
would give. 
Persons increasingly are leaving employment because they have been 
employed on a temporary contract or because they have been made re-
dundant. In these situations there may be no financial compensation 
to the employee (other than a redundancy payment to those entitled 
under employment law), but presumably there is a perceived benefit 
to the employer. To penalize these employees further by reducing the 
amount of the pension they can expect to receive at retirement is less 
justifiable. 
The results show that in certain circumstances the extra cost re-
quired to revalue deferred benefits in line with earnings is not great. For 
an employee changing jobs every five years the cost calculated varies 
between 1.1 percent and 3.2 percent of salary per annum. If employ-
ers do not want to increase the overall cost of an occupational pension 
scheme, an alternative is to review the target benefit provided at retire-
ment. 
This brings us to another cross subsidy: between employees experi-
encing different rates of salary growth. By comparing the benefits pro-
vided by a revalued career average pension scheme and a final salary 
pension scheme we see that in a final salary penSion scheme those 
employees with flatter salary progression effectively subsidize those 
with faster salary progression. The problem is one of equity: each em-
ployee's pension year should be identified and given a fair weighting in 
the calculation of the eventual benefit paid which leads to a revalued ca-
reer average design where the rate of revaluation is linked to increases 
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in earnings. With this design the problem of deferred benefits would 
disappear. 
The second circumstance in which money purchase pension schemes 
outperform defined benefit pension schemes is also a question of eq-
uity. To whom does the surplus in a penSion scheme belong if the em-
ployer meets the balance of the cost? If the contribution is perceived 
solely as deferred pay, then the surplus belongs to the members of the 
pension scheme. As the employer's contribution can fluctuate without 
any regard to the progression of employees' earnings and, in any case, 
it is calculated in a way that is not intended to be member specific, it 
may be unreasonable to assume 100 percent of the contribution is in 
respect of deferred pay. If this is the case, some mechanism for shar-
ing the surplus between the employer and the members of the pension 
scheme could be devised. This could depend on the extent to which 
the employer has a commitment to meet payments where the pension 
scheme is in deficit and on the normal cost of the penSion scheme as 
reported in the Companies Act accounts. 
If some categories of employees are to be paid higher benefits in de-
fined benefit pension schemes without the overall cost increasing, other 
employees will have to receive lower benefits. A final salary pension 
scheme could achieve this by reducing the target benefit in a pension 
scheme by redUCing the rate of accrual, while introdUCing revaluation 
for deferred benefits in line with salary growth. This leaves the problem 
of cross subsidy between different rates of salary growth. A revalued 
career average pension scheme can address both problems by remov-
ing the proportionately larger rewards available in final salary pension 
schemes to those whose salaries increase faster than the average. While 
probably not removing all of the cross subsidy (because some index of 
average salary growth will have to be adopted by the pension scheme), 
the problem is at least controlled. It is also demonstrably equitable and 
consistent with the idea of pensions representing deferred pay. 
Personal pension plans will always have something to offer employ-
ees. For example, they can be much more flexible than occupational 
pension schemes. In particular, the majority of persons in paid em-
ployment do not have access to occupational pension schemes. Money 
purchase pension schemes cannot offer insurance to the same degree as 
a defined benefit pension scheme. The results of this paper reinforce 
the work of others (for example, Davies and Ward, 1992) in demon-
strating the difficulties of relying on money purchase arrangements, 
particularly for the less well paid. It is possible to develop a reasonably 
straightforward pension scheme that can offer a fair level of benefit to 
many different categories of employee. 
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Appendix l-Glossary of Terms 
Additional Voluntary Contributions-In the U.K., members of occupa-
tional pension schemes are allowed to make additional voluntary 
contributions, up to certain limits of their salaries, in order to in-
crease their benefits in retirement. The contributions attract the 
same tax relief as ordinary contributions to a pension scheme. 
Appropriate Personal PenSion Plan-If an individual chooses to con-
tract out of the state earnings-related scheme through a personal 
pension plan, the U.K. Department of Social Security pays part of 
the individual's national insurance contributions to an appropri-
ate personal pension plan. This is known as the contracted out 
rebate. The contributions must be accounted for separately from 
the plan participant's other contributions. More than half of the 
persons who have personal pension plans only have an appropri-
ate personal pension plan; that is, they do not make any additional 
contribution beyond the rebate made by the Department of Social 
Security (Williams and Field, 1993). 
Basic State Pension-In the U.K. (and most other developed countries) 
the government pays a pension to those persons over the state 
retirement age who satisfy certain eligibility requirements. In 
the U.K. eligibility depends on the number of national insurance 
contributions paid. Within European Union countries the level of 
this pension varies between approximately 15 percent of average 
salary and 25 percent of average salary. 
Limited Price Increases-In the U.K. the 1994 Pensions Act prescribes 
that for pensions accrued after April 1, 1997, defined benefit pen-
sion schemes must increase the pension in payment by limited 
price increases. That is, pensions in payment must be increased 
by the minimum of 5 percent or the rate of increase in the Retail 
Prices Index over a year. 
Linked and Nonlinked Policies-The value of contributions paid to 
linked poliCies will change according to an associated investment 
fund. Depending on the fund chosen, the contributions will be 
more or less secure. The value of nonlinked poliCies can only in-
crease and will do so at the rate of bonus declared by the insurance 
company. 
National Insurance Contributions-In the U.K. the national insurance 
contributions are a tax levied on employees and employers for so-
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cial insurance benefits provided by the state. Employees only pay 
the tax (which is scaled according to the amount earned) on pay 
under the upper earnings limit. The insurance cover includes, for 
example, unemployment benefits and maternity benefits, as well 
as the basic state pension and the state earnings-related penSion. 
Occupational Pension Scheme-A pension scheme providing pensions 
in respect to a period of employment with an employer partici-
pating in the pension scheme. The participating employer must 
make regular contributions to the scheme. Employees of partici-
pating employers can join the pension scheme, provided they sat-
isfy its eligibility rules. Many occupational pension schemes only 
cover certain categories of staff; frequently temporary employees 
or those working part time are excluded (GAD, 1991). Member-
ship cannot be compulsory. Whether employees who choose to 
join the pension scheme make contributions depends only on the 
scheme rules. The pension scheme can be defined benefit or de-
fined contribution. 
State Earnings-Related Pension-Some governments provide pensions 
in excess of the basic level described above. This pension is usu-
ally salary related, although it is common for the definition of pen-
sionable salary used in the calculation to be capped. In the U.K. 
the pension is called the state earnings-related pension scheme 
(SERPS), and it is based on an individual's upper band earnings 
[the salary between the lower earnings limit (approximately equal 
to the basic state pension) and the upper earnings limit (approxi-
mately seven times the lower earnings limit)]. SERPS is effectively 
a revalued career average scheme, with an earnings cap. 
Appendix 2-Career Patterns 
Using the information provided in studies such as those by Martin 
and Roberts (1984) and Dex (1984), and after discussion with the Equal 
Opportunities COmmission, Davies and Ward (1992) use the career pat-
terns given below: 
1) No Breaks-Employed full-time throughout working life. 
2) Break and Part-Time-Employed full-time until a relatively few years 
are taken from paid employment for child care followed by part-
time employment until retirement. 
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3) Break and Full-Time-Employed full-time until a longer break from 
paid employment is taken for child care followed by full-time em-
ployment. 
4) Break and Mixed-Employed full-time until relatively few years are 
taken from paid employment for child care followed by a mixture 
of unemployment, part-time and full-time employment, finishing 
with a gap in the employment record. 
5) Late Break-Only two periods away from full-time paid employment, 
the first for child care, the second over the period up to age 60 
for other types of family care. There is also a period of unemploy-
ment. 
6) Late Start-A gap in paid employment until the mid-20s, followed 
by full-time paid employment except for a short break for child 
care. 
(Davies and Ward, 1992) 
The categories used in this paper are given in Table Al which summa-
rizes the paid work in different five year periods. Thus, for example, 
a "break-and-mixed" category employee is assumed to be working part 
time in paid employment for 75 percent of the week between the ages 
45 and 49. The full-time-and-bonus category is assumed to work over-
time until age 45 and then to continue basic full-time work 
Table A2 presents the time spent in paid employment by each cat-
egory as a percentage of the maximum assumed possible of 40 years 
and the total service pension accrued as a percentage of that accrued 
by a full-time employee. 
If the salary of each category of employee were assumed to grow 
at the same rate regardless of whether the employee was in full-time 
or part-time work or employed or unemployed, then the ratios of total 
service pension to full-time pension would be the same as the ratios of 
service. The differences occur because it is assumed that salaries grow 
at different rates, depending on employment status. Table A2 indicates 
the retirement income lost, relative to the full-time income, due to the 
different working profiles. 
Table Al 
Assumed Working Histories of Different Categories of Employee 
Age Range 
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 
Full-Time 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Break and Mixed 1 1 0 0.4 0 0.75 1 0 
Late Break 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Break and Part-Time 1 1 0 0.4 0.4 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Early Break and Full-Time 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Late Break and Full-Time 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Short Break and Full-Time 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Long Break and Full-Time 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Late Start 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Full-Time & Bonus 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 1 1 
Cyclical 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
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Table A2 
Comparing Time in Paid Employment 
And Total Service Pension 
Total Service Pension: 
Real Salary Growth of: 
Service 1% 2% 
Full-Time 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Break and Mixed 51.9% 40.5% 31.6% 
Late Break 62.5% 53.8% 46.4% 
Break and Part-Time 63.1% 47.3% 35.5% 
Early Break and Full-Time 75.0% 67.9% 61.5% 
Late Break and Full-Time 75.0% 67.9% 61.5% 
Short Break and Full-Time 87.5% 83.3% 79.3% 
Long Break and Full-Time 62.5% 53.8% 46.4% 
Late Start 75.0% 67.9% 61.5% 
Full-Time & Bonus 112.5% 100.0% 100.0% 
Cyclical 50.0% 41.0% 33.6% 
45 
Appendix 3-Results for Basic Pension and Average 
Salaries 
Most persons who have enrolled in personal pension schemes have 
paid only the minimum contribution (that is, the contracted out rebate). 
For someone earning an average wage in the 1995/96 tax year, this 
amounted to just less than 5 percent of upper band earnings.1 5 Table 
A3 shows that in many cases this level of contribution would provide a 
pension not much greater than the basic state pension. 
Table A3 also illustrates a potential problem that may arise due to 
the British government's current policy of uprating the basic state pen-
sion in line with prices rather than earnings. In the discussion on money 
purchase pension schemes, Table 14 demonstrates that the least ben-
eficial experience for a money purchase pension scheme (of the bases 
considered) was 4 percent real investment return and 2 percent real 
lSUpper band earnings are those earnings between the lower earnings limit (£358 per 
week in 1995/6) and the upper earnings limit (£440 per week in 1995/6). The state 
earnings-related pension is based on upper band earnings. 
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Table A3 
Pension Provided by a Contribution of 5 Percent Salary, 
Expressed as a Proportion of the Basic State Pension 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Full-Time 184.1% 245.9% 216.6% 286.0% 
Break and Mixed 99.2% 138.0% 105.8% 146.6% 
Late Break 122.3% 168.3% 134.9% 184.4% 
Break and Part-Time 110.9% 151.7% 118.3% 161.5% 
Early Break and Full-Time 117.6% 153.6% 132.1% 170.9% 
Late Break and Full-Time 127.3% 170.3% 142.5% 188.9% 
Short Break and Full-Time 152.7% 203.4% 175.2% 230.7% 
Long Break and Full-Time 106.8% 144.8% 116.8% 157.1% 
Late Start 115.9% 149.7% 130.6% 167.4% 
Full-Time & Bonus 211.5% 284.3% 247.1% 328.5% 
Cyclical 93.0% 127.6% 100.3% 136.8% 
salary growth. Here it appears that 4/1 is the worst. Similarly it ap-
pears 5/2 gives a lower pension than 5/1. This happens because the 
basic state pension has been assumed to increase in line with prices 
only. That is, the increase in salaries enters the equation on the asset 
side (as increased contributions) only and not the liability side (where 
it can represent increased standard of living). 
We can present the pensions in Table A3 as a proportion of average 
full-time earnings at retirement. The results are given in Table A4. 
While the pension provided under the 4/2 assumption is a smaller 
proportion of average salary than the pension provided under the 4/1 
assumption, it is a larger amount. The assumption of 2 percent real 
salary growth means that more contributions are paid to the scheme, 
but not to such an extent that the pension can compensate for the larger 
growth in average earnings. 
The basic state penSion is currently about 15 percent of average 
earnings. If real rates of salary increase 1 percent per annum, in 40 
years the basic state pension would be only 10 percent of average earn-
ings; if real salaries increase 2 percent, it would be 7 percent. Now 
we can see the small amount of pension that some employees who con-
tribute only the minimum amount to a money purchase penSion scheme 
can expect to receive at retirement. 
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Table A4 
Pension Provided by a Contribution of 5 Percent Salary, 
Expressed as a Proportion of Average Earnings 
4/1 5/1 4/2 5/2 
Full-Time 35.5% 47.4% 28.4% 37.5% 
Break and Mixed 19.1% 26.6% 13.9% 19.2% 
Late Break 23.6% 32.4% 17.7% 24.2% 
Break and Part-Time 21.4% 29.2% 15.5% 21.2% 
Early Break and Full-Time 22.7% 29.6% 17.3% 22.4% 
Late Break and Full-Time 24.5% 32.8% 18.7% 24.8% 
Short Break and Full-Time 29.4% 39.2% 23.0% 30.3% 
Long Break and Full-Time 20.6% 27.9% 15.3% 20.6% 
Late Start 22.3% 28.9% 17.1% 22.0% 
Full-Time & Bonus 40.8% 54.8% 32.4% 43.1% 
Cyclical 17.9% 24.6% 13.2% 18.0% 
By gradually devaluing the basic state pension, the British govern-
ment will find an increasing number of pensioners either accepting in-
creasing levels of poverty or claiming income support.16 
16Income support in the U.K. is a means tested social security benefit paid to those 
on low income. 
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Seeking the Profitability-Risk-Competitiveness 
Frontier Using a Genetic Algorithm 
Ronnie Tan* 
Abstract 
Monte Carlo simulation is used to develop a flexible framework to measure 
the profitability, risk, and competitiveness of any insurance product. A ge-
netic algorithm is then used to seek the optimum asset allocations that form 
the profitability-risk-competitiveness frontier and to examine the profitability, 
risk, and competitiveness trade-off's. We also show how to select the appro-
priate asset allocation and crediting strategy in order to position the product 
at the deSired location on the profitability-risk-competitiveness spectrum. 
Key words and phrases: asset allocation, product positioning, risk-based capital, 
Monte Carlo simulation, capital asset pricing model 
1 Introduction 
Monte Carlo l simulation has been widely accepted as a valid method 
of valuing path-dependent cash flows. Hull (1993) applies Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques to derivatives, Hayre and Lauterbach (1995) ap-
ply them to mortgage-backed securities, and Asay, Bouyoucos, and Mar-
ciano (1993) apply them to pricing single premium deferred annuities. 
In recent years, asset-liability management actuaries also have begun 
*Ronnie Tan, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., is an actuarial assistant in the Corporate Finance de-
partment at Equitable of Iowa Companies. He received his B.S. degree in actuarial sci-
ence from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 1994. Since joining Equitable of Iowa 
Companies in 1994, his assigmnents have included interest rate risk management, eq-
uity index annuity hedging, dynamic pricing, corporate financial projections, cash flow 
testing, risk based capital, and surplus management. 
Mr. Tan's address is: Equitable of Iowa Companies, 909 Locust Street, Des Moines, IA 
50309-2899, USA. Internet address: rytan@equitable-of-iowa.com 
1 For an introduction to Monte Carlo simulation in general see, for example, Kalos 
and Whitlock (1986). 
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using Monte Carlo simulation to value insurance company liabilities 
and these liabilities' option-adjusted durations and convexities.2 
Although asset-liability management actuaries are using Monte Carlo 
simulation in their work, product development actuaries have yet to 
widely apply it. This is because Monte Carlo simulation techniques, as 
they now exist, do not address the needs of the product development 
actuary. In pricing their products, product development actuaries want 
to know the following: 
• Will the capital invested by the company earn more than the com-
pany's cost of capital? 
• Will the risk of selling the product be acceptable? 
• Will the product be competitive enough to meet the company's 
sales target? 
• How should the company invest in order to balance the above 
three criteria? 
The 1993 paper by Asay, Bouyoucos, and Marciano does not meet the 
above needs for product development actuaries for the following rea-
sons: 
• Product development actuaries are concerned with distributable 
earnings after considering the surplus required to satisfy both reg-
ulators and rating agencies. They are concerned with the liability 
cash flows only when they impact distributable earnings. 
• Profitability, risk, and competitiveness of a product must be con-
sidered in pricing. By matching durations and convexities, an at-
tempt is made to minimize the risk component of the product. It 
may be desirable, however, to take additional risk to enhance the 
profitability and competitiveness of a product. Asay, Bouyoucos, 
and Marciano formulated a profitability measure using option-
adjusted spreads. Their measure is, however, defiCient because it 
only requires an asset option-adjusted spread that is greater than 
the liability option-adjusted spread. Though such option-adjusted 
spreads may result in positive profits, they do not ensure that the 
profits are sufficient to cover the cost of capital. 
2For more discussion and detail on the market value of liabilities, see the American 
Academy of Actuaries Task Force on Fair Valuation of Liabilities (1995), Merfeld (1996), 
and Reitano (1997). 
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• The investment allocation likewise must be considered in pric-
ing. While asset-liability management actuaries extensively work 
to determine the ideal asset allocation to back the liability, their 
definition of "ideal" has always been that of minimizing risk. A 
new definition that balances profitability, risk, and competitive-
ness is needed. 
Section 2 introduces a framework through which profitability, risk, 
and competitiveness of a product can be measured. In calculating pro-
fitability and risk, emphasis is placed on distributable earnings.3 These 
earnings are not only determined by the profit stream of the product, 
but are also dependent on the target surplus required by regulators and 
rating agencies. We use the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners (NAIC) risk-based capital formula as a proxy for the target 
surplus needed to be held. 
In Section 3 we provide a brief description of a genetic algorithm 
and provide references for more detailed information. A genetic algo-
rithm is then used to determine the ideal asset allocation for a single 
premium deferred annUity. We show that there is no single asset alloca-
tion that can be considered ideal. Rather, we have a set of asset alloca-
tions forming the profitability-risk-competitiveness frontier. With the 
genetic algorithm, asset allocations close to the frontier can be found. 
Section 4 describes a method to quantify the profitability-risk-com-
petitiveness trade-off's. Once these factors are quantified, deCisions on 
where to position the product on the profitability-risk-competitiveness 
spectrum can be made by restating the first three concerns of product 
development actuaries as constraints on each of the three measures 
defined in Section 2. 
2 Profitability-Risk-(ompetitiveness Framework 
For the n-th path of the Monte Carlo simulation, let ry,t,n denote 
the yield curve path with y = 0.25,0.5,1,2, ... ,30 denoting the point 
on the yield curve, t = 0,1,2, ... , T denoting the time period (be it 
monthly, quarterly, or annually), and n = 1, 2, ... ,N denoting the path 
number. Many models can be used to generate these paths. Under 
each model, many decisions must be made about the values to be used 
for parameters. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe and 
3Distributable earnings are after tax statutory earnings plus changes in target sur-
plus, Le., they are net cash flows facing the insurance company. They represent how 
much the insurance company has to put in and how much it can take out from the 
project (of selling the product). 
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evaluate the various models available. The model selected should be 
arbitrage free, however, and the values used for the parameters in the 
model should be justifiable. Models that are not arbitrage free will 
result in mispricing the various asset classes. Hull (1993) describes 
some of these models. 
Once the yield curve paths have been generated, an asset-liability 
model is used to calculate the distributable earnings of the insurance 
product. The asset-liability model will consider the asset allocation 
used, the investment strategy under positive and negative cash flows, 
the interest-crediting strategy of the product, the required target sur-
plus, competitor rates, and mortality, lapse, and expense assumptions. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail asset-liability modeling. 
Asay, Bouyoucos, and Marciano (1993) provide further detail on the 
topic. 
Let DEt,n denote the distributable earnings for time period t and the 
path number n. The present value of distributable earnings for path n 
can be calculated as 
T 
PVDE = I DEt,n (1) 
n t;O nk-;:'~(l + rO.25,k,n + s)M 
where ~t is the length of each time period and 5 is the risk premium that 
must be added to the risk free rate in order to arrive at the appropriate 
discount rate for distributable earnings. 
From the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the required 
return on a project or a security, R, is given by 
where RF is the risk free rate, {3 is a measure of the riskiness of the 
project or security relative to the market, and RM - RF is the market 
risk premium. If we assume that the product being priced has risk 
similar to that of the insurance company as a whole, and the {3 of the 
insurance company can be reasonably estimated, the risk premium in 
equation (1) can be replaced with: 
(2) 
The market risk premium RM - RF has been estimated by Brealey and 
Myers (1991, Chapter 8, page 161) to be 8.40 percent, resulting in 5 := 
0.084{3. Clearly 5 is similar to the option-adjusted spread of mortgage-
backed securities as described in Hayre and Lauterbach (1995) and the 
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option-adjusted spread of single premium deferred annuities as de-
scribed in Asay, Bouyoucos, and Marciano (1993). 
The profitability measure now can be defined as the sample mean 
of PVDE (Le., E[PVDE]) and the risk measure as its sample standard 
deviation (Le., 51D [PVDE]), Le., 
Profitability Measure 
N 
.l L PVDEn (3) 
N n=l 
Risk Measure 
N 
N ~ 1 L (PVDEn - E[PVDE])2. (4) 
n=l 
Finally, the competitiveness measure can be tailored to the type of prod-
uct. It may be appropriate to look at the credited interest rate for de-
ferred annuities and fund-based life insurance such as universal life. 
For traditional life insurance we may want to use the annual premium 
as the competitiveness criterion, while for immediate annuities we may 
want to examine the periodic payments the policyholder will receive. 
3 Genetic Algorithms: Overview and Example 
3.1 What is a Genetic Algorithm?4 
The birth of the genetic algorithm is generally attributed to Holland 
(1975). Descriptions of the ideas behind these algorithms can be found 
in Goldberg (1989). 
Genetic algorithms are fundamentally different from classical algo-
rithms. The differences are based on four principles (Goldberg, 1989): 
1. Genetic algorithms use a coded representation of the parameters, 
not the parameters themselves; 
2. Genetic algorithms search from a population of solution vectors, 
not a single solution vector; 
4The description of a genetic algorithm used in this section is taken from Brig-
ger (1995). Brigger's dissertation can be accessed on the World Wide Web at 
http.//ltswww.epf/.ch/pub_files!brigger/thesis_html/node58.html. One can also visit ge-
netic algorithm web sites such as http://www.aic.nrl.navy.mil/galist/for more informa-
tion. Applications of genetic algorithms to actuarial investments are given in Barber 
(1995) and Wendt (1995). 
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3. Genetic algorithms exclusively use values of the function under 
study and do not consider auxiliary information, such as the deriva-
tive; and 
4. Genetic algorithms use probabilistic transition rules, not deter-
ministic rules. 
The function parameters-or the "living being" -are represented by 
a structure called a chromosome. Genetic algorithms manipulate chro-
mosomes to profit from and exploit similarities between different per-
forming chromosomes. Genetic algorithms optimize a population of 
chromosomes, unlike other methods that optimize only a single so-
lution vector. The probability to select a false solution is reduced by 
considering several solution vectors of high performance. Genetic al-
gorithms remain highly general because their optimization is directly 
based on the function values. There are no limitations set to continu-
ous and derivable functions. Transition rules of genetic algorithms are 
stochastic and not deterministic as in many other algorithms. Yet there 
remains an important difference between genetic algorithms and ran-
dom search algorithms, where decisions uniquely based on pure chance 
guide the exploration. Genetic algorithms benefit largely from the avail-
able information within the current population and use chance only to 
guide their exploration. 
As in any optimization procedure, three associated objects are char-
acteristic for genetic algorithms: 
1. The environment of the system undergoing optimization; 
2. The adaptive plan that determines successive structural modifi-
cations in response to the environment; and 
3. A measure of the performance of different chromosomes in the 
environment. 
The first and third points are given by the problem, and the task of the 
genetic algorithm is to control the mixture of operators that affect the 
system undergoing optimization. Thus, the workings of the system are 
conveyed in the adaptive plan which determines what chromosomes 
arise in response to its environment. A given chromosome performs 
differently in different environments, it is more or less fit, and it is the 
adaptive plan's task to produce chromosomes that perform well (are 
fit) in the environment confronting it. 
The key problem for the adaptive plan is that it has absolutely no 
information about which chromosomes are most fit. In order to ob-
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tain this information, the plan must test and evaluate different chro-
mosomes within the environment. Based on the fitness of each, the 
adaptive plan draws a selection. The adaptiveness is invoked when dif-
ferent environments cause different chromosomes to be selected. Suc-
cessive structural modifications dictated by an adaptive plan amount 
to a sequence or trajectory through the set of all attainable chromo-
somes. For a plan to be adaptive, the trajectory must depend upon 
which environment is present. 
3.2 An Example Using a Deterministic Genetic Algorithm 
Suppose we have a single premium deferred annuity (SPDA) as de-
scribed in Table 1 and an asset-liability model with assumptions as 
described in Table 2. Furthermore, we have the ability to invest in the 
types of assets as shown in Table 3. 
Policy Characteristics 
Premium: 
Average Policy Size: 
Guarantee Period: 
Minimum Rate: 
Surrender Charges: 
Free Withdrawal: 
Sales Commissions: 
Issuance Expenses: 
Table 1 
Description of SPDA 
Description 
$1,000,000; 
$50,000; 
1 year for both initial and renewal rates; 
3.00%; 
7% year 1, declining 1% per year; 
10%; 
5% of premium; 
0.1% of premium; 
Administrative Expenses: $20 per policy per annum; 
Fund value. Death Benefit: 
Given the specifications of the SPDA and the asset-liability model, 
the goal is to determine the asset allocation that will satisfy the prod-
uct development actuary in terms of profitability, risk, and competi-
tiveness. With ten different types of assets, however, there is a wide 
range of possible asset allocations to consider. This is where a genetic 
algorithm is able to help. Genetic algorithms allow solutions to evolve 
from one generation to the next, with the new generation of solutions 
superior to the prior generation. 
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Table 2 
Asset-Liability Model Assumptions 
Model Component Assumption 
Projection Period: 
Target Surplus: 
Federal Income Tax Rate: 
Company Beta: 
Mortality: 
Sex Distribution: 
Issue Age: 
Base Lapses: 
Dynamic Lapses: 
Maximum Lapses: 
Competitor Rate: 
Crediting Strategy: 
Investment Strategies Under 
-Positive Cash Flows: 
-Negative Cash Flows: 
Number of Scenarios: 
25 years; 
200% of NAIC company action 
level capital; 
35%; 
1.00; 
1975-1980 SOA mortality rate; 
50% male, 50% female; 
60; 
2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 30%, 
10%,10% ... ; 
Considers difference between 
competitor rate and credited 
rate, and surrender charge re-
maining; 
50%; 
Maximum of five year treasury 
rate and 3.5%; 
Subtract 220 basis points from 
asset yield; 
Invest in the same allocation as 
the initial allocation; 
Sell assets in proportion to their 
market values at the time of 
sale; 
100, starting with the Decem-
ber 31, 1996 yield curve. 
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To begin the genetic algorithm process, it is necessary to define the 
first generation of solutions. One possible way is to define asset allo-
cations that are 100 percent of each of the asset types. Table 4 shows 
the results of these allocations. We observe the following from Table 4: 
• The level of profitability is higher for A bonds, less for commer-
cial mortgages, and least for BB bonds. Based on the NAlC risk-
based capital formula, A bonds require the least capital, commer-
cial mortgages more capital, and BB bonds the most capital. 
• Investing in longer maturity assets will result in higher risk. In 
general, the market values of longer maturity assets are more sen-
sitive to changes in the yield curve. Because policyholders have 
the option to surrender their policies at book value, the insurance 
company is exposed to most of the fluctuations in the market val-
ues of the assets. 
• Because of the crediting strategy of deducting a fixed spread from 
the asset yield to arrive at the credited rate, assets with higher 
yields will result in a more competitive SPDA. There is no require-
ment that the spread has to be the same for different asset allo-
cations. 
Table 3 
Types of Assets Available to Invest 
Spread Over 
Type Asset Treasury Curve 
1 3 Year Noncallable A Bond +35 basis points 
2 5 Year Noncallable A Bond +40 basis points 
3 7 Year Noncallable A Bond +45 basis points 
4 10 Year Noncallable A Bond +60 basis points 
5 5 Year Noncallable BB Bond +165 basis points 
6 7 Year Noncallable BB Bond +185 basis points 
7 10 Year Noncallable BB Bond +220 basis points 
8 5 Year Commercial Mortgage +140 basis points 
9 7 Year Commercial Mortgage +145 basis points 
10 10 Year Commercial Mortgage + 150 basis points 
Note: All commercial mortgages have a 20 year amortization schedule. 
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Table 4 
Generation 1 Results 
Asset Allocation: 100% in Mean STD ICR 
3 Year Noncallable A Bond 15,654 7,657 4.13% 
5 Year Noncallable A Bond 11,346 13,184 4.35% 
7 Year Noncallable A Bond 6,391 18,787 4.55% 
10 Year Noncallable A Bond 3,377 25,371 4.79% 
5 Year Noncallable BB Bond -11,018 11,340 5.25% 
7 Year Noncallable BB Bond -17,287 16,700 5.59% 
10 Year Noncallable BB Bond -21,132 22,415 6.04% 
5 Year Commercial Mortgage -33 8,765 5.48% 
7 Year Commercial Mortgage -1,496 12,797 5.67% 
10 Year Commercial Mortgage -1,074 17,445 5.81% 
Notes: MEAN = Mean of PVDE; STD = Standard Deviation of PVDE; and 
ICR = Initial Credited Rate. 
To create the second generation of solutions, it is possible to select 
any two first generation solutions and combine them. Thus, combining 
a 100% Type 2 (Le, in 5-year-noncallable-A-bonds) allocation and a 100% 
Type 8 (Le., in 5-year-commercial-mortgages) allocation will result in 
an asset allocation with a 50 percent weight in each of Types 2 and 
8 assets. With ten different allocations from which to choose, we are 
able to create 45 (Le., C20)) new asset allocations to form the second 
generation of solutions. After the second generation, with 55 different 
asset allocations in our solution set we can create up to 1,485 (Le., (Sn) 
different asset allocations to form the third generation of solutions. It 
is impractical, however, to run the asset-liability model for so many 
different asset allocations. Biased reproduction, based on the fitness 
of an asset allocation, is imposed to limit the number of solutions we 
have for the third and later generations. 
Let 0 denote the set of all asset allocations that can be formed from 
the ten asset types shown in Table 3. For an asset allocation j E 0, let 
F(j) denote its fitness score, defined as: 
(5) 
where 
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F(P) (j) 
F(R)(j) 
E[PVDE]j - E[PVDE]min 
E[PVDE]max - E[PVDE]min 
SID [PVDE] max - SID [PVDE]j 
SID [PVDE] max - SID [PVDE]min 
ICRj - ICRmin 
ICRmax - ICRmin 
Mean of PVDE for allocation j 
59 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) F(C) (j) 
E[PVDE]j 
SID [PVDE]j 
ICRj 
Standard deviation of PVDE for allocation j, and 
Initial credited rate for allocation j. 
From Table 4 we obtain: 
E[PVDE]max 
E[PVDE]min 
SID [PVDE] max 
SID [PVDE] min 
ICRmax 
ICRmin 
15,654 
-21,132 
25,371 
7,657 
6.04% 
4.13%. 
If there are two asset allocations j, k E Q such that F(P) (j) < F(P) (k), 
F(R) (j) < F(R) (k), and F(C) (j) < F(C) (k), we say that asset allocation k 
dominates asset allocationj. When this occurs we force asset allocation 
j to become extinct and eliminate it from our solution set. Asset allo-
cations that are not dominated by other asset allocations will remain 
in the solution set. Only the fittest asset allocations (Le., those with 
the highest fitness scores) of these survivors, however, will combine to 
produce new asset allocations for the next generation. 
A conscious effort is made to ensure that solutions across the pro-
fitability-risk-competitiveness spectrum are achieved so that the final 
solution set is not concentrated in a small part of the spectrum. Also, 
for diversity purposes, asset allocations representing as many different 
asset types as possible are selected to reproduce. After six generations, 
it can be observed that there is no longer much improvement in the 
fitness scores, implying that the solution set is close to the profitability-
risk -competitiveness frontier. 
Tables Al through A8 in the appendix show all the asset allocations 
in our solution set after generation six, while Figures 1 and 2 show the 
evolution of our solution set from generation one to generation six. 
Figures 1 and 2 are similar to the familiar efficient frontier of portfolio 
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theory, except they contain an additional variable. Instead of an effi-
cient frontier in the profitability-risk space, we now have an efficient 
frontier in the profitability-risk-competitiveness space. 
Figures 1 and 2 show that there is no asset allocation that simulta-
neously yields the highest profitability, the least risk, and the highest 
credited rate. In order to achieve a higher credited rate for the SPDA, we 
must reduce the profitability or increase the risk. We will now explore 
these trade-offs. 
4 Profitability-Risk-Competitiveness Trade-Offs 
Figure 1 does not allow us to quantify the trade-off between risk and 
competitiveness because the profitability measure has not been held 
constant. Similarly, Figure 2 does not allow us to quantify the trade-
off between profitability and competitiveness because the risk measure 
has not been held constant. To view the various trade-offs, we must 
include all three measures in a single graph. Before we construct such 
a graph, two points must be made: 
• Not all of the asset allocations shown in the appendix are fea-
sible. Although the profitability-risk-competitiveness profiles of 
these allocations are sufficiently attractive to allow them to sur-
vive through all generations, some of these allocations may not be 
in line with the investment policy of the insurance company. One 
such policy may be the requirement that the asset allocation can-
not be too concentrated in anyone asset category to reduce credit 
and sector risks. Because the model used in this paper does not 
consider such risks, there is a tendency for these risks to be ig-
nored . 
• We have assumed that the credited rate is determined by deduct-
ing 220 basis points from the asset yield. The spread of 220 basis 
points is by no means magical, and the insurance company is not 
bound to that number. The insurance company may even use a 
different spread for each policy year. We now assume that the 
spread can be any number. To simplify matters, however, we con-
tinue to assume that a level spread is used. For any given asset 
allocation, changing the spread will change the profitability-risk-
competitiveness profile of that allocation. 
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Figure 1 
Initial Credited Rate Versus STD [P\lDE] 
• 
• 
x 
• 
>t 
x • ~ ~ ~ x x 
if x ~ • II: X 
V >st )( • x \ x ~ ~\\ x x • 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 g 0 0 0 0 It) CD .,; .q: .q: M 
elBH pellpeJO IBIilUI 
~ 
0 q 
M 
§ 
g 
0 
0 
0 
III 
N 
0 
0 
0 
0 
N 
0 
0 
0 
~ 
0 
0 
0 
~ 
0 
0 
0 
III 
0 
61 
Iii' 
" 0 Q 
'" > ~e:. .. 
I=! " .. (!) VI 
• CD 
" 0 
'" ~
.. 
" .. (!) 
x 
62 
;ft. ;ft. 
0 0 
to 0 
<6 <6 
)t( 
~ 
x,;« 
• 
Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 5, No.1, 1997 
Figure 2 
Initial Credited Rate Versus E[PVDE] 
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Figure 3 redraws the final solution set shown in Figure 2 with two 
changes. First, the policy of limiting the combined allocation of BB 
bonds and commercial mortgages to 50 percent of the asset portfolio 
is imposed. Second, the spread of 220 basis points is relaxed to range 
from 20 basis pOints to 420 basis points. 
In Figure 3, points A, B, C, and the four points between them belong 
to the same asset allocation, with spreads ranging from 20 basis pOints 
to 420 basis points. The same case applies to points D, E, F, and the four 
points between them. Limiting our choice to asset allocations having a 
combined BB bonds and commercial mortgages allocation of not more 
than 50 percent reduces our solution set to the line BE while allowing the 
ability to change the spread to something other than 220 basis points 
expands our solution set to the area inside ABCFED. Any point within 
the area ABCFED can be reached by selecting an asset allocation along 
the line BE and then changing the spread. 
Figure 3 shows that when the spread is reduced to increase the cred-
ited rate, profitability is adversely impacted. Moving from point B to 
point A increases the credited rate by 200 basis points from 5.08 per-
cent to 7.08 percent, but reduces E[PVDE] from 5,695 to -55,876. Risk 
is reduced as well when the credited rate is increased. As shown in fig-
ure 4, SID[PVDE] is reduced from 14,783 at point B to 4,690 at point 
A. Crediting a high rate will make policyholders less likely to surrender 
their policies in rising interest rate scenarios, thereby reducing the loss 
from the sale of assets at low market values and making profits more 
stable. 
From the SID [P\lDE) values shown on Figure 4, it is possible to draw 
rough equivalent risk curves representing the points on the profitability-
competitiveness space where the risk level is the same. As expected, 
these curves have negative slopes which implies that if we keep the 
risk level constant, the only way to increase profitability is to reduce 
credited rate. The only way to increase credited rate is to reduce profit-
ability. Also, by increasing the acceptable risk level (shifting to a higher 
equivalent risk curve), we are able to increase profitability while keeping 
credited rate the same, increase the credited rate while keeping profit-
ability the same, or even increase both profitability and the credited 
rate. 
Figure 4 allows us to measure the various profitability-risk-compet-
itiveness trade-offs. The trade-off between profitability and competiti-
veness can be obtained by moving along an equivalent risk curve; the 
trade-off between profitability and risk can be obtained by mOving hor-
izontally; and the trade-off between competitiveness and risk can be 
obtained by moving vertically. 
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Figure 3 
Investment Policy Imposed and Varying Spread Allowed 
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In Section 1, we introduced four concerns of product development 
actuaries when doing their pricing work. We can use Figure 4 to ad-
dress these concerns if we recognize that the first three concerns can 
be restated as constraints on the three measures we have defined: 
• Setting E[PVDE] greater than zero will ensure that the insurance 
company earn more than its cost of capital; 
• Setting S1D[PVDE] less than, say, 10,000 (this is just an example, 
as the actual level will be subjective) will ensure that the risk level 
is acceptable; and 
• Setting the initial credited rate greater than, say, 5.00 percent 
(again, this is just an example) will make the product sufficiently 
competitive. 
Once these constraints are placed on Figure 4, it will not be difficult 
to determine the set of asset allocation/spread combinations that will 
meet these constraints. 
It is possible that when the constraints are placed on Figure 4, no 
possible solution will be found because the area of interest falls out-
side the area ABCFED. When this occurs, either the constraints must be 
adjusted to be more realistic or more asset types must be included in 
the analysis to expand the solution set to an area larger than ABCFED. 
The search for new asset classes is currently under way at many in-
surance companies as the competition they face intensifies. Some of 
these new asset classes include asset-backed securities, credit deriva-
tives, and emerging market debts. If the constraints cannot be adjusted 
and no new asset classes can be found, the company may want to re-
consider the feasibility of selling the product. 
A new asset class may be superior to existing asset classes because 
it is able to take advantage of loopholes in the risk-based capital for-
mula. For example, an asset-backed security may be given an invest-
ment grade rating by the NAIC when the assets backing the security 
are noninvestment grade assets. Thus, the insurance company buying 
the security will gain from the higher yield without having to put in 
the extra capital. Such loopholes will not last forever. Once regulators 
become aware of the loopholes, they will take measures to correct the 
situation. 
Some insurance companies may try to increase profitability by re-
ducing the amount of capital they use to fund their products. For ex-
ample, they may deCide to change the target surplus they use from 
200 percent to 150 percent of the NAIC company action level capital. 
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Such actions eventually will result in downgrades of their ratings. When 
downgrades occur the cost of capital will increase, and profitability will 
decrease on a present value basis. Also, downgraded ratings will make 
their products more difficult to sell. Maintaining the competitiveness 
of their products will require crediting higher rates, again reducing pro-
fitability toward the original level. 
5 Summary and Conclusion 
This paper presents a flexible methodology that meets the needs 
of product development actuaries. The methodology can be adapted to 
any product as long as the distributable earnings for the product can be 
modeled. Other asset types, including derivatives, can be added as long 
as the asset cash flows can be modeled. The weighting of the various 
components of the fitness score also can be adjusted to emphasize one 
of the three measures. 
The methodology is superior to the traditional pricing model in three 
ways. 
• The use of multiple scenarios allows the assessment of the risk of 
the product. Under the traditional approach where a static eco-
nomic environment is assumed, the risk of not achieving the re-
quired profit objectives due to changing economic environments 
cannot be measured. 
• The use of cost of capital that changes with the yield curve re-
sults in a more accurate profit measure. Under the traditional 
approach, distributable earnings are discounted at a fixed per-
centage. This ignores the fact that earning 12 percent when the 
90 day treasury rate is 5 percent is different from earning 12 per-
cent when the 90 day treasury rate is 15 percent. 
• The use of an asset-liability model allows us to determine the ap-
propriate asset allocation to back the product. Under the tradi-
tional approach, assets are not modeled. As such, the product 
development actuaries are not involved in the selection of the as-
set allocation. 
The investment community has long been aware of the first two 
weaknesses of the traditional approach. This is evident in the pricing 
of mortgage-backed securities by Hayre and Lauterbach (1995) where 
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Monte Carlo simulation techniques are used to overcome both the prob-
lem of path-dependent cash flows and the problem of discounting cash 
flows at a fixed rate under different paths. 
Asset-liability management actuaries have used the same techniques 
to value liability cash flows and to calculate their durations and convex-
ities. These models do not serve product development actuaries well 
because little emphasis is placed on profitability and the competitive-
ness of the product. This paper combines the strengths of both worlds 
and presents a general framework that can be adapted to any product. 
Despite these strengths, areas exist where further research is needed. 
Using the simple genetic algorithm described in this paper to seek the 
profitability-risk-competitiveness frontier is found to be efficient. Ge-
netic algorithms different from the one described in this paper, how-
ever, may be more efficient especially since the genetic algorithm we 
use lacks randomness and mutations. 
With the advent of more complicated products such as equity index 
annuities and life insurance, the need for models to simultaneously 
generate both equity and interest rate scenarios is compelling. Also, 
studies on policyholder behavior under various equity/interest rate en-
vironments are needed to model the product more accurately. 
CAPM is used to find the risk premium in equation (1). With all 
the controversy surrounding the appropriateness of CAPM, more work 
is needed to find a better method to calculate the risk premium. For 
mortgage-backed securities where a broad market exists, the market 
values can be used to back into the correct option-adjusted spread. 
Without a market for insurance products, it will be a challenge to create 
an accurate measure of the risk premium. 
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Table At » 
"" 0 
Solution Set After Generation Six "0 
"0 
Asset Types* ([) 
10 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year Initial :::l Co 
3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year BB Comm Comm Comm Credited X 
A Bond A Bond A Bond A Bond Bond Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE] Rate 
100.00% 15,654 7,657 4.13% 
100.00% -21,132 22,415 6.04% 
100.00% -33 . 8,765 5.48% '--
0 
100.00% -1,496 12,797 5.67% s:: 
..... 
100.00% -1,074 17,445 5.81% ::l ~ 
50.00% 50.00% 14,046 10,264 4.24% 0 
50.00% 50.00% 8,098 7,520 4.80% 
....., 
» 
50.00% 50.00% 6,605 11,884 4.97% 1"1 ,...,. s:: 
50.00% 50.00% 5,749 12,718 5.01% SlJ 
::::!. 
50.00% 50.00% 5,695 14,783 5.08% ~ 
50.00% 50.00% -11,072 14,785 5.76% 
" ..... 
50.00% 50.00% -11,531 17,157 5.86% SlJ 1"1 ,...,. 
50.00% 50.00% -11,344 19,760 5.93% ri' 
_(I) 
50.00% 50.00% -423 10,483 5.57% < 
50.00% 50.00% -121 12,798 5.65% 0 
50.00% 50.00% -1,096 14,953 5.74% U1 
75.00% 25.00% 14,993 8,889 4.18% z 
50.00% 25.00% 25.00% 12,690 11,593 4.29% 0 
50.00% 25.00% 25.00% 7,442 8,507 4.85% 
50.00% 25.00% 25.00% 7,444 9,572 4.88% \D 
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations \D 
"" 
Table A2 -i 
Solution Set After Generation Six 
$lJ 
:::l 
Asset Types* ""0 
"'"' 10 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year Initial 0 :::n 
3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year BB Comm Comm Comm Credited 
,.... 
$lJ 
0-
A Bond A Bond A Bond A Bond Bond Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE] Rate ,.... 
50.00% 25.00% 25.00% 6,658 10,747 4.93% -.:;: 
;:0 
25.00% 75.00% 12,878 11,629 4.30% VI 
25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 7,101 10,008 4.91% 7' n 
25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 7,063 11,066 4.94% 0 3 25.00% 25.00% 50.00% 6,389 10,964 4.95% "0 
(I) 
25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 6,345 11,962 4.99% ,.... ;::;: 
50.00% 25.00% 25.00% 6,317 11,814 4.96% <. (I) 
25.00% 50.00% 25.00% 2,746 13,194 5.33% :::l (I) 
25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 2,181 14,202 5.38% VI VI 
25.00% 25.00% 50.00% 2,222 15,268 5.41% "T1 
"'"' 25.00% 75.00% 1,938 12,822 5.31% 0 :::l ,.... 
25.00% 50.00% 25.00% 1,683 13,708 5.35% iii 
"'"' 25.00% 50.00% 25.00% 1,724 14,929 5.39% 
50.00% 25.00% 25.00% -11,081 15,812 5.81% 
25.00% 25.00% 50.00% -6,029 13,574 5.71% 
25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 25.00% -5,831 14,728 5.75% 
25.00% 25.00% 50.00% -5,779 16,005 5.79% 
25.00% 75.00% -6,578 14,864 5.76% 
25.00% 50.00% 25.00% -6,371 16,019 5.80% 
25.00% 25.00% 50.00% -6,251 17,236 5.83% 
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations '-l i-' 
Table A3 '-I N 
Solution Set After Generation Six 
Asset Types* 
10 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year Initial 
3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year BB Comm Comm Comm Credited 
A Bond A Bond A Bond A Bond Bond Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE] Rate 
75.00% 25.00% -123 9,532 5.53% 
75.00% 25.00% 69 10,745 5.56% 
50.00% 25.00% 25.00% -230 11,582 5.61% '-0 
75.00% 25.00% -1,227 13,850 5.70% s::: 
.... 
25.00% 75.00% -1,036 16,132 5.78% ~ ~ 
87.50% 12.50% 15,372 8,242 4.15% 0 
....., 
75.00% 25.00% 12,114 7,552 4.46% » 
75.00% 12.50% 12.50% 11,762 8,064 4.49% f"I .... s::: 
62.50% 12.50% 25.00% 11,849 8,234 4.49% !lJ .... 
62.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 11,518 8,728 4.52% iii· 
50.00% 37.50% 12.50% 7,800 8,004 4.83% \J .... !lJ 
50.00% 12.50% 25.00% 12.50% 7,034 9,545 4.89% f"I !:!. 
37.50% 12.50% 50.00% 7,913 8,290 4.83% f"I 
.!b 
37.50% 12.50% 25.00% 12.50% 12.50% 7,324 9,760 4.89% < 
37.50% 12.50% 25.00% 25.00% 7,297 10,299 4.91% 0 
37.50% 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 12.50% 6,939 10,246 4.92% VI 
-
37.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 6,898 10,753 4.94% z 
25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 12.50% 12.50% 7,098 10,525 4.92% 
0 
12.50% 12.50% 62.50% 12.50% 2,422 12,981 5.32% 
12.50% 75.0Q% 12.50% 1,681 10,904 5.41% \0 
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations 
\0 
'-I 
Table A4 -; 
Solutiou Set After Generation Six 
$U 
:::l 
Asset Types* 
" '""10 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year Initial 0 ::n 
3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year BB Comm Comm Comm 
..... 
Credited $U 0-
A Bond A Bond A Bond A Bond Bond Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE] Rate ;::;: 
12.50% 62.50% 12.50% 12.50% 1,509 11,359 5.43% -< ;;b 
12.50% 62.50% 25.00% 1,555 11,916 5.45% VI 
12.50% 50.00% 25.00% 12.50% 1,302 11,839 5.45% A n 
12.50% 50.00% 12.50% 25.00% 1,361 12,385 5.47% 0 3 
12.50% 87.50% 1,137 10,769 5.40% "0 (J) 
12.50% 75.00% 12.50% 1,083 11,167 5.42% ..... ;::t. 
12.50% 75.00% 12.50% 1,135 11,805 5.44% <. (J) 
12.50% 62.50% 25.00% 954 11,615 5.44% :::l (J) 
12.50% 62.50% 12.50% 12.50% 1,016 12,202 5.46% VI VI 
12.50% 12.50% 62.50% 12.50% -3,596 13,663 5.71% ""T1 
'"" 12.50% 12.50% 50.00% 25.00% -3,501 14,214 5.73% 0 :::l 
..... 
12.50% 12.50% 37.50% 37.50% -3,429 14,782 5.75% (J) 
'"" 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 50.00% -3,383 15,369 5.76% 
87.50% 12.50% -40 9,115 5.51% 
87.50% 12.50% 79 9,747 5.52% 
75.00% 12.50% 12.50% -17 10,109 5.55% 
62.50% 37.50% -257 9,992 5.55% 
62.50% 25.00% 12.50% -146 10,549 5.57% 
62.50% 12.50% 25.00% -77 11,121 5.59% 
50.00% 37.50% 12.50% -311 11,027 5.59% 
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations "'-I w 
Table AS '-l 
../::. 
Solution Set After Generation Six 
Asset Types* 
10 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year Initial 
3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year BB Comm Comm Comm Credited 
A Bond A Bond A Bond A Bond Bond Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE] Rate 
62.50% 37.50% -1,153 14,393 5.72% 
37.50% 62.50% -1,056 15,532 5.76% 
12.50% 87.50% -1,052 16,755 5.79% ~ 0 
62.50% 37.50% 10,149 7,516 4.63% c 
""' 62.50% 31.25% 6.25% 9,986 7,759 4.64% :J s:u 
62.50% 25.00% 12.50% 9,816 8,011 4.66% 0 
....... 
56.25% 6.25% 37.50% 10,043 7,870 4.65% » 
56.25% 6.25% 31.25% 6.25% 9,884 8,109 4.66% ("I .... c 
50.00% 12.50% 37.50% 9,914 8,234 4.66% s:u 
""' 50.00% 31.25% 18.75% 7,627 8,252 4.84% ~. 
43.75% 6.25% 50.00% 8,017 7,899 4.82% -0 
""' 
43.75% 6.25% 43.75% 6.25% 7,880 8,132 4.83% s:u("I .... 
43.75% 6.25% 37.50% 12.50% 7,738 8,377 4.84% ;::;. 
_(0 
43.75% 6.25% 31.25% 18.75% 7,573 8,622 4.85% < 
37.50% 12.50% 43.75% 6.25% 7,786 8,520 4.84% 0 
37.50% 6.25% 56.25% 7,002 7,947 4.90% U1 
-
31.25% 18.75% 50.00% 7,782 8,690 4.85% z 
31.25% 18.75% 43.75% 6.25% 7,666 8,914 4.86% 0 
25.00% 6.25% 68.75% 4,497 8,845 5.10% 
25.00% 6.25% 62.50% 6.25% 4,412 9,065 5.11% \.0 
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations \.0 '-l 
Table A6 
-I 
Solution Set After Generation Six !lI :::s 
Asset Types* '"'C 
..... 
10 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year Initial 0 :::P. 
3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year BB Comm Comm Comm Credited 
,.... 
!lI 
A Bond A Bond A Bond A Bond Bond Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE] Rate 0-
18.75% 6.25% 6.25% 68.75% 4,413 9,286 5.11% 
,.... 
-c;: 
6.25% 87.50% 6.25% 926 9,800 5.44% ~ til 
6.25% 81.25% 6.25% 6.25% 883 10,002 5.46% 7' n 6.25% 81.25% 12.50% 924 10,301 5.46% 0 
6.25% 75.00% 12.50% 6.25% 821 10,217 5.47% 3 "0 
6.25% 75.00% 6.25% 12.50% 863 10,506 5.48% (D ,.... 
6.25% 68.75% 18.75% 6.25% 748 10,443 5.48% 
;:::;: 
<' 
6.25% 68.75% 12.50% 12.50% 791 10,724 5.49% 
(D 
:::s 
(D 
6.25% 62.50% 25.00% 6.25% 665 10,675 5.49% til til 
6.25% 56.25% 31.25% 6.25% -1,650 11,008 5.60% ., 
..... 
6.25% 50.00% 37.50% 6.25% -1,724 11,253 5.61% 0 :::s 
6.25% 50.00% 31.25% 12.50% -1,674 11,532 5.62% 
,.... 
(D 
6.25% 43.75% 43.75% 6.25% -1,806 11,503 5.62% ..... 
6.25% 43.75% 37.50% 12.50% -1,753 11,779 5.63% 
6.25% 37.50% 50.00% 6.25% -1,895 11,757 5.63% 
6.25% 37.50% 43.75% 12.50% -1,841 12,031 5.64% 
6.25% 31.25% 56.25% 6.25% -1,993 12,019 5.64% 
93.75% 6.25% -35 8,925 5.49% 
93.75% 6.25% 40 9,248 5.50% 
87.50% 6.25% 6.25% 13 9,415 5.51% 
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations '-J 
V1 
Table A7 
" O'l Solution Set After Generation Six 
Asset Types* 
10 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year Initial 
3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year BB Comm Comm Comm Credited 
A Bond A Bond A Bond A Bond Bond Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE] Rate 
81.25% 18.75% -74 9,316 5.52% 
81.25% 12.50% 6.25% -15 9,610 5.53% 
81.25% 6.25% 12.50% 27 9,912 5.54% '--
75.00% 18.75% 6.25% -66 9,814 5.54% 0 t: 
..... 
68.75% 31.25% -185 9,759 5.54% :::l ~ 
68.75% 25.00% 6.25% -125 10,038 5.55% 0 
68.75% 18.75% 12.50% -77 10,321 5.56% 
....., 
» 
62.50% 31.25% 6.25% -196 10,269 5.56% n ..... 
t: 
56.25% 43.75% -337 10,234 5.56% SlJ 
..... 
56.25% 37.50% 6.25% -276 10,509 5.57% ~ 
46.88% 3.13% 50.00% 8,061 7,709 4.81% \J ..... 
43.75% 3.13% 53.13% 7,265 8,072 4.87% SlJ n 
..... 
25.00% 3.13% 68.75% 3.13% 4,390 8,371 5.12% ;::;. (1) 
25.00% 75.00% 4,002 7,804 5.14% -< 
25.00% 71.88% 3.13% 3,955 7,902 5.15% 0 
25.00% 65.63% 9.38% 3,887 8,127 5.16% V1 
-
21.88% 3.13% 3.13% 68.75% 3.13% 4,364 8,588 5.13% z 
21.88% 3.13% 75.00% 3,985 8,028 5.15% 0 
21.88% 3.13% 71.88% 3.13% 3,966 8,278 5.16% 
21.88% 3.13% 68.75% 6.25% 3,913 8,232 5.16% 1.0 
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations 1.0 
" 
-i 
$lJ 
:::I 
Table AS 
""0 
Solution Set After Generation Six """ 0 
::h 
Asset Types* ..... $lJ 
10 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year Initial C'" 
3 Year 5 Year 7 Year 10 Year BB Comm Comm Comm Credited ..... -c;: 
A Bond A Bond A Bond A Bond Bond Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage E[PVDE] STD[PVDE] Rate ;;:0 VI 
21.88% 3.13% 65.63% 9.38% 3,876 8,343 5.17% A n 18.75% 3.l3% 3.l3% 71.88% 3.l3% 3,663 9,027 5.19% 0 
18.75% 3.13% 3.l3% 56.25% 15.63% 3.13% 2,286 9,619 5.26% 3 
"U 
18.75% 3.l3% 78.l3% 3,281 8,466 5.21% II> :! .
18.75% 3.l3% 75.00% 3.13% 3,265 8,720 5.22% ..... <. 
18.75% 3.l3% 71.88% 6.25% 3,220 8,669 5.22% II> :::I 
II> 
3.13% 93.75% 3.l3% 459 9,266 5.46% VI VI 
3.l3% 90.63% 3.l3% 3.13% 462 9,362 5.47% "T1 
""" 3.l3% 90.63% 6.25% 480 9,510 5.47% 0 :::I 
3.l3% 84.38% 9.38% 3.13% 438 9,557 5.48% ..... II> 
3.l3% 68.75% 25.00% 3.13% -852 10,147 5.56% ..... 
96.88% 3.l3% -48 8,834 5.49% 
96.88% 3.13% 8 9,005 5.49% 
93.75% 3.13% 3.l3% -15 9,076 5.50% 
90.63% 9.38% -32 9,020 5.50% 
90.63% 6.25% 3.13% -8 9,169 5.50% 
87.50% 9.38% 3.l3% -9 9,265 5.51% 
*No solutions involving five year BB bonds or seven year BB bonds remain after six generations 
'-J 
'-J 
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Fuzzy Underwriting: An Application of Fuzzy Logic 
to Medical Underwriting 
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Abstract 
One of the most difficult issues in the medical underwriting of life insurance 
applicants is diabetes mellitus. Compiling the prognosticating parameters for 
diabetic applicants results in a complex system of mutually interacting factors. 
In addition, neither the prognosticating factors themselves nor their impact on 
the mortality risk is clear cut. 
We show how a fuzzy inference system can be used in underwriting dia-
betes mellitus. A fuzzy inference system can cope with the imprecise nature of 
medical parameters by converting them into fuzzy sets and aggregating them 
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using mathematical techniques. The fuzzy underwriting system presented 
goes further than previous applications of fuzzy set theory in insurance, as it 
is a real life application with contributions from insurance economics, insur-
ance medicine, and computer science. 
Key words and phrases: multiple risk factors, fuzzy inference, life insurance 
1 Introduction 
An important challenge in competitive life insurance markets is the 
accurate underwriting of prospective policyholders. Underwriting in 
life insurance is designed to determine and evaluate the individual mor-
tality risk of new applicants for insurance, and for current insureds who 
want to increase their amount of insurance. Underwriting quantifies 
the potential adverse deviations from "normal" mortality and converts 
them to higher premiums. 
The resulting risk surcharge is justified by subjective factors such 
as certain recreational and sport activities, professional factors such 
as miners vs. white collar workers, and specific medical factors. More 
specifically, medical underwriting is aimed at quantifying the current 
and future mortality and morbidity risks arising from a health impair-
ment and determining a premium commensurate with the overall risk. 
1.1 Insurance Medicine 
Since the early 1900s, insurance medicine has formed the scientific 
basis of medical underwriting in life insurance (Florschiitz, 1914). It 
has established the life-shortening of many medical conditions includ-
ing obesity and hypertensive diseases. No other medical discipline is 
involved with prognostic evaluations that span such long periods of 
time. Long-term prognosis is the most important feature distinguish-
ing insurance medicine from other fields of medicine (Deutsch, 1938). 
Though this long-term approach is necessary because of the long-term 
nature of life insurance policies, it may adversely affect the accuracy 
of estimating a particular individual's life expectancy. Few other scien-
tificstudies of human mortality, however, are designed to encompass 
decades. 
The established selection criteria used in the insurance business are 
riddled with flaws. For example, the mortality and morbidity rates de-
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termined decades ago are not applicable today.l During the years be-
tween the application for a policy and its payout of the benefit, med-
ical advances may significantly influence any predictions. Moreover, 
the problem is exacerbated by the fact that insurers rarely can iden-
tify whether death can be attributed to the disease for which the risk 
surcharge was once levied. Because of these weaknesses, insurance 
medicine has increasingly oriented its prognoses on studies developed 
using mathematical and statistical methods (Lew and Gajewski, 1990). 
The disease-related prognostic findings are compiled in manuals for 
reinsurance companies and provided to direct insurance companies. It 
is the job of the underwriter to document the individual diseases of an 
applicant and allocate them to a specific risk surcharge as defined by the 
manuals. The problem with this task is that the information available on 
a specific disease is usually not adequate for it to be accurately assigned 
to a defined group with a known prognosis. 
The basic problem can be illustrated with the diagnosis of chest pain. 
This vague diagnosis applies to a large group. The sole risk surcharge 
for a mention of the disease would be low, but it is unjustified for most 
members of the affected group. If chest pain were subclaSSified further 
as anterior myocardial infarction with moderate impairment of heart 
pumping action, this diagnosis would apply to only a small portion 
of the overall group. Hence, most of the applicants would be accepted 
with a normal premium; the few with the anterior myocardial infarction 
diagnosis would be rejected. 
1.2 Common Problems in Underwriting 
When the quality of information is poor, it is difficult to accurately 
allocate diseases to rating classes. Obtaining detailed information cre-
ates a delay in processing time and an increase in costs. The costs are 
imposing, when one considers the German experience: only 0.5 percent 
to 1.0 percent of all life insurance applications are rejected, 2.0 percent 
to 5.0 percent are accepted with a risk surcharge, and the 94 percent to 
97 percent are accepted at the normal premium.2 To achieve this result 
(and depending on the insurance company), 15 percent to 25 percent 
of all applicants are assessed in the underwriting department for extra 
mortality risks. Most underwriting is superfluous, i.e. the risk is under-
IAn example is the Medical Impairment Ratings from 1932, edited by the Actuarial 
Society of Anlerica and Association of Life Insurance Medical Directors. 
2The German experiences are compiled by the Federation of the German Life Insur-
ers, (Verband der Lebensversicherungsunternehmen E.V., Verbandrundschreiben Nr. 
31,1992). 
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written and the policy issued without any surcharge levied. To reduce 
this superfluous underwriting, many German insurance companies are 
developing and installing computer-assisted underwriting systems (Ue-
berscher et al., 1996). 
A problem of quality also exists, a problem that has not been tackled 
by computer-assisted expert systems. Table 1 shows the distribution of 
diseases for applicants for life insurance in Germany. Whereas some of 
the anomalies listed in Table 1 (such as hypertension and obesity) can 
be assessed automatically during application processing at the insur-
ance company, other medical problems are too complex for immediate 
assessment. One disease that poses a key problem in underwriting is 
diabetes mellitus, especially when it is manifested as type I (IDDM). Di-
abetes mellitus usually affects persons up to 30 years of age. Onset of 
the disease is prior to the typical age at which most persons apply for 
life insurance. But the disease is characterized by a multitude of differ-
ent clinical courses most of which are associated with a markedly lower 
life expectancy. There are unequivocal indicators for risk groups with 
a particularly poor prognosis. It is imperative that these indicators be 
surveyed and assessed within the scope of underwriting. 
Table 1 
Frequency of Abnormal Applications 
In Underwriting life Insurance in Germany 
Disease Frequency 
Hypertension 18% 
Disorders of lipid metabolism (hypercholesterolemia) 15 
Alcohol-related organ changes 13% 
Obesity 12% 
Diabetes mellitus 10% 
Heart disease 10% 
Asthma 6% 
Other 16% 
Source: Hannover Re, Karl-Wiechert·Allee 50, 30625 Hannover, Germany. 
1.3 Outline of the Paper 
The objective of this paper is to show how a fuzzy inference system 
can be used in the underwriting of an applicant with diabetes mellitus 
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for a life insurance policy. Fuzzy inference provides mathematical tools 
for deriving a crisp (Le., non-fuzzy) output from a multiple fuzzy input 
space. Fuzzy inference is useful in underwriting life insurance because 
the risk attributes of medical parameters are not "either/or" variables. 
An underwriting system based on fuzzy inference can cope with the 
imprecise nature of medical parameters by converting them into fuzzy 
sets and aggregating them. The fuzzy underwriting system differs from 
other risk assessment systems because it allows for gradual shifts in 
the input variables and allows for compensation between criteria. 
In Section 2 we introduce a theoretical framework delineating how 
fuzzy inference can be used to analyze risks in general and to scruti-
nize multiple prognostic factors in diabetes mellitus in particular. The 
paper goes further than previous applications of the fuzzy set the-
ory described in the insurance literature (see, for example, Lemaire, 
1990; Cummins and Derrig, 1993; Ostaszewski, 1993; Derrig and Os-
taszewski. 1995; and Young, 1996).3 The underwriting method is one 
of the first computer-based fuzzy underwriting system being imple-
mented in insurance. In addition, the paper takes an interdisciplinary 
approach: It integrates the theory of fuzzy inference with the princi-
ples of insurance medicine and programming techniques in computer 
science. 
Fuzzy underwriting provides powerful tools for the risk assessment 
of fuzzy and multiple prognostic factors. We believe that techniques 
of fuzzy underwriting will become standard tools for underwriters in 
the future. 
2 Basics of Fuzzy Set Theory and Fuzzy Inference 
2.1 Identification of Fuzzy Sets Over Membership Functions 
To understand what a fuzzy set is, one must first understand what 
a classical set is. In classical set theory, a set has a crisp (well defined) 
boundary. For example, in a set of real numbers A, expressed as 
A={xlx>10}, (1) 
a clear boundary point exists at 10, i.e., if x is greater than 10 it belongs 
to set A; otherwise it does not. This membership in a classical subset A 
of X can also be viewed as a characteristic function J.lA from X to {O, I}, 
Le., 
3DeWit (1982) is probably the first to consider underwriting to be a potential area of 
application of fuzzy set theory to insurance, but his analysis is not detailed. 
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{
I iff x E A and A <;; X 
JiA (x) = 0 iff x rt A and A <;; X. (2) 
The definition in equation (2) implies that a classical set only allows full 
membership or no membership. A fuzzy set is, on the other hand, a set 
without a crisp (well defined) boundary. The transition from belonging 
to a set ard not belonging to a fuzzy set is gradual and not absolute. 
The membership function for a fuzzy set defines how each point in 
the input space is mapped to a membership value between 0 and 1. 
As a result, an element may belong to a set with a certain degree of 
membership, not necessarily 0 or 1. The closer the value of JiA (x) is to 
1, the more x belongs to A. A common characterization of a fuzzy set 
A is 
A = {(x, JiA) I x E X and JiA : X - [0, In, (3) 
where x is the element of interest, JiA is the membership function of x 
in the subset A, and X is the universe of discourse. 
The only condition a membership function for a fuzzy set must sat-
isfy is that it has to vary between 0 and 1. The function itself can assume 
an arbitrary shape and is defined from the point of view of SimpliCity, 
convenience, and efficiency. Most common are monotonic, triangular, 
trapeZOidal, and bell-shaped membership functions; see Figure 1. 
Due to their SimpliCity, both triangular and trapezoidal member-
ship functions are used extensively. As the membership functions are 
composed of straight lines, however, they are not smooth at the transi-
tion points. The Gaussian and the generalized bell-shaped membership 
functions are smooth and nonzero at all points and are appropriate in 
cases where crisp transition points are misleading. To specify asymmet-
rical membership functions, the monotonic or sigmoidal membership 
functions can be used. An asymmetrical membership function is ap-
propriate for expressing concepts that gradually increase or decrease, 
such as height or weight.4 
As the membership function is the essential component of a fuzzy 
set, it is logical to define operations with fuzzy sets by membership 
functions. Analogous to ordinary set operations, Zadeh (1965) defines 
extended operations valid on fuzzy sets. The most important connec-
tions of verbal fuzzy expressions are the logical operations and and or. 
4The assignment of membership function to the collection of objects X is subjective. 
Therefore, there must be a rationale behind useful applications. Often the justification 
of an assignment relies on COmmon sense, expertise, empirical knowledge, and so on. 
In the fuzzy underwriting system, a medical expert has assigned membership functions 
to corresponding fuzzy sets. 
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Figure 1 
Membership Functions 
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b ) Trapezoidal 
d) Bell-Shaped 
Consider the fuzzy subsets A and B of the universal set X. In fuzzy set 
theory, and and or operations are defined with respect to the operators 
1\ and v respectively as follows: 
f.1A(X) 1\ f.1B(X) = min{f.1A(X),f.1B(X)} 
f.1A(X) v f.1B(X) = max{f.1A(x),f.1B(X)}. 
(4) 
(5) 
The intersection of A and B refers to the largest fuzzy set that is con-
tained in both A and B. Analogously, the union of A and B refers to the 
smallest fuzzy set containing both A and B. 
The max and min operators have the disadvantage that the result-
ing membership value cannot assume a value between the maximal and 
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minimal value, Le., extreme valuations cannot be offset by moderate 
ones. The max and min operators consider only one of the two mem-
bership functions. There are other operators with qualities for union 
and intersection that are different than those of max and min. These 
operators vary in their generality and justification of the connections to 
which they refer. Connectives consistent with the definitions for fuzzy 
and and fuzzy or have been proposed in the literature under the names 
T-norm and T-conorm operators, respectively (Dubois and Prade, 1980, 
p. 11). By following the basic requirements according to T-norms and 
T-conorms, the and/or operators can be customized as desired. As it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate T-norm and T-conorm, we 
refer the interested reader to Zimmermann (1991, pp. 28-43), in B6hme 
(1993, pp. 43-65), and in Klir and Yuan (1995, pp. 50-93). 
2.2 Fuzzy Inference Rules By Generalized Modus Ponens 
2.2.1 If-Then Rules 
The basic rule of inference is modus ponens.5 Using an "if-then" rule 
and a premise, one can investigate the truth of a conclusion. Consider 
the follOWing example: 
Rule: 
Premise: 
Conclusion: 
if x E A then y E B 
XEA 
Y EB. 
In this case of binary logic, the "if-then" rules are easy to follow. If 
the premise is true, then the conclusion is true. We normally employ 
the modus ponens in an approximate manner. The premise does not 
correspond exactly with the antecedent in the "if-then" rule. To allow 
for statements that are characterized by fuzzy sets, the modus ponens 
must be extended for gradual numerical values. 
Assume A and B are defined as fuzzy sets on the universes X and 
Y, respectively, Le., A = {(X,I1A) Ix E X} and B = {(Y,I1B) Iy E Y}. 
Now the modus ponens can be generalized as follows (Mizumoto and 
Zimmerman, 1982): 
5 Modus ponens means "demarcation inference" and belongs to the set of inference 
rules in the syllogism 
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Rule: 
Premise: 
Conclusion: 
if x E A then Y E B 
x EA' 
Y EB' 
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where A' is a fuzzy set.6The logic of this fuzzy example should be clear. 
If the premise is true to some degree of membership, then the conclu-
sion is also true to that same degree. In order to perform this general-
ized modus ponens, Zadeh (1973) proposes inference methods based 
on fuzzy logic. In essence, fuzzy inference is based on two concepts: a 
fuzzy implication (or fuzzy rule) and a composition rule of inference. 
The fuzzy rule "if x E A then Y E B" expresses a relation between 
the objects A and B. Without any loss of generality, we can define the 
fuzzy "if-then" rule as a binary fuzzy relation; a fuzzy rule is defined 
as the relation between the antecedent and the conclusion. For this 
purpose, let Rxy denote a fuzzy relation on the product space X x Y, 
then the fuzzy rule "if x E A then Y E B" is specified by the following 
membership function: 
(6) 
where 1\ refers to the intersection operator defined in equation (4) as 
the minimum connective.? We can complete the inference method of 
the generalized modus ponens by applying the compositional rule of 
inference (Zadeh, 1973). 
2.2.2 Compositional Rule 
Next we define the compositional rule on inference to be based on 
max min composition. Let A, A', and B be fuzzy sets in the universes 
X, X, and Y, respectively. Further, let Rxy represent the fuzzy relation 
"if x E A then Y E E". Therefore, we express the generalized modus 
ponens as 
j.1Rxy (x, Y) V XEA' {j.1A' (x) 1\ j.1Rxy (x, Y)} 
m~min{j.1A' (X),j.1R xy (X,y)}. (7) XEA 
6Throughout this paper, the prime notation is used to signify that the set is a fuzzy 
set. Thus A' is a fuzzy set, not the complement of A. 
7The binary fuzzy rule "if x E A then Y E Bn can be interpreted as A is coupled 
with B. This rule is an extension of the classical Cartesian product, where each element 
(x, y) E X X Y is identified with a membership grade denoted by JiRxy (x, y). 
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By applying this inference procedure we assign the conclusion a degree 
of membership from the intersection of the premise and the fuzzy re-
lation. Remember that max and min are just two of many other com-
position operators. It is possible to introduce other connectives: for 
example, an algebraic product or more generally T-norms as and oper-
ators; and an algebraic sum or more generally T-conorm operators as 
or operators.8 
As a general form of fuzzy inference, consider n multiple rules with 
mUltiple antecedents combined with "else": 
Rule 1: 
Rule 2: 
Rule n: 
Premise: 
Conclusion: 
if x E Al or y E BI , then Z E CI else 
if x E A2 or y E B2, then Z E C 2 else 
if x E An or y E Bn, then Z E Cn 
X E A' and y E B' 
Z E C' 
When dealing with mUltiple rules we are faced with a problem: more 
than one rule can fire (take effect) simultaneously. To decide which 
consequence should be taken as the result of the simultaneous firing 
of several rules, we apply the process of conflict resolution (Berenji, 
1992). 
If A and B are the premise part, Le., the inputs in a fuzzy infer-
ence system, then their corresponding membership functions are rep-
resented by JiAi (x) and JiBi (y) for the i-th rule i = 1,2, .... The firing 
strength, (Xi, of the i-th rule can be calculated by 
(8) 
The (Xi expresses the matching strength of the antecedents for each 
rule. By applying this strength on respective conclusions, we obtain 
the inferred fuzzy sets for each rule, 
Jic~ (z) = (Xi /\ JiCi (Z). 
! 
(9) 
As a result of the inputs A' and B', the inference of Rule 1 generates 
the conclusion Jic' (z), Rule 2 generates Jic' (z), and so on. Thus, each 
1 2 
8When a fuzzy rule takes the form "if x E A or y E B then Z E C," the degree 
of fulfillment of this fuzzy rule is given as the maximum degree of a match with the 
antecedent part. 
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rule suggests a different output. To resolve this dilemma, the conflict-
resolution process recommends that the conclusions of respective rules 
be aggregated by the union operator. We can derive the aggregate out-
put C' as 
Pc' (z) [lXl /\ PCI (z)] V [lX2 /\ PC2(Z)] v ... V [lXn /\ PCn (z)] 
Pc; (z) /\ Pc~ (z) /\ ... /\ Pc~ (z). (10) 
The connective "else" is interpreted as the logical or. The or is inter-
preted as the max operator. Hence, the final output is calculated by 
aggregating results from each rule using the max operator. 
2.3 Defuzzification Strategies 
The implication of equation (10) is characterized by a membership 
function, i.e., the output of the fuzzy inference is a fuzzy set as well. 
Often it is necessary to receive an output in crisp terms. Therefore, 
the membership function of the final output must be translated, i.e., 
defuzzified, a single criSp value. A defuzzification strategy refers to the 
way a crisp value is extracted from a fuzzy output set. Several defuzzi-
fication strategies have been suggested in the literature (see Jager et al., 
1994, pp. 179-185). We describe the most popular method called the 
center of area (coa) method. This defuzzification strategy returns the 
center of area under the membership curve as 
2.]=1 ZjPc' (Zj) 
Zcoa = --"-nq-=-----C..-
2.j=l Pc' (Zj) 
(11) 
where Zcoa is the defuzzified output, q is the number of quantifica-
tion levels of the output, Zj is the amount of output at the quantifica-
tion level j, and Pc' (z j) is the aggregated output membership function. 
This defuzzification strategy is simply a weighted average of the z/s 
(similar to the expected value of probability theory). A common feature 
of this method and the computation of expected values is the nondis-
crimination of extreme values. The center of area calculation is made 
on the basis of all aggregated outputs without eliminating endpoints. 
Other defuzzification strategies (such as mean of maximum, largest 
of maximum, and smallest of maximum) do not consider the parts of a 
fuzzy output, the membership values of which are below the maximum. 
Defuzzification can be performed in several arbitrary ways. Different 
strategies arise for specific applications. There is no accurate way to 
analyze them except through experimental studies. 
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3 A Computer-Based Fuzzy Underwriting System 
We provide one description of how expert knowledge about under-
writing diabetes mellitus in life insurance is processed for a fuzzy infer-
ence system. The system was developed and programmed in MS Excel 
5.0 using Visual Basic. The rationale of the system relies on medical 
knowledge concerning the etiology of diabetes mellitus and underwrit-
ing principles in insurance economics. 
3.1 Prognosticating Diabetes Mellitus 
The list of prognostic parameters for diabetes mellitus is long. There 
are primary and secondary medical parameters, and an accurate as-
sessment of the prognosis can be made taking into account a limited 
number of parameters. 
Diabetes mellitus is characterized by an elevation in blood sugar 
values. In type I diabetes mellitus, this blood sugar elevation is caused 
when the pancreas secretes no insulin. Type II diabetes mellitus, which 
chiefly affects persons over age 30, has an underlying pathological mech-
anism, whereby, despite the fact that the pancreas secretes insulin, the 
activity is suppressed. If not treated successfully either by drugs or 
insulin replacement, life-threatening conditions will occur within a few 
days. Renal impairment occurs in type I diabetics, which often leads to 
kidney failure as early as 10 years to 20 years after onset. In general, 
the blood vessels in diabetics are damaged; heart attack, stroke, and 
neural and eye impairment are common complications (Mehnert et al., 
1994, pp. 76-78). The prognosis in diabetes mellitus can be based on 
three primary factors (Rossing et al., 1996, Nathan, 1993): (i) the time 
factor; (ii) the therapy (adjustment) factor; and (iii) the complication 
factor. 
If complications such as kidney failure, eye disorders, or heart at-
tack are manifest, the underwriting normally ends in rejection of the 
applicant. While in the past, the insurer chiefly applied the time factor 
when underwriting a risk, new medical research increasingly has shown 
the importance of the therapy factor. The time factor ultimately reveals 
that the insurance company is only willing to accept an application for 
life insurance with a risk surcharge if the duration of the diabetes plus 
the applied term insurance do not exceed a specified period of time. 
In such a case, staggered risk surcharges are assigned for a period of 
15 years to 35 years. Numerous case studies have shown, however, 
that the better the diabetes mellitus can be treated with insulin so that 
blood sugar levels approximate the level and course of a healthy per-
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son, the lower the organ-related complication rate will be. These special 
forms of therapy cannot be given to every diabetic. Underwriting thus 
consists of evaluating as accurately as possible the quality of this ther-
apy in terms of the adjustment parameters and excluding any possible 
complications by achieving a high quality of information (Mehnert et al. 
1994, pp. 93, 131). 
The quality of therapy can be established by current blood sugar val-
ues and the HbA1-values (glycolysated hemoglobin). The HbA1-value 
can be determined easily in the blood and reflects the blood sugar level 
over a period of around 90 days. These two parameters of insulin 
therapy-or other treatment strategies in type II diabetics-define the 
adjustment by medication or therapy efficiency. 
Another important aspect to consider in patients with diabetes mel-
litus is that the more cardiovascular risk factors are present, the worse 
is the mortality risk. These factors include elevated blood lipids, high 
blood pressure, or smoking, These risk factors also must be reviewed 
within the scope of any prognostic assessment. In addition to these 
main parameters, several other prognostic factors are important for an 
adequate risk evaluation of diabetes mellitus. 
Table 2 lists the prognostic factors that form the input space in our 
underwriting system. These prognosticating factors for diabetes mel-
litus result in a complex system of interdependent variables that mu-
tually interact. All changes can be identified with regard to their effect 
on the overall prognosis for increased mortality. The prognosticating 
factors and their impact on the mortality risk is not clear cut. 
3.2 Design of the Fuzzy Underwriting System 
To depict the knowledge concerning the etiology of diabetes melli-
tus, the major areas were processed in chronological order: 
1. Hierarchical structure of the prognosticating variables; 
2. Membership functions of the terms of the prognosticating vari-
ables; then 
3. Rule base. 
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Table 2 
Prognostic Factors in Diabetes Mellitus 
27 Factors 
Age of the patient 
Age at onset of the disease 
Duration of the disease 
Type I or type II diabetes 
Quality of the therapy (with medication) 
Blood sugar level 
Blood sugar profile 
HbAl 
Fructose amine concentration in the blood 
Sugar detected in the urine 
Compliance with dietary recommendations 
Compliance in taking medicine 
Insulin dose 
Frequency of daily blood sugar checks 
Intensified insulin therapy 
Intercurrent complications in diabetes 
Myocardial infarction 
Coronary heart disease 
Peripheral vascular disease 
Eye disorders 
Renal function 
Blood pressure 
Body weight 
Frequency of hospitalization because of coma 
Extent of blood sugar fluctuations 
Profession 
Education 
Sources: Rossing et al. (1996), Borch-Johnson (1987), 
Panzram (1987), Nathan (1993). 
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First, the three primary factors attributed to diabetes mellitus (ther-
apy factor, time factor, and complication factor) are subdivided into in-
fluencing factors on the subordinate level. This process of hierarchical 
top-down classification was repeated until input factors were present 
on the first level that either 
• showed a continuous dimension (e.g., blood sugar level in mil-
ligrams per deciliter) or if such a dimension were lacking; or were 
• subject to discrete evaluation by the medical expert (e.g., classi-
fication of vascular complications into minor, moderate, marked, 
or severe). 
If a continuous dimension exists, the medical expert determines 
the values for which terms of language have no membership, Le., the 
membership equals 0, and those have complete membership, Le., the 
membership equals 1. A linear course of the membership function was 
defined between the mathematical items for no membership and com-
plete membership defined in this way. If a discrete natural dimension 
existed for a variable, only complete membership values relating to one 
of the terms of the linguistic variables could be present. For example, 
retinopathy can only be present in either stage 1, 2, 3, or 4. In this 
way, the structure of the fuzzy inference system and all the system's 
elements are defined. 
The next step is connecting these membership values according to 
a given structure. For this purpose, the expert is required to define 
rule sets {Rl, R2, ... , Rn} for all allocations within the fuzzy inference 
system.9 The rule sets must account for all possible combinations from 
the terms of subordinate variables. For example, the variable "blood 
sugar level" and "HbAl-value" are defined by five terms each; in other 
words, 25 rules must be defined. 
Each of the individual rules consisted of an antecedent and a conclu-
sion. The antecedent includes the terms of the subordinate variables 
9The expert knowledge is often referred to as a knowledge base of a fuzzy inference 
system. Most often the knowledge base also contains a set of rules that specifies the 
output as a function of a fuzzy input space. In general, there are four methods of rule 
generation (Sugeno, 1985): 
i) Experience and knowledge of an expert; 
ii) Modeling the operator's control actions; 
iii) Qualitative modeling of a system; and 
iv) Self·organization. 
The first method is the most widely used, and it is the rule base used in this application. 
For a review of the other methods, see Sugeno (1985) or Klir and Yuan (1995, pp. 327-
356). 
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and the conclusion includes the terms of the superior variable. In gen-
eral, a rule takes of the form of: "If {variable l} is {term set l} and 
{variable 2} is {term set 2}, then {consequence l} is {term set 3}". 
An example of a rule is: If the blood sugar level is very low and 
the HbAl-value is normal, then the blood sugar profile is to be rated 
as medium. The structure of the total system is illustrated in Figure 
2. On the left in Figure 2 we see the final output: the risk-adjusted 
premium. The lower risk factors extra mortality and age represent ac-
tuarial factors to calculate the extra premium for substandard risks. 
While age is an original input factor, extra mortality is inferred by the 
three primary factors attributed to diabetes mellitus: therapy factor, 
complication factor, and time factor. All other medical risk factors 
are regarded as fuzzy subfactors. To explain the whole fuzzy infer-
ence system would not make any sense in this limited space. We make, 
therefore, an arbitrary demarcation in the presentation and consider 
only how the therapy factor is inferred. 
3.3 Inferring the Therapy Factor 
From Figure 2, we see that the therapy factor is inferred by three 
original input factors (blood sugar value, HbAl-value, and insulin in-
jections) connected in two places. Let us show in more detail how the 
therapy factor is determined by considering an applicant who has the 
profile described in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Applicant Profile 
Factors Level 
Blood sugar value 130 mg/dl 
HbAI 13.5% 
Insulin injections 10 per week 
Figure 3 demonstrates how blood sugar value, HbAl, and number 
of insulin injections are allocated to the terms of the variables (in other 
words, how the inputs are fuzzified). The blood sugar value of 130 
mg/dl has the membership values 0.67 as normal and 0.33 as high. No 
other terms fire for 130 mg/dl. The HbAl-value of 13.5 percentage has 
the membership values 0.75 as high and 0.25 as very high. The number 
of 10 insulin injections per week has the membership values 0.57 as 
low and 0.43 as medium. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
A Pictorial Representation of the Inference Rules 
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In inferring the therapy factor, we must make two inferences. The 
first inference is to connect the blood sugar value with the HbAl-value 
and thereby infer the blood sugar profile. In the second inference, we 
connect blood sugar profile and insulin injections. This yields the ther-
apy factor, which in turn has to be defuzzified into a premium sur-
charge. These two inference steps are illustrated in Figure 4. 
The rule sets of inference 1 and inference 2 are given in Tables 4 
and 5. In our example, we only consider rules that have positive mem-
bership values. In rules in which at least one term in the antecedent 
has a membership value of zero, then a membership of zero results for 
the conclusion. These rules have no effect on the further processing of 
information and, therefore, are not represented by numerals in the rule 
sets. 
The operators in the rule base are defined to be the max and min 
functions, respectively, similar to the inference system proposed by 
Mamdami (1976). Such an inference method is called max-min infer-
ence, because the membership function of the aggregated output is the 
union (max) of the fuzzy sets assigned to that output after cutting their 
degree of membership values at the degree for the corresponding an-
tecedents by the intersection min operator. 
After the inference of blood sugar profile and insulin injections we 
receive the inferred output therapy factor. The last step is to translate, 
or defuzzify, the therapy factor into a crisp premium surcharge. In Fig-
ure 4, we see that the firing strength of the medium premium surcharge 
rule is 0.57 and 0.25 for the high premium surcharge rule, which means 
that the membership functions of the medium premium surcharge and 
high premium surcharge are cut at 0.57 and 0.25, respectively. This is 
illustrated in Panel B in Figure 5. Thereafter, a total function is pro-
duced from both firing rules. 
From the resulting fuzzy output set (Panel C in Figure 5) we use 
the center of area method defined in equation (11) to extract a crisp 
premium surcharge. This applicant must pay a premium surcharge of 
207 percent on top of the class rate. The underwriting is now complete, 
and the gradual risk of diabetes has been translated into a premium 
surcharge using fuzzy set theory and fuzzy inference. Allowing for 
gradual shifts in the input space makes this system fle~ble and gives a 
better mapping of individual risk profiles than classical expert systems. 
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Table 4 
Fuzzy Inference of Blood Sugar Values and HbAI 
Antecedents Conclusions 
Rule BSV MY HBA1 MY BSP MY 
1 very low very low bad 
2 low very low bad 
3 normal very low bad 
4 high very low bad 
5 very high very low bad 
6 very low low medium 
7 low low medium 
8 normal low medium 
9 high low medium 
10 very high low medium 
11 very low normal medium 
12 low normal normal 
13 normal normal normal 
14 high normal normal 
15 very high normal medium 
16 very low high medium 
17 low high medium 
18 normal 0.67 high 0.75 medium 0.67 
19 high 0.33 high 0.75 medium 0.33 
20 very high high medium 
21 very low very high bad 
22 low very high bad 
23 normal 0.67 very high 0.25 bad 0.25 
24 high 0.33 very high 0.25 bad 0.25 
25 very high very high bad 
BSV = Blood Sugar Value; BSP = Blood Sugar Profile; and MY = Membership Value. 
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4 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
We introduce a new inference technique, called fuzzy inference, for 
underwriting in life insurance. Fuzzy inference systems are well suited 
for compiling medical facts and can help underwriters cope with the 
complexity of prognostic decision making. Fuzzy logic presents medi-
cal information more realistically than do the classical methods. Med-
ical practice has had to rely on auxiliary constructions for prognostic 
parameters by forming intervals of demarcation to increase practica-
bility. These intervals in effect convert continuous functions into dis-
continuous ones. 
Table 5 
Inference of Blood Sugar Profile and Insulin Injections 
Antecedents Conclusions 
Rule BSP MY INU MY THEF MY 
1 normal low good 
2 normal medium good 
3 normal high good 
4 normal very high good 
5 medium 0.67 low 0.57 medium 0.57 
6 medium 0.67 medium 0.43 medium 0.43 
7 medium high good 
8 medium very high good 
9 bad 0.25 low 0.57 bad 0.25 
10 bad 0.25 medium 0.43 bad 0.25 
11 bad high medium 
12 bad very high medium 
BSP = Blood Sugar Profile; INU = Insulin Injections; THEF = Therapy Factor; 
and MY = Membership Value. 
Another feature of medical descriptions is their fuzziness. It is easy 
to reach a consensus among physicians that a disease or a symptom 
is mild, moderate, or severe. A quantitative expression of these fuzzy 
terms is not normal practice in medicine, but is necessary to be able to 
make precise prognostic statements. Fuzzy inference systems provide 
an excellent approach to reaching such solutions. 
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Figure 5 
Defuzzification of the Aggregated Premium Surcharge 
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The fuzzy underwriting system presented here has been used in 
practical applications. It shows that the fuzzy language of physicians 
combined with fuzzy prognostic parameters can be expressed as fuzzy 
inference rules and, thus, be implemented as criSp decisions. Using 
fuzzy underwriting, more prognostic factors can be taken into account 
than are currently possible in underwriting practices of direct insurance 
companies. The prognosis of disease is generally not determined by one 
factor alone, but by a combination of factors. 
Even in the early versions of the fuzzy underwriting system, prac-
tical cases from everyday insurance could be used to show that cor-
rect decisions are possible in about 80 percent of all cases. The re-
maining 20 percent does not result from weakness of the system, but 
from deficiencies in the information available. The PC-supported sys-
tem presented also makes decisions when the information available 
is sparse. Such decisions are naturally less reliable. Prognosis struc-
tures can be constructed for many diseases analogously to our exam-
ple of diabetes mellitus. Fuzzy inference systems can be devised for 
most diseases. For direct insurance companies, such fuzzy systems 
would make decision-making process more preCise, more transparent, 
and more free of the subjective errors that have hindered accurate un-
derwriting assessments in the past. 
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Accelerated Death Benefits, Viatical Settlements, 
and Viatical Loans: Options for the Terminally III 
Paula Schmidt* 
Abstract t 
There are three options available for terminally ill insureds who are inter-
ested in accessing all or part of the face value of their life insurance policies: 
through the life insurance company (accelerated death benefits), through a vi-
atical company (a via tical settlement), or through a via tical loan company (a 
via tical loan). This paper explores the definitions and tax regulations, calcula-
tions, and the claims process associated with accelerated death benefits and 
via tical settlements and loans. 
Key words and phrases: life expectancy, claims, taxes, regulations 
1 Introduction 
For a person diagnosed with a terminal illness, there are few mon-
etary options available to pay the expenses needed to sustain his or 
her life. Medical insurance may only cover expenses up to a limit, and 
their savings and/or possessions may not be enough to cover bills. For 
the insured terminally ill, however, there are often three other options: 
accelerated death benefits, viatical settlements, or via tical loans. 
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Accelerated death benefits are benefits offered by life insurance com-
panies to terminally ill insureds. The proceeds from an acceleration 
result from a recalculation of the insured's life expectancy due to the 
terminal illness and can be excluded from the owner's personal gross 
income under current tax law. The proceeds consist of a fraction (typi-
cally 50 percent, but can vary from 25 percent to 100 percent depending 
on the company) of the policy's face value, the remainder being paid at 
the time of death. There is sometimes a waiver of premiums during the 
period the insured is expected to die. If the insured survives the period, 
there may be a resumption of premiums. Whether the premium needs 
to be resumed is company specific and is stated in the policy or rider 
form that contains the accelerated benefit provision. 
The risk insurance companies take when they fund accelerated death 
benefits differs from the risk insurance companies assume at the sale 
of a life insurance policy. There is minimal adverse mortality risk in-
volved in accelerated death benefits, if the physician's diagnosis is cor-
rect, given the likelihood of death occurring in the near future. Thus, 
the risk assumed is primarily an investment risk. 
A viatical settlement is one in which the owner of a life insurance 
policy sells the policy to a viatical company for an amount less than the 
face amount. The amount paid is directly related to the amount of time 
the insured is expected to live, Le., the longer the life expectancy, the 
less the amount paid. The viatical company in turn pays the remaining 
premiums needed to keep the policy in force. 
If the person lives longer than expected, viatical settlement compa-
nies will suffer a decrease in their investment return. Thus, viaticals 
risk losing some of their profit. If they are highly leveraged, this could 
be a large percent of that profit. 
A viatical loan involves a policyowner giving collateral assignment 
of his or her life insurance policy to a viaticalloan company. The loan is 
then repaid in full at the time of death of the insured. The premiums are 
paid by the viaticalloan company and are subtracted from the viatical 
loan amount in the initial computation. Often, a via tical loan allows the 
policyowner to receive more of the death benefit than an accelerated 
death benefit or viatical settlement. At the death of the insured, the 
balance of the death benefit is paid to beneficiaries. 
The benefit covered in this paper is the terminal illness-triggered 
benefit. To be eligible for this benefit, a physician must certify that 
death is imminent within a specified time period. This time period is 
usually six months to a year, though 24 months is the requirement in the 
Internal Revenue Code for a benefit to be treated in a manner similar to 
life insurance proceeds. Therefore, a terminal illness-triggered benefit 
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is any payment made from a life insurance policy while the insured is 
alive that results from recalculating the insured's life expectancy due 
to the terminal illness. 
2 Life Insurance Companies 
2.1 The Calcu lation of Accelerated Death Benefits 
There are two common methods used to calculate accelerated death 
benefits: discounting the face value (less any outstanding policy loans) 
of the policy or by taking a lien against the policy. Other methods are 
used, but they are not as acceptable to most life insurance companies. 
The discounting method requires the face value of the policy to be 
discounted by a factor related to current market rates (e.g., the u.s. Trea-
sury bill rate) and the length of the acceleration period. The amount 
paid is subtracted from the face amount of the policy, which results in 
a lower remaining death benefit. In some cases, companies waive the 
premium during acceleration. Some life insurance companies charge an 
administrative fee to cover the expenses of processing the acceleration. 
Typical fees range from $100 to $300. 
A simple example of discounting an accelerated death benefit fol-
lows. Assume a policy with a $100,000 face amount, a 60 percent ac-
celeration benefit, no loans, a company-implemented administrative fee 
of $200, and a Treasury bill rate of 8 percent. The insured is assumed to 
have a year to live. The amount to cover the interest on the accelerated 
portion is: 
$60,000 - ($60,000/1.08) = $4,444.44. 
Therefore the accelerated payment is: 
$60,000 - $200 - $4,444.44 = $55,355.56. 
The policy would remain in force with a $40,000 death benefit. 
In the lien method, the accelerated benefit is treated as a loan se-
cured by the policy. Once death occurs, the loan is reimbursed with 
interest from the entire death benefit. The difference between the lien 
method and a straight policy loan is that for the lien method, advances 
can exceed the contract's cash value. With a loan, however, the policy-
owner only is able to obtain an amount not higher than the cash value 
of the policy. 
Let us now look at a lien method example using the same scenario as 
for discounting, with the exception that the 8 percent Treasury bill rate 
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is assumed to be the loan rate and there is a $200 administrative fee. 
The policyowner would be loaned $59,800 ($60,000 - $200) now. The 
death benefit remaining, assumed to be paid in one year's time, would 
be: 
$100,000 - ($60,000 * 1.08) = $35,200. 
The difference between the total payments for the two methods is 
minimal (less than $400). With the discounting method a payment of 
$55,355.56 could be received now and $40,000 at death. The total pay-
ment would be $95,355.56. The lien method offers $59,800 now and 
$35,200 at death, a total of $95,000. The final deciding factors depend 
upon the options available from the individual's insurance company. 
Some companies only offer one of the options. The policyowner also 
must decide if he or she would benefit from more money at acceleration 
or at death. These decisions vary for each individual. 
2.2 Regulations and Tax Treatment of Life Insurance Pro-
ceeds 
When an accelerated death benefit is paid to a policyowner, the in-
surance company must send a statement illustrating the effect of the 
benefit on the face amount of the policy, the specified amount of the 
benefit, the accumulation account, the cash value, any loan balance, and 
what the future premiums (if any) will be (Adam, 1990). 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for-
mulated model insurance regulations to serve as a guide to accelerated 
death benefits. A disclosure required by the NAIC guideline l is a brief 
description of the benefit and definitions of the conditions or occur-
rences that triggered the benefit payment. No further conditions may 
be placed on the payment of accelerated benefits other than those spec-
ified initially in the policy or rider. 
Benefit payment options also are covered in the NAIC 1996 guide-
line. The insured has the option of receiving the accelerated benefit 
in a lump sum, in periodic payments for a fixed time, or in a fixed 
amount for an indefinite period of time. Some companies require that 
the accelerated benefit be taken as a lump sum, but most accommo-
date policyholder wishes. To receive the accelerated death benefit, the 
owner often is required by the insurance company to surrender all or 
part of his or her policyholder rights (Cruise, 1994). 
1 NAIC guidelines can be obtained by writing to the NAIC at: NAIC, 120 West 12th 
Street, Suite 1100, Kansas City MO 64105-1925, USA. 
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The introduction of accelerated death benefits in early 1990 resulted 
in the general public and some insurance companies being concerned 
about tax uncertainties and terminology. To alleviate these concerns, 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the NAIC established tax regu-
lations and model insurance regulations, respectively. On August 21, 
1996, President Clinton signed The Health Coverage Availability and 
Affordability Act of 1996 (HR 3101) clarifying the tax treatment of ac-
celerated death benefits. This act went into effect on January 1, 1997; 
(see Chodes, 1997). The sections of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) 
that affect accelerated death benefits are Sections 72, 101, 7702, and 
7702A. The regulations are being amended; more changes may occur 
in the future. 
State-specific regulations are based upon model regulations enacted 
by the NAIC. The NAIC cannot force states or insurance companies to 
use model regulations. Because the NAIC is composed of each state's 
respective insurance commissioner, though, most states have adopted 
the regulations. 
Once the states accept regulations, insurance companies must com-
ply and alter their poliCies (if needed) in order to do business within 
each individual state. At first most states allowed accelerated death 
benefit recipients to be exempt from state income taxes, though recip-
ients may still have had to pay federal taxes (Blake, 1993). Because no-
body really knew if taxes were owed or not, the NAIC advised insurance 
companies to add a disclaimer suggesting the policyholder consult his 
or her tax advisor about the tax treatment of such a provision (Adam, 
1990). 
Under Section 7702 of the IRC, a life insurance contract is defined as 
any contract that is a life insurance contract under applicable law, but 
only if the contract meets the cash value accumulation test or meets the 
guideline premium requirement and falls within the cash value corridor. 
Whichever of these two tests a life insurance contract meets at incep-
tion also must be met after a change in the death benefit is recorded 
(Kraus, 1993). Therefore, a redetermination of values must occur after 
accelera tion. 
The tax treatment has always been a concern for those terminally 
ill and considering such benefits. Current regulations provide that ac-
celerated benefits will be considered as death benefits under Sections 
101(a) and 7702. Section 101 states that any amount of a death benefit 
received in a lump sum or otherwise paid by reason of death of the 
insured is not included in a person's gross income (Freeman and Mar-
cus, 1993). The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 redefined Section 101 (g). With its passage there are now two types 
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of accelerated death benefits (received after December 31, 1996) that 
are excludable from gross income. They are amounts received from 
a life insurance policy or from a viatical settlement company for the 
sale or assignment of a policy. The determining factor is that the in-
sured is terminally or chronically ill (Wolosky, 1996). The act defines 
being terminally ill as having 24 months or less to live. To be classed 
as chronically ill, the insured is not able to perform at least two of six 
listed daily activities (Christopher, 1997). This paper, however, will not 
cover chronic illness benefits in any depth. 
The definitions and regulations of the IRS and NAIC aim to clar-
ify the treatment of accelerated benefits. Most state insurance depart-
ments have adopted similar regulations, so the alterations necessary 
from state to state tend to be minimal. It is most probable that the tax 
laws and regulations will continue to change as the insurance industry 
becomes more experienced in accelerated benefits. For now, the pro-
ceeds from a qualifying acceleration can be received free from personal 
income tax. With this clarification, the insurance industry should no-
tice more terminally ill persons submitting claims for accelerated death 
benefits. 
2.3 The Claims Process for Accelerated Death Benefits 
The process for accelerating the payment of benefits on a life policy 
has many elements. Most companies require a minimum face amount to 
be carried on a policy, i.e., $100,000, before any claim for acceleration 
of the death benefit can occur. Fraudulent claims can be reduced by 
setting a limit to the amount of accelerated benefit a policyholder can 
receive. A minimum amount also may be set to avoid the relatively 
excessive administrative expenses in processing small claims. 
Specialized claim forms are required for acceleration. These forms 
must be comprehensive enough to encompass all aspects of the illness 
and the benefit payout. In addition, these forms should include verifi-
cation and certification from the insured's physician stating the date of 
diagnosis of the terminal illness, the extent of the insured's symptoms, 
the proposed treatments and their efficacy, and the expected life span 
of the insured. The insured also should be asked to complete a claim 
form to prevent fraud (Adam, 1990). 
When claims are made during the contestable period, special effort 
must be made to determine whether the illness was present at the in-
ception of the policy (Hitzeman, 1992). If the illness was present, it 
gives the insurance company a legal reason not to accelerate the death 
benefit. The insurer must verify that the policy is a valid contract and 
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was issued based upon correct and accurate information before it de-
termines whether the accelerated benefit is payable. 
The medical information required by the claim forms should provide 
adequate data for an initial investigation for the possible contestability 
of the payment. If the submitted information appears to be legitimate 
and satisfactory to the insurance company's medical board, the claim 
is processed and paid (Reimers, 1994). 
If the information appears to be false, an extensive investigation 
usually follows. Certain steps are recommended to protect insurance 
companies from fraud by policyholders and physicians. First, compa-
nies must verify the attending physician's credentials. The next step is 
to obtain treatment records from any attending physicians and hospi-
tals. It also may be beneficial to interview the insured and/or spouse to 
determine the extent and severity of the illness and to rule out the pos-
sibility of self-inflicted injuries as the cause of the terminal condition. 
The policyholder must be asked if he or she is mentally competent and 
be determined as such (Hitzeman, 1992). Anything that seems suspi-
cious should be investigated to safeguard the insurance company. 
The insurance company should reserve its right to reaffirm the diag-
nosis of terminal illness by the company's medical doctor. Most compa-
nies also state within their rider or policy that if the insured's physician 
disagrees with the company's physician on the diagnosis, the company 
will pay a third impartial physician to perform an evaluation. Both 
parties should agree the third diagnOSis will be the one by which the 
insured and the company will abide (Hitzeman, 1992). 
Because claims only can be made by the policyowner, irrevocable 
beneficiaries and assignees can complicate the claim process. If a re-
lease cannot be obtained from either of these two, payment of the ad-
vanced benefit should be refused (Adam, 1990). In most cases the ben-
eficiaries are close to the insured and are aware of the ramifications of 
acceleration. Irrevocable beneficiaries and assignees commonly playa 
large role in the decision to accelerate. 
Companies offering such riders must be fair to all parties so they are 
not accused of taking advantage of the insured and the terminal con-
dition. At the same time the company must make correct assumptions 
about the premiums and/or fees charged so that they do not lose money 
offering such a benefit. Discrimination must not exist in the underwrit-
ing and processing of different types of terminal illnesses (Adam, 1990). 
The insurance company also must protect the privacy of the insured. 
No matter how careful and methodical an insurance company is in 
investigating claims, problems will arise. One problem is how to deal 
with an insured who recovers after receiving the accelerated death ben-
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efit. A correctly written policy should protect both parties in such an 
event (Adam, 1990). Some companies require an insured to resume 
payment of premiums on the face amount remaining after acceleration 
if the insured survives beyond the acceleration period (Aerts, 1994). 
Other companies waive the premium. 
Another possible problem is an insured who commits suicide after 
receiving his or her accelerated death benefit. If the suicide occurs 
within the customary two year contestability period the policy would be 
terminated; beneficiaries may have to repay the advance (Adam, 1990). 
If suicide occurs after the contestable period beneficiaries may receive 
the remaining death benefit. Each company must decide its stand on 
suicides. 
Claims practices of insurance companies are complicated by accel-
erated death benefits. In the past an insured died and a benefit was 
paid. Now an insured may have a terminal illness, and a partial bene-
fit may be paid. Insurance companies should expect more claims in a 
wider variety and greater volume due to terminal conditions. 
Accelerated death benefits are consumer friendly and possess a hu-
manitarian appeal that complements traditional life insurance (Wang, 
1990). This benefit promises an extra measure of financial security in 
the event of a catastrophic or terminal illness. Life insurance products 
have come to offer more while persons are alive instead of after they 
have died. Accelerated death benefits are one way companies are of-
fering their policyholders additional safeguards and personal benefits. 
This benefit allows companies a slight marketing advantage. Acceler-
ated benefits give the company's agents a selling point that is visible 
and desirable for insureds. It is seen by some agents to be a low risk, 
but a low reward provision. 
Although some controversy surrounds accelerated death benefits, 
most persons familiar with the concept praise it. The benefit may be re-
ceived as a lump sum, in installments, or as expenses are incurred. Pay-
ment depends upon the insurance company and its established prac-
tices. The payment can be a way for a dying person to take care of 
medical bills, visit family in a different part of the world, or do what 
he or she always has dreamed. The adverse impact of an accelerated 
death benefit is the decrease in the death benefit of the policy to the 
insured's survivors. 
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3 Viatical Companies 
3.1 Viatical Settlements 
There is a second option available to an insured whose insurance 
company does not offer accelerated death benefits or to an insured who 
wants an advance payment sooner than the insurance company offers. 
This option is to sell the life insurance policy to a viatical company. 
A viatical settlement is a private transaction in which a policyowner 
sells the policy while the insured is living. The owner sells the policy 
to a viatical company for an amount less than the face value of the 
policy. Viaticals usually offer a contract under which the company is 
designated as the sole benefiCiary of the life insurance policy. Most of 
these contracts are made with insureds who are terminally ill or have a 
catastrophic illness. Via tical companies expect to make their profits by 
buying life insurance policies from terminally ill insureds. 
The factors that determine the purchase price (Le., the amount of 
payment offered) are based on the amount of the policy's death benefit, 
the terminally ill insured's life expectancy, the annual premium, the 
type of policy, the rating of the insurance company, and the market 
rate available on a similar investment. Some companies may buy partial 
benefits in which the policyholder names a co-benefiCiary who retains 
an interest in the death benefit. 
The purchase price, however, hinges on life expectancy-the more 
time a person has to live, the less money the policyowner will receive 
(Kristof, 1991). The key is evaluating an insured's life expectancy (Bar-
rett, 1992). The sooner the insured dies, the sooner the viatical com-
pany receives the death benefit and its profit. This may sound inhu-
mane [some have called viatical settlements death futures (Niedzielski, 
1995)], but those selling the poliCies see the viatical option as a chance 
to do something with part of the death benefit (Sing, 1990). 
The policy sale process starts when the viatical company verifies 
the life expectancy of the insured and computes a purchase price. The 
owner can accept or reject the offer. If the policyowner rejects the 
viatical company's initial purchase price, the viatical company often 
returns to its investors and tries to improve its offer to one that is 
more acceptable to the policyowner. Viatical companies are third-party 
competitors in the free market. They try to offer the best possible price 
to policyowners (Faig, 1997). 
After buying the policy, the viatical company assumes the premium 
payment and either becomes the sole beneficiary or a co-beneficiary of 
the policy. At the time of death of the insured the viatical company 
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collects the portion of the death benefit to which it is entitled. Thus 
via tical companies require a large amount of upfront capital and have 
no immediate payoff. 
3.2 Regulations and Tax Treatment of Viatical Settlement 
Proceeds 
The via tical industry began in 1989 with three companies. Currently 
there are 54 viatical settlement companies operating nationwide (Con-
nolly, 1995b). The entire viatical industry is estimated to have had a 
market of $400 million in policies purchased in 1994 and $500 million 
in 1995, with the potential to reach $6 billion within the next five years 
(Connolly, 1995a). As an industry they have established themselves as 
an organized secondary market in the life insurance arena (Faig, 1997). 
A growing concern is whether state insurance departments should 
regulate viatical companies. Although viaticals are not insurance com-
panies, they cross into the realm of the insurance industry. They are 
purchasing policies involving mortality risk. A viatical company has the 
option and ability to pay persons who have up to five years to live (which 
is the void in the insurance industry that viatical companies fill) (Stone, 
1993). Only settlements based on two years or less life expectancy, 
however, could be received tax free. 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 now 
defines terminally ill as having 24 months or less to live. A stipulation in 
the 1996 act is that in order for a viatical settlement to be considered 
to be tax-free, the viatical company must be licensed by the state. If 
that state does not have a licensing system the viatical must pay to the 
policyowner at least the minimum in purchase price (see Table 1) for 
policies as set by the NAIC viatical model act. The regulations do allow 
viaticals to decide the length of life expectancy in which they will invest 
and if they will pay more than these minimum required prices. 
The percentages in Table 1 may be reduced 5 percent for viaticating 
a policy written by an insurer rated less than the highest four cate-
gories by A.M. Best. This percentage reduction could be alleviated by 
the existence of state guarantee associations which would lessen the 
bankruptcy risk of the less favorably rated companies. 
Though the number of persons wanting to sell their life insurance 
policies to viaticals is relatively low, it continues to rise each year. Limits 
to acceleration and the possibility for a high return mean that investors 
are eager to buy viator policies. Insurance regulators and insurance 
companies are concerned, however, that viatical companies may be-
come a problem for the insurance industry. Moral risk has been cited 
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Table 1 
NAIC Model Minimum Purchase Price As a Percentage of Policy Face Value 
Life Expectancy Months Minimum (In Months) Percentage 
<6 
6-12 
12-18 
18-24 
24+ 
80% 
70% 
65% 
60% 
50% 
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as a major factor in the regulation of via tical companies. It has been considered by some that the via tical industry has been created by com-panies waiting for a financial reward that is greatly increased by the early death of an insured (Faig, 1997). Via tical companies tend to believe they are dealing with the sale of a private asset that should not concern the NAIC. The viatical industry also was under attack by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from August 1995 until July 1996. The SEC considered viatical settle-ments to be securities and challenged their validity in the U.S. court system (Connolly, 1995a). The SEC wanted viaticals to register the frac-tionalized shares of life insurance polices they were selling to investors. Many of the via tical settlement companies disliked this because it in-fringed on the small investors who could only afford to purchase shares of policies and not entire ones. 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled in July 1996 that viatical settlements are not securities and are not to be considered in-surance policies either (Connolly, 1996). The court held that " ... a vi-atical settlement is not an insurance policy, and the business of selling fractional interests in insurance policies is no part of the business of insurance" (Connolly, 1996). The court reasoned that profits from such viatical settlements do not come from the efforts of a party other than the investors themselves. The SEC may appeal this ruling. The via ticals see the legislation and regulations as hindrances to their business. Regulation also may affect the selling price of policies. With increased costs due to registration fees and expenses incurred because of required compliance, the amount an insured would receive would decrease. In the end, legislation and regulations could hurt the persons regulators are trying to help. 
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companies, viaticals, and the general public) will lead to more stability 
in the accelerated benefits industry. 
Medical advances will be a significant factor in the future of acceler-
ated death benefits for many reasons. First, with further developments 
and enhancements of DNA and genetic testing, the diagnosis of the pos-
sibility of being stricken with a terminal illness at some point of time in 
the future will become more accurate. Second, the enhanced treatment 
of and/or cures for current diseases will reduce the severity of terminal 
illness. These two reasons may make the calculation of life expectan-
cies more difficult, however, as has been the example of AIDS protease 
inhibitors. These inhibitors have greatly increase the life expectancy 
of some patients while they have not had much of an effect on others. 
Even though these are beneficial advances, such new-found methods 
may cause uncertainty among those calculating life expectancies. 
Eventually, increased accuracy in calculating life expectancy and 
more readily available advanced treatment methods will lead to more 
exact accelerated death benefit payments. The final payout, however, 
will be based on who calculates the life expectancy, what formula is 
used, and who has made the final terminal diagnosis. When the final 
payout is made because of decisions of a handful of persons, the result 
can make or break a terminally ill insured and could be construed as 
morally unjust. Using a simple equation may allow difficult decisions 
to be minimized by simplistic assumptions for mortality and interest. 
If the time between payout and death can be determined, the dollar 
investment necessary to cover the difference between the accelerated 
portion and the actual will be more accurately calculated. This is an 
advantage to all parties and would reduce the risk and profit margins. 
Not only can the insurance and viatical companies cover any losses 
while also making a profit, but insureds also should receive the best 
price for the policy. 
The path of accelerated death benefits and viatical settlement com-
panies will continue in the same direction, but the company field will 
narrow. Only those viaticals that are strong in their investment port-
folios and keep up to date with medical advances will remain in the 
accelerated death benefit market. In the future viaticals also may buy 
life insurance policies from healthy but old persons. 
Steven Arenson, a vice president of Viaticus, Inc., painted a picture 
of the current viatical market. In Employee Benefit Plan Review (1996) 
Mr. Arenson was quoted as saying, "Only 2% of the terminally ill are 
AIDS patients, but 95% of those early viatical settlements (mid-1980's) 
involved AIDS victims. Last year (1995), 23% of our viatical settlements 
involved cancer patients." This represents the shift in the viatical mar-
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ket from one almost entirely serving AIDS patients to expanding to 
other illnesses. 
Some of the unsettled issues are: 
• Whether the use of the accelerated benefit proceeds can be re-
stricted (Pear, 1992); What happens if the insured lives longer than 
the stipulated length for the acceleration; and 
• What effects the accelerated benefits will have on a person's eligi-
bility for governmental assistance (Will it be considered an asset?) 
(Employee Benefit Plan Review, 1990). 
Additional questions arise from beneficiaries over estate tax and es-
tate/inheritance tax treatment of the death benefit remaining after ac-
celeration. Because of these and other issues, some insurance compa-
nies have been waiting to initiate and introduce accelerated benefits. 
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The Right to Underwrite? An Actuarial Perspective 
With a Difference 
Thomas A. Moultrie* and R. Guy Thomas t 
Abstract 
For a long time underwriting has been a part of the actuarial canon. With 
increasing frequency, however, challenges are being issued against the right 
of insurance companies to underwrite applications for new bUSiness, arguing 
that certain aspects of the practice are undesirably discriminatory. 
We explore the role of the actuary in the underwriting process and the chal-
lenges that are being set for the profession (as opposed to the life insurance 
industry) as a result of this role. As the distinction between the interests of the 
actuarial profession and the interests of the life insurance companies has be-
come increasingly blurred, we consider how the profession can maintain this 
distinction and so retain its identity as a profession worthy of public trust and 
respect. 
Key words and phrases: merit goods, fairness, social legitimacy, risk classifica-
tion, independence, professional status 
1 Introduction 
In recent years there have been several papers by actuaries com-
menting on the broad social debate about what the authors call the 
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"right to underwrite" or the "freedom to underwrite."l [For example, 
see Leigh (1996) in the U.K. and de Ravin and Rump (1996) in Australia.] 
These authors see the role of actuaries as defending the insurance in-
dustry against criticism from other interest groups which Leigh (for 
example) disparages as "the medics, the moralists, and those who are 
genetically unfit" (Leigh, 1996, p. 19). In this paper we intend to address 
some of the same issues as these authors, but from a more independent 
perspective. 
We do not mean to imply that life insurance companies should not 
seek to influence public debate on underwriting practice to protect their 
commercial interests. The response of life insurance companies as an 
industry is theirs to make. Such response may include lobbying, public 
relations, and sponsorship of research that the industry thinks likely 
to support its case. In this regard, the life insurance industry is no dif-
ferent from any other business group pursuing its own agenda. The 
issue with which we are concerned, however, is the role of the actuar-
ial profession in the debate on underwriting practice and the need to 
articulate a separate, professional, actuarial perspective on the matter. 
In our view the right to underwrite is not an issue that should be 
examined solely within our discipline or only from the perspectives 
of the life insurance industry. It is necessary to look at the nature of 
insurance and the role that it plays in SOCiety. The right to underwrite 
can be examined accurately only within this broad context. 
This paper examines the broad issues first to establish a framework 
in which insurance practice can be located. We start by outlining the 
special features of insurance business that may lead public policy mak-
ers to impose restrictions on underwriting practices. We then examine 
alternative concepts of distributive justice and discuss criteria by which 
a risk classification scheme may be judged. After noting the limitations 
of the actuarial perspective on these issues, we conSider the proper role 
of the actuarial profession in underwriting and the broader proper role 
of the actuarial profession in society. 
1 An earlier group of authors, Cummins et aI., (1983), produced a study of risk classi-
fication in life insurance. Their study concentrated mainly on the economic, statistical, 
and practical aspects risk claSSification, and, as such, may not be germane to our dis-
cussion. 
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2 The Nature of Insurance 
2.1 Special Features of the Insurance Industry 
Insurance companies, like all businesses, operate in a social context. 
Within this context, however, insurance (particularly insurance of life, 
health, and disability risks) has a number of special features that dis-
tinguish it from other consumer services. Some of these features may 
lead to a perceived need for special regulation of insurance. 
First, the seller of insurance insists on selecting the customers to 
whom it will sell and on setting different terms for different individ-
ual customers; this is not a familiar phenomenon in mass consumer 
markets. 
Second, the cost of providing the service is not known in advance on 
an individual level. This leads to a fundamental tension in all insurance 
programs between pooling on the one hand and actuarial rating on the 
other. This tension between pooling and pricing means that insurance 
has a dual nature. Insurance is like private savings accounts in its actu-
arial rating features, but it is like public assistance in that payouts are 
made selectively to those who suffer loss. 
Third, insurance is a collective, communal enterprise; it is redis-
tributive in nature. It redirects resources toward those who suffer loss 
and away from those who do not. This feature distinguishes insurance 
both from personal savings for adverse contingencies and from other 
consumer services. Insurance can be made more or less redistributive, 
but it is fundamentally different from other products that do not in-
volve pooling and subsequent redistribution according to need. 
Fourth, insurance against certain contingencies may be an example 
of a merit good (that is, a good that society conSiders should be available 
in certain quantities to all, even to those who do not have the resources 
to purchase it in a market transaction). 
Fifth, insurance may be a social good (that is, the supply of such a 
good generates positive externalities, so that society has an interest in 
ensuring that the good is supplied as widely as possible). The notion of 
a positive externality refers to the benefits arising from the supply of 
the service that accrue to persons other than those to whom the service 
is supplied. For example, the satisfaction and sense of well-being of the 
present authors may be increased by the knowledge that we live in a 
society in which insurance is made available to certain disadvantaged 
groups. (In this example, the positive externality is relatively intangible 
in nature, but this need not necessarily be the case.) 
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Sixth, insurance is unusual because in addition to competing in the 
usual ways for service industries-price, level of service, product dif-
ferentiation, recruitment of employees and agents-the insurers also 
compete in risk selection. An insurer that introduces a new under-
writing procedure that facilitates the exclusion of higher risks from its 
insurance pool gains a competitive advantage over other insurers. This 
selection competition does not contribute to the aggregate welfare of 
consumers as obviously as do other types of competition, e.g., compe-
tition to reduce expenses. It therefore can be argued that public policy 
should be directed toward discouraging this bad competition and pro-
moting the good type of competition, e.g. on expense costs and level 
of service. 
2.2 Insurance as a Merit Good 
Certain types of insurance are merit goods that society considers 
should be available in certain quantities to all irrespective of ability to 
pay. The extent to which particular types of insurance are merit goods 
depends on the availability of alternatives to the particular insurance in 
meeting social needs. For example, in a jurisdiction such as the United 
States where access to adequate medical care is largely dependent on 
the purchase of private insurance, insurance disabilities may lead to 
broader social disabilities. In other jurisdictions such as the United 
Kingdom where a high standard of medical care is guaranteed by the 
state, it is less clear that insurance disabilities lead to social disabilities. 
In such a society insurance may not be a merit good; one mainstream 
political party in the U.K. remains ambivalent about whether it wishes 
to encourage or discourage private medical insurance. 
Medical insurance is not the only form of insurance for which the 
status of the coverage as a merit good is influenced by state benefits. 
The existence and level of state-provided death benefit, disability cover, 
old age pensions, and other welfare benefits also have implications for 
the extent to which the state expects individuals to be able to find pri-
vate insurance to meet various contingencies. 
Another example where private sector insurance disabilities can cre-
ate broader social disabilities is the provision of mortgage coverage or 
home loan business. If lenders generally require such insurance, then 
uninsurable members of society are effectively precluded from home 
ownership and its associated benefits. Some governments have recog-
nized the need to remedy this social disability. For example, in France 
an agreement has been reached between the FFSA (Federation of French 
Insurers) and the Ministries of Trade and Health to provide loan secu-
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rity policies to HIV-infected individuals to reduce and limit these social 
disabilities. 
The relevance of the above examples and the extent to which in-
surance can be viewed as a merit good differ from country to country. 
The trend in recent years in many countries away from state protection 
and toward private insurance, however, has tended to increase the ex-
tent to which insurance is viewed as a merit good. If private insurance 
continues to play an increasing role in meeting social needs, it seems 
likely that society's interest in the social legitimacy of risk classification 
variables will continue to increase. 
Insurance has a number of special features that give it the charac-
teristics of a merit good. Increasingly, this characterization has called 
into question the fairness and social legitimacy of insurance practices. 
In insurance, however, the concepts of fairness and social legitimacy 
are not straightforward. 
3 Fairness and Social Legitimacy in Insurance 
3.1 Notions of Fairness 
Actuaries traditionally have argued that underwriting is justifiably 
unequal. This defense assumes that all forms of cross-subsidization 
are inherently wrong: "[I]t represents an unfair charge to one individual 
or group to subsidize another individual or group" (Paddon, 1990, p. 
1363). 
Many non-actuarial commentators take the opposite stand. They 
argue that, in reality, society may prefer equality to equity (or, more 
accurately, society may prefer equality of outcome rather than equality 
of assessment). Actuarial fairness may be seen as seeking to place the 
costs of misfortune on the unfortunate, a notion of fairness that non-
actuarial commentators may regard as rather eccentric (O'Neill, 1997). 
How do we decide between these views? The choice between alter-
native views of fairness is essentially a question of social philosophy. It 
is not an actuarial question, and actuarial science is of little assistance 
in answering the question. 
Probably the most influential concept of fairness over the last 25 
years has been that proposed by the Canadian philosopher John Rawls 
(1972). Rawls' seminal book runs mote than 600 pages and has spawned 
an extensive literature; here we can do no more than sketch the central 
concepts. 
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There are two aspects to the Rawlsian notion of fairness: the prin-
ciple of greatest equal freedom and the principle of difference. (There 
is also a principle of equality of opportunity, but that does not pertain 
to the issues that we consider here.) The first principle, the principle of 
greatest equal freedom, says that each person or organization should 
have the widest possible freedom, but only to the extent that is com-
patible with the possession of equal freedom by other persons. The 
second principle, the principle of difference, says that inequalities may 
be justified, provided that they make even the poorest members of a 
society better off than they would otherwise have been. Rawls argues 
that these principles will be acceptable to all if they place themselves 
behind a veil of ignorance; that is, they assume that when chOOSing 
the principles by which society should operate, they do not know what 
position in society they occupy. 
It is not obvious from the Rawlsian perspective that fairness in in-
surance must mean equal treatment for equal risks. Nor is it obvi-
ous that the life insurers' unfettered freedom to underwrite as advo-
cated by Leigh (1996) is consistent with Rawlsianjustice. Such freedom 
for insurance companies may have adverse effects on the freedom of 
individuals-for example, if this freedom for insurers prevents individ-
uals from obtaining adequate health care. In most societies the sick and 
disabled include some of the poorest individuals. It is difficult to see 
how their exclusion from insurance risk pools can make these individ-
uals better off than they otherwise would have been. The freedom-to-
underwrite principle may fail to satisfy either facet of Rawlsian justice. 
The Rawlsian perspective is only one view of justice, albeit an influ-
ential one; there are a number of alternatives. Some views place a higher 
emphasis on merit or reward consequent upon individual choice, and 
could be employed in defense of underwriting variables that society 
perceives are linked to individual choices (e.g., smoking status). 
Other ethical theories may offer more support for the paradigm of 
conventional risk classification-although these theories, unlike many 
apologists for the insurance industry, generally do not claim to be con-
cerned with fairness. 
For example, the principle of utilitarianism-"the greatest good for 
the greatest number" -can be seen as supporting the exclusion of a mi-
nority of persons from insurance pools. Any utilitarian calculus, how-
ever, requires weighting the benefit enjoyed by those able to purchase 
insurance marginally more cheaply against the harm suffered by those 
excluded from insurance. In jurisdictions where buying insurance is 
the means for obtaining adequate health care or other merit goods, ex-
clusion from insurance can cause great harm to the indiVidual. It is not 
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obvious that great and fundamental harm to a few is outweighed by a 
marginal price benefit for many. 
It would be easier to defend current practice if the insurance indus-
try took steps to ameliorate the worst harms caused by risk classifica-
tion; for example, the industry could establish industry-wide pools to 
cover otherwise uninsurable risks. This approach has been followed in 
a number of countries, sometimes at the insistence of government and 
sometimes on a voluntary basis. 
3.2 Social Consent to Insurance Practices 
Another feature of a merit good is that it is widely perceived as a 
good thing. This is true of life insurance, and the industry's sales de-
pend on this perception. But what happens if life insurance comes to be 
seen as undeSirable because it is discriminatory? Experience in other 
markets suggests that consumer perceptions on ethical issues can have 
a major impact on business. For example, certain U.K. banks suffered 
considerable loss of business in the 1980s because of consumer boy-
cotts motivated by the banks' perceived continuing involvement in, and 
impliCit support of, the apartheid regime in South Africa. Consumer ac-
tivism also has had an increasing impact on environmental issues. For 
example, in 1995 the Shell Oil Company was forced to abandon its plans 
for sinking its Brent Spar oil rig at sea because of a consumer boycott in 
several European countries, despite the SCientific evidence on the mer-
its of deep sea disposal as opposed to other decommissioning options 
(such as on-shore dismantling). 
In both cases the companies initially disparaged criticism as the 
work of pressure groups, rather as some underwriters today dispar-
age criticism of their unfettered right to underwrite. Yet in both cases 
the companies were eventually made to look foolish, being forced to re-
verse positions in which they had invested financial and political capital 
because of an increasing flood of public comment. 
While these examples do not necessarily imply that the insurance 
industry will be forced to follow a similar course, they do represent 
a warning of the possible consequences for any business that fails to 
respond to changes in social opinion. 
3.3 Social Legitimacy of Risk ClaSSification Variables 
The fairness of insurance classification procedures is a question ex-
tending beyond actuarial science. It is not surprising that many non-
132 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 5, No.1, 1997 
actuarial authors have considered the question of what determines the 
legitimacy of a risk classification variable. 
For example, Abraham (1985, p. 442) argues that classification vari-
ables may be suspect for any of the following reasons. 
• A particular characteristic may be used improperly in other fields 
and is therefore objectionable on symbolic grounds. For example, 
women often are discriminated against in an economic context, 
and, therefore, gender is suspect as a classification variable. In-
surers ideally would like to disassociate risk classification from 
the use of the same variables to stigmatize particular groups, but 
this can be difficult to achieve-particularly because insurers play 
many roles (e.g., as employers) outside the context of an insurance 
contract. 
• There may not be enough data to justify the classification. 
• Some variables may be used only to the disadvantage of certain 
groups and never to their advantage. An example in insurance 
is the underwriting of medically impaired lives for life insurance 
without a corresponding allowance in annuity prices offered. 
Wortham (1986, p. 417) proposes seven criteria for assessing rating 
factors (with translation into statistical terminology where appropri-
ate): 
• Statistical power. The probability of accepting a life on terms that 
would not be used if all relevant facts were known should be as 
small as possible. 
• Statistical size. The probability of rejecting a life that would be 
accepted on the terms proposed if all relevant facts were known 
should be as small as possible. 
• Causality. Classification factors for which a causal explanation 
can be given are preferred to factors for which the link is purely a 
statistical correlation and there is no apparent causal explanation. 
• Incentives to loss reduction. Classification factors that provide 
incentives for the policyholder to reduce the risk of losses are 
socially beneficial. For example, if cigarette smoking is viewed as 
a matter of free choice rather than an addiction, then classification 
by smoker or nonsmoker status provides such an incentive. 
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• Controllability. This criterion is a pre-condition for the previous 
criterion. A classification variable cannot provide an incentive to 
loss reduction unless it is to some extent controlled by the in-
sured. 
• Compatibility with social values. This criterion relates to the use 
or abuse of the classification variable in other contexts. If a vari-
able is misused or has been misused to disadvantage particular 
groups, the use of the variable in insurance may be tainted by as-
sociation. This situation prevails in many countries with regard 
to racial discrimination in insurance. 
• Are alternatives to private insurance available? The existence of 
such alternatives may result in insurance classifications being of 
lesser concern for public policy. 
Probably only the first two of these criteria (the statistical criteria) 
normally would be considered in any actuarial analysis to determine 
an appropriate rating structure. This does not mean that the actuarial 
approach is wrong, but it does mean that it is incomplete. 
3.4 Limitations of the Actuarial Perspective 
To illustrate our view that the actuarial perspective on underwriting 
is incomplete, it is instructive to review how actuaries have defined 
underwriting. 
One such definition of underwriting or risk classification is that it is 
"the process of grouping risks with similar risk characteristics so as to 
appropriately recognize differences in cost" (Paddon, 1990, p. 1362). 
Implicit in this definition is a concept of how we should appropri-
ately recognize differences in cost. What is appropriate depends on 
the relative merits of equity and eqUality. The definition implies that-
in the market for life insurance, at least-equity is a more desirable 
outcome than eqUality. Unlike some other actuaries writing about un-
derwriting, however, Paddon does acknowledge this choice: "As actu-
aries we do not oppose equality in and of itself. However the means 
by which [equality] is increased can have unanticipated consequences, 
and in some cases results quite opposite of those intended" (1990, p. 
1365). 
But actuaries are not the only persons who have access to determin-
ing what is fair and what is not. Lawyers, medical practitioners, under-
writers, and policy makers all have their own different interpretations 
about fairness in insurance. 
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Another reason why the actuarial perspective on fairness in insur-
ance is incomplete is that actuaries tend to consider fairness only from 
the point of view of existing policyholders. But the issue of distributive 
justice can be viewed (Stone, 1990, p. 393) from inside the circle of pol-
icyholders or from the vantage point of people who are already ill who 
are not policyholders. From a societal perspective, the persons who 
need life insurance most (Le., those who are already ill) are precisely 
the individuals whom, from within the circle of policyholders, it is eco-
nomically necessary and fair to exclude. This conflict between views of 
fairness from alternative vantage points is the crux of disagreements 
over fairness in insurance. 
4 The Actuarial ProfeSSion's Role in Underwriting 
Underwriting is not a scientific discipline; underwriters frequently 
use intuition and experience in making decisions. In principle, the con-
tribution made by actuaries in establishing the statistical justifications 
for particular underwriting processes can be seen as scientific. In some 
cases, however, the scientific basis of actuaries' underwriting recom-
mendations is difficult to discern. 
The demands of practical work necessitate the use of some approx-
imations. But in South Africa, for example, there has been an alarming 
trend for risk classification schemes dependent on factors that have 
not been properly investigated. Truyens (1993, p. 9), referring to the 
post-April 27, 1994 changes in South Africa, asked whether income-
based and education-based rate differentiation would be outlawed as 
irrational discrimination. He feared that unless the South African in-
surance industry could produce actuarial statistics to justify such dif-
ferentiation, that it would be deemed irrational discrimination. Many 
antidiscrimination laws (for example, in New Zealand, the EU, and the 
United States) make specific provision for waiver on the grounds of 
actuarially justifiable statistics. But if actuaries term particular con-
clusions "actuarially justifiable" when they are based on suspect foun-
dations as alluded to by Truyens, their credibility with public policy 
makers will be eroded. 
The credibility of the profeSSion also depends on our acknowledg-
ing legitimate non-actuarial concerns pertaining to underwriting pro-
cedures. The policy statements of other actuarial bodies recognize 
some of the issues associated with the social acceptability of under-
writing. For example, the Institute of Actuaries of Australia (1994) has 
stated that where chosen risk classification factors have been found to 
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be no longer significant or to be socially unacceptable, they have been 
removed. They also acknowledge that actuaries need to review con-
tinually the factors that they choose in order to "reflect the effect of 
emerging statistics and changing social attitudes." 
But the actuarial profession needs to recognize that although actu-
aries establish the statistical justification for particular underwriting 
processes, the decision to implement them is a commercial decision 
taken by life offices in view of other social forces. This distinction be-
tween the role of the actuary as a professional and that of the industry is 
crucial if national actuarial associations wish to be regarded as profes-
sions (as opposed to trade unions of life insurance company employees 
or technicians). 
Although our focus has been classification factors that society finds 
unacceptable, societal preferences also can have the opposite effect. 
For example, if insurers had chosen not to recognize smoking as an 
underwriting variable, this position might have been difficult to sustain 
in light of increasing public recognition (and disapproval) of the effects 
of smoking on mortality. 
5 The Actuarial Profession's Role in Society 
The previous section concerns the role of the actuarial profession 
in underwriting. In this section we broaden the discussion to consider 
the proper role of the profession in society and the requirements that 
actuaries must meet if society is to regard the actuarial profession as 
one worthy of public trust and respect. 
Two over-arching requirements for the ongoing social acceptance of 
professions are those of independence and social benefiCiation. 
5.1 Independence 
It is necessary to distinguish the role of the actuary as a scientist 
and professional and her (or his) role as a life insurance company em-
ployee. As a scientist and as a professional the actuary is constrained 
by responsibilities more stringent than those that affe<;t life insurance 
companies. Life insurance companies can be assumed to act in a way 
that preserves their interests and position in society. If an associa-
tion of individual actuaries aligns itself too closely with such vested 
interests, however, the association risks compromising its professional 
identity and integrity. 
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One of the key roles of a profession is to be able to articulate both 
sides of a debate-to observe the pros and cons of any given course of 
action. According to Paddon (1990, p. 1365): " ... we have a responsibil-
ity to encourage those who make public policy to understand the impact 
of a proposal or decision." In recent years the actuarial profession has 
not played this role well, at least not with respect to underwriting. The 
contribution of actuaries generally has been to act as partisan defend-
ers of the life insurance industry. 
While actuaries may side with life insurers on particular issues, the 
maintenance of professional status depends on actuaries being per-
ceived as capable of distinguishing a professional viewpoint from the 
commercial viewpoint of the life insurance industry. 
In a number of countries actuaries' status as professionals is ques-
tionable because of actuaries' inability or unwillingness to maintain this 
distinction. In South Africa, for example, the problem is exacerbated 
by the fact that in recent years the profession has had no input in im-
portant social and legal processes, instead choosing to subsume its re-
sponses to those of the Life Offices' Association (LOA). In effect, the 
message is that the views of the South African actuarial profession are 
identical to those held by the LOA. 
This apparent lack of independence is potentially damaging not only 
to professional status, but also to the profession's prospects for ex-
pansion. If actuaries are seen as being uniquely identified with the life 
insurance industry, in the longer term this perceived lack of indepen-
dence can only hinder the growth and expansion of the profession. 
5.2 Social Beneficiation 
Independence is a necessary, but not suffiCient, condition for the 
maintenance of professional status. A second requirement for the long-
term surVival of a profession is that of social beneficiation. By this we 
mean that the work that we do as professionals should add value to 
SOciety. 
Some actuaries would argue that performing traditional actuarial 
roles in life insurance companies and pension funds is sufficient for this 
purpose. If society decides to reevaluate the way in which the insurance 
business operates, however, the actuarial profession may come under 
scrutiny too. If actuaries are seen to be capable only of defending the 
rights of the life insurance industry and its current policyholders, it is 
possible that actuaries will be seen as life insurance technicians with 
no other role than performing prescribed calculations and lobbying for 
those institutions. 
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An alternative is to view the social responsibility of the actuary as 
extending beyond these institutions. Such an approach would not be 
merely altruistic. By demonstrating its ability to look beyond the short-
term interests of its principal employers, the profession could increase 
the possibility of expanding and developing its professional influence 
into other areas. 
6 Summary and Conclusion 
Insurance underwriting, like all business practices, operates in a so-
cial context. Insurance has a number of distinguishing features that 
give it some of the features of a merit good (that is, a good that society 
considers should be available in certain quantities even to those who do 
not have the resources to purchase it in a private market transaction) 
and some of the features of a social good (that is, a good the supply of 
which generates positive externalities). 
The importance of these features depends on the extent to which 
social needs are met by private insurance. If the insurance industry 
wants an increasing social role for private insurance and the associated 
opportunities for profit, it must accept that society will take a greater 
interest in the social legitimacy of risk classification procedures. The 
alternative is for the industry to decline this increased social role and 
retreat into a more limited position in which its risk classification pro-
cedures will be of less concern to society. 
Actuaries should recognize that the actuarial perspective on fair-
ness in insurance claSSification has its limitations and that actuaries 
are not the only arbiters of fairness. The acceptability of underwrit-
ing procedures is societally determined, and a profession that fails to 
recognize and make allowances for this may find itself ostracized and 
increasingly ignored. 
It should be possible for actuaries to take a different position from 
that of their principal employers in the debate on underwriting and in 
other debates where corporate and professional views are not neces-
sarily congruent. Unless actuaries are perceived as being capable of 
holding a different view-whether they do so in practice or not-the 
professional status of the actuarial profession could come under threat. 
If actuaries are to survive as a profession-one that actively engages 
in debate and the expansion of knowledge and that is aware of its re-
sponsibilities to society-actuaries must challenge themselves about 
what it means to be an actuary, as opposed to an employee of a life 
insurance company. 
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Discussion of T.A. Moultrie and R.G. Thomas's 
''The Right to Underwrite? An Actuarial Perspective 
With a Difference" 
Charles L. Trowbridge* 
This interesting but controversial paper studies a subject I too have 
seriously considered. Nearly a decade ago I was commissioned to pre-
pare a monograph that appeared in 1989 under the auspices of the 
Actuarial Education and Research Fund under the title Fundamental 
Concepts of Actuarial Science. 1 Chapter VII of this work, "Classification, 
Selection, and Antiselection," claims that the cluster of ideas surround-
ing these three words form a fundamental actuarial concept. 
I have recently reviewed this monograph (hereinafter FCAS) and am 
struck by the dissimilarities between the two treatments. The authors 
of "The Right to Underwrite?" (RTU) were unaware of my work, and I 
mean this in no derogatory sense. FCAS does not appear in the usual 
literature search, particularly one undertaken from overseas. 
This discussion will be an outline of the points at which FCAS and 
RTU differ. I will paraphrase, avoiding detail and concentrating on the 
essentials. I highlight the important differences by considering only the 
three questions stated below. 
* Charles L. Trowbridge, F.S.A., was employed by Bankers life Company (now the Prin-
cipal Mutual Life) immediately after receiving his M.A. degree in 1938 and has remained 
with the company until his retirement in 1979. For thirty months in the early 1970's 
he was chief actuary of Social Security Administration of the u.s. For four years in the 
early 1980's he was professor of actuarial science at the University of Michigan. 
Mr. Trowbridge has served on the Society of Actuaries (SOA) Board of Governors for 
nine years, including a term as President (1975). He has written extensively for the 
Transactions of the Society of Actuaries and for other actuarial, insurance, and business 
publications, and has served as the editor of the SOA's publication The Actuary. 
Mr. Trowbridge's address is: 8115A 58th Ave. SE, Olympia WA 98503, USA. Internet 
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Why Do Insurance Companies Underwrite? 
Chapter VII of FCAS states that insurance companies underwrite not 
because of any specific concept of fairness and not because they have a 
right or freedom to do so, but because they must. If insurance prospects 
have choices about whether to buy, in what amount, and from whom, 
they can be expected to act in their perceived self interest and antiselect 
against the collective. Underwriting has no other purpose than self-
protection. (To emphas~ze this point, FCAS notes that the predominant 
forms of life insurance protection, at least in North America, are those 
where such chOices are not given, where antis election is minimal, and 
where und~rwriting disappears). 
RTU, on the other hand, does not mention antiselection. RTU has 
no clear answer to the question, though at one point RTU suggests that 
the purpose of underwriting is the creation of a competitive advantage 
for the insurer. I am troubled by the antiselection omission. Do the 
authors of RTU believe that antis election does not exist or that it can 
be disregarded? 
What Is the Relationship Between Underwriting and the Actu-
arial Profession? 
FCAS treats the cluster of ideas surrounding classification, selec-
tion, and antiselection as one of a handful of fundamental actuarial 
concepts. Sound classification systems have a statistical component, 
but FCAS recognizes that SOCially oriented considerations also can be 
important. While actuaries have no monopoly in the design of clas-
sification systems, they do have expertise. This expertise may lie in 
the ability to examine all aspects of a difficult problem. Classification 
systems in use today are products of actuarial thinking tempered by 
actuarial experience. 
RTU, on the other hand, views the relationship differently. The ac-
tuarial approach is defined only statistically. After defining the term so 
narrowly, however, RTU says that the actuarial approach is incomplete. 
Do Life Company Actuaries Have a Professional Obligation to 
Speak Out When They Disagree With the Company's Classifi-
cation System? 
RTU seems to answer this question with a resounding yes. The au-
thors of RTU clearly and honestly speak and suggest that others should 
do the same. 
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FCAS is silent on this question. If forced, the author of FCAS might 
reply as follows. The views of the insurance industry and of the ac-
tuarial profession on classification are similar. Both realize there are 
no perfect solutions to this difficult matter, and both are searching for 
better answers, especially in areas where statistical and social consid-
erations conflict. If any person, actuary or otherwise, has constructive 
ideas on how classification methods for any financial security system 
can be improved, these ideas should be well received. These ideas, 
however, must recognize the world as it is, not as we wish it were. 
William R. Lane* 
The authors raise a number of issues that are legitimate societal 
concerns today. Several points, however, are worth noting. 
Two Types of Insurance 
The authors rightly determine that the distinction between insur-
ance as a merit good and insurance as a social good is important. But 
they do not differentiate forms of insurance. 
Certain types of insurance are largely all-or-none propositions. A 
person either has or doesn't have medical insurance. While a huge spec-
trum of provisions to medical insurance (such as deductibles, coinsur-
ance, and restrictions applicable to managed care provider networks) 
exists, a central question remains: Does the level of benefits available 
to insureds allow them access to medical care services for all types of 
injuries and illnesses? Under these circumstances, the issue of whether 
insurance is a merit good becomes a critical question. If society deems 
access to medical care services to be a merit good (in other words, avail-
able without regard to ability to pay), then medical insurance also must 
be considered as a merit good. It is important to note that the cost of 
* William R. Lane, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., is prinCipal for Heartland Actuarial Consulting, LLe. 
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dollars in premium. He has been Group Actuary for several other companies including 
Guarantee Life, Protective Life, and Time Insurance. 
Mr. Lane is vice chairman of the Health Benefits Research Committee for the Society 
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medical insurance with a $100,000 maximum benefit and the cost of 
medical insurance with a $10 million maximum benefit is not signifi-
cantly different. The preponderance of the cost of medical insurance is 
determined by the benefits that most persons consider to be basic to the 
insurance (such as covering most of the cost of hospital and physician 
services). 
Other types of insurance are incremental. For example, a person 
may have $10,000 of life insurance, or $25,000 of insurance, or $10 
million of life insurance. While it may be argued that a minimum level 
of life insurance is a merit good (at least as long as the individual has 
dependents who rely on the individual for income), it would be difficult 
to argue the same point for $10 million of insurance. In this case the 
cost for $10 million of insurance is essentially 1,000 times the cost 
of a $10,000 policy. Thus, for life insurance, if one is to argue that 
it constitutes a merit good, then one also must determine how much 
coverage is required as a social necessity. 
The two concepts, all-or-none and incremental, are not mutually ex-
clusive. For example, disability income replacement is largely an all-or-
none proposition with regard to the types of disabilities covered, but 
the benefit amount is incremental. Life insurance, if offered, rarely ex-
cludes specific conditions after the contestable period. Thus, the issue 
of what causes of death are covered is usually not significant. Given 
the trend to ever increasing deductibles for medical insurance, it also 
has an element of incremental benefit levels. 
Incremental benefits can be considered a merit good only to the 
extent that the level of benefits is appropriate. Hence, the debate for 
such benefits must begin with a question of what level of benefit is 
under discussion. All-or-none benefits, however, beg the issue of their 
social necessity; the question of whether the coverage constitutes a 
merit good is critical. Hence, any discussion of whether society should 
require insurance products to be available should begin by limiting the 
discussion to those products that are merit goods, and that will require 
for some forms of insurance a discussion of how much coverage is a 
social requirement and how much is a personal decision. 
An Actuarial Issue 
The authors claim that "the choice between alternative views of fair-
ness ... is not an actuarial question." I strongly disagree. Offering 
a good as a merit good requires redistribution of revenue. When the 
good is purchased on a voluntary basis, knowledgeable persons resist 
the purchase to the extent they perceive the price of the good has been 
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increased by such redistribution to the point that the value of the good 
to the individual is no longer worth the cost. All forms of insurance 
require redistribution. That is the chief purpose of insurance. But in-
dividuals, when viewing such a voluntary transaction, make a personal 
determination if the cost of redistribution is worth the value of the 
benefit obtained by the insurance. 
The question then arises: At what point does offering insurance on a 
voluntary basis become financially impossible (in other words, the prod-
uct is incapable of statistically providing a profit that at least equals the 
cost of capital) when legislation or social expectations have required the 
insurer to consider the product as a merit good? 
While the understanding and financial modeling of individual selec-
tion of insurance is not an exact science, it is within the province of 
the actuary. No other profession is as well equipped to understand 
and evaluate these financial mechanics as the actuary. This issue has 
been explored in the context of various insurance coverages within the 
United States. It is professionally challenging, but cannot be considered 
as strictly a question of social philosophy. 
For many years medical insurance in the United States was relatively 
inexpensive and was offered by many Blue Cross and Blue Shield orga-
nizations as essentially a merit good. Individuals and employers were 
largely not underwritten, and prices were rarely, if ever, related to the 
individual risk. As the cost of medical coverage rose, however, the will-
ingness of individuals and employers to finanCially support this redis-
tribution of revenue declined. Providers of medical insurance, includ-
ing Blue Cross and Blue Shield, were faced with the issue of accepting 
prospects for coverage and basing the price of coverage on the expected 
cost of coverage or going out of business due to bankruptcy. 
This change in underwriting culminated in a national debate over 
health care reform. At the crux of that debate was the issue of whether 
medical insurance was a merit good. (Albeit the term was rarely if ever 
used by the popular press.) I participated in this debate in several ways. 
In the United States actuaries vigorously discussed all sides of the ques-
tion. Those actuaries who strongly favored considering medical insur-
ance as a merit good were forced to bring actuaries into the debate 
because a merit good loses it value if it can't be finanCially supported. 
In other words, the actuarial question of how to financially support a 
voluntarily purchased merit good had to be answered; public policy re-
sisted legislation that restricted the insurance providers in their ability 
to underwrite and differentiate in price based on risk. 
146 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 5, No.1, 1997 
Simply because society wishes for something to be available at a 
given price doesn't make it possible. A law requiring luxury cars to 
be sold for $100 each would not make them more available. It sim-
ply would mean that no luxury cars would be sold to anyone. Though 
insurance is more complex than a luxury car, the result of outlawing un-
derwriting would produce the same result: no insurance, as we know it 
today, would be sold. 
Actuaries have an important role in helping the general public un-
derstand the ramifications that such decisions produce. Actuaries also 
have a critical role in the financial modeling of such restrictions and the 
development of alternate approaches that balance the financial needs 
of the insurers with society's desire to make insurance available to alL 
It has been my experience in this country that many actuaries have con-
tributed to this debate and have reflected all sides of the questions at 
hand. 
Authors' Reply to Discussion 
We thank the discussants for their comments and suggestions. We 
are grateful to Mr. Trowbridge for drawing our attention to his mono-
graph, which contains a broader treatment than is typical in actuarial 
accounts of underwriting. 
Mr. Trowbridge asked if we believed that anti-selection does not ex-
ist. That anti-selection can and does occur in voluntary insurance is 
not in dispute. The extent to which it occurs, and whether its occur-
rence Significantly impairS the viability of private insurance, however, 
are strictly empirical questions for which the answers will differ accord-
ing to the class of insurance, the rating factors concerned, and over 
time. For many classes of insurance, some degree of anti-selection may 
be regarded as socially optimal according to Rawlsian or other public 
choice criteria. More prosaically, the occurrence of some degree of anti-
selection may maximize public acceptance of the insurance mechanism 
(as noted by Mr. Lane in the context of medical insurance). 
In the light of our brief excursions into social philosophy, both dis-
cussants were concerned to reclaim risk classification as a largely if not 
exclusively actuarial matter. According to Mr. Trowbridge, actuaries' 
expertise may lie in their ability to examine all aspects of a difficult 
problem. Actuaries have a statistical and financial training, but they 
typically have little knowledge of social philosophy or ethics and no 
professional interest in, or concern for, persons who are harmed by 
underwriting practice. Even if actuaries might be capable of examining 
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all aspects of the problem, there are other constraints that make them 
reluctant to do so; as Mr. Trowbridge notes, the views of actuaries on 
underwriting are usually conveniently aligned to those of their principal 
employers. 
Finally, we were exhorted to recognize the world as it is, not as we 
wish it were. The world as it is to whom? To actuaries ensconced com-
fortably in the insurance industry, or to those whom actuaries would 
exclude from medical insurance in the name of the principle of actu-
arial fairness? The acceptability of the world as it is depends on from 
where it is viewed. 

